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The question of Puerto Rican status has never ceased to be
debated by the people of the Caribbean island since it was acquired
by the United States in 1898. Why, then, begin the study in 1936?
The date represents the beginnings of a significant departure in
the debate. The murder of Col. E. Francis Riggs, the Tydings
independence bill, and the split in the Liberal party created conditions for the birth of the Partido Popular Democrdtico, the party
of Luis Mufi.oz Marin that was to deviate from the "either independence or statehood" approach and to implement the Commonwealth. The study traces the development of the new status up
to 1968.
Puerto Rico achieved rapid progress in its political autonomy
within the scope of the study. The major portion of the book is
devoted to its discussion. The formulation and implementation
of the Commonwealth status, however, is highlighted, for it is
within this brilliant and unique experiment in federalism that
the Puerto Ricans have attempted to accommodate their economic
needs and wants and to satisfy their sense of dignidad. Its great
merit, of course, is that it is not irrevocable. If in the future Puerto
Ricans should decide upon some other form of status arrangement, they can draw upon the fruits of past debate on the question.
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Kansas Open Books Foreword

Writing this foreword has been a privilege because, as one
who was born in Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico, and raised in the
Bronx and Brooklyn, New York, and Trenton, New Jersey, I take
to heart the complexities surrounding the more-than-a-centurylong relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico.
Although I was born in a US colonial territory with its own proud
and extensive cultural and political history, I also inherited US
citizenship through the Jones Act of 1917. As such, identifying
as a Puerto Rican with US citizenship has endowed me with the
curiosity to learn more about and simultaneously celebrate two
distinctive cultural traditions. In fact, growing up in the northeastern parts of the United States, I was often encouraged to
embrace both my American national identity (constitutional/
historical roots) and Puerto Rican cultural identity (sociocultural/historical heritage) equally. I, therefore, found it necessary
to study more about how and why Puerto Rico was so deeply intertwined socially, politically, and economically with the United
States despite not being a state. Rather, Puerto Rico was deemed
“foreign in a domestic sense” as stated in the Supreme Court
case Downes v. Bidwell (1901). With this pronouncement and
subsequent Insular Cases (1901–1922), a new constitutional
xi
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xii
GRFWULQH DQ H[WUDFRQVWLWXWLRQDO OHJDO ÀFWLRQ  ZDV ERUQ GHYHOoped, and applied to Puerto Rico and other “acquired” overseas
territories: the concept of “unincorporated territory” that came
with limited federal constitutional protections for both the territory and its inhabitants.1
Puerto Rico, the jewel of the Caribbean Sea, has been seeking a stable form of political status since at least 1898. Over the
past one-hundred-plus years since the island (or archipelago)
was “acquired” by the US government after signing the Treaty
of Paris (1898) with Spain, scholars have attempted to make
sense of this symbiotic or perhaps dialectical relationship between two culturally distinctive peoples. Within the past twenty
years, for example, there have been a number of notable books,
journal articles, essays, memoirs, biographies and autobiographies, among others,2 that address, among many other topics,
Puerto Rico’s political and constitutional status and its social
and economic implications. These works, written mostly by
Puerto Rican scholars, provide diverse analytical approaches to
the politics over status and beyond while highlighting the subsequent overseas’ expansion of US imperialist power since the
Spanish-Cuban-American War (1895–1898) and through the
HDUO\WZHQW\ÀUVWFHQWXU\
Surendra Bhana in his now classic book The United States
and the Development of the Puerto Rican Status Question, 1936–
1968, traced the historical, institutional, and political development of Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status that in 1952 granted
the island more political autonomy but still placed it under US
FRQJUHVVLRQDO SOHQDU\ DXWKRULW\ %KDQD·V ERRN ÀUVW SXEOLVKHG
in 1975, remains one of the most readable and well-documented
historical narratives on mid-twentieth-century US–Puerto Rico
affairs. The book provides a unique outsider’s perspective.
Bhana wrote not as an American or a Puerto Rican but rather
as an Indian who lived for over forty years in South Africa under apartheid. His extensive knowledge and experience in dealing with the notion of white supremacy, internal ethnic identity
IRUPDWLRQUHIRUPDWLRQDQGFRQÁLFWDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQ
politics and the power of personal spiritual growth and morality
allowed him to closely and impartially examine how and why
Puerto Rico’s current commonwealth status developed the way
it did under the leadership of Luis Muñoz Marín and the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) in the mid-twentieth century.
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xiii
Muñoz Marín stands at the center of Bhana’s historical account,
both as the architect of the commonwealth idea (a compromise
position between statehood and independence) and as the main
negotiator between the US federal government and the colonial government in Puerto Rico in the late 1930s through early
1960s. Bhana writes about Muñoz Marín’s views and short- and
long-term strategies in this period:
Even though Muñoz Marín succeeded in winning for Puerto Rico
a great amount of autonomy in 1952, the political agitation that
surrounded the status issue continued. The Puerto Rican leader
claimed the Commonwealth to be more than it really was. To him
it was voluntary association with the United States, with features
that could be the basis of a permanent relationship between the
island and the mainland. It was really, however, a unique constitutional arrangement growing from the earlier pattern established
by the Foraker Act [in 1901] and the Jones Act [of 1917], with one
FUXFLDOO\LPSRUWDQWIHDWXUHXQFKDQJHG³QDPHO\&RQJUHVVKDGÀnal say in matters concerning Puerto Rico. (5)
Indeed, Muñoz Marín stated on a number of occasions his
TXDOLÀHG RSSRVLWLRQ WR HLWKHU VWDWHKRRG RU LQGHSHQGHQFH 2QH
such occasion was at a roundtable conference at the University
of Chicago . . . in July 1943, when he expressed his desire to
see the “colonial” status ended, but ruled out independence and
statehood on economic grounds. It was more realistic, he argued,
to work for an elective governor at the time. (74)

Many, including this writer, have argued that the continuing colonial relationship between the United States and Puerto
Rico became entrenched over a twenty-plus-year period in
the mid-twentieth century despite attempts at expanding liberal self-government and industrial economic opportunities on
the island, as Bhana showed in his study. This entrenchment
occurred gradually—from the so-called Operation Bootstrap, a
New Deal–inspired economic policy in 1947, the Elective Governors Act (1947), the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act (1950),
the Commonwealth Constitution in 1952, and subsequent ÀUVW
status referendum in 1967—none of these advances changed
the precarious political status of Puerto Rico nor its economic
dependency on the United States.
7RGD\ ZLWK D GHFDGHORQJ ÀQDQFLDO DQG HFRQRPLF FULVLV
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xiv
major hurricanes (Irma and Maria in 2017) and most recently
earthquakes (2019–2020) in and around the historic city of
Guanica,3 Puerto Rico is once again in the national and international spotlight as a subject of interest for journalists, politicians, academics and ordinary people alike.4 Although some
may now know that Puerto Ricans are US citizens (though with
second-class standing and limited political rights on the island),
there remains confusion over the island’s territorial status. As
these events surrounding Puerto Rico reach levels of humanitarian crises, more and more people continue to inquire who
or what has control over the island’s recovery efforts and seek
broader clarity on Puerto Rico’s exact political and constitutional
status in relation to the United States. Is Puerto Rico a colony,
a protectorate, a kind of state-like entity, an unincorporated territory, a dominion, or an independent nation-state? In order to
understand what is happening in Puerto Rico today, we must
begin by attending to the historical development of the island’s
political status (and the Commonwealth Constitution).
The United States and the Development of the Puerto Rican
Status Question, 1936–1968, is relevant today because it reveals
in detail why Puerto Rico and its ongoing humanitarian crises—
political, social, and economic—may not be inseparable from
its long and complex relationship with the United States. Bhana’s book was written in a thoughtful, fair, and critical manner,
drawing on local, regional, and national archival materials and
the personal papers and close conversations with those actors
depicted in this study (e.g., Luis Muñoz Marín). The book traces
the historical strategic alliances behind the political development of Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status that continues not
only to structure island party politics but also to inform when
DQG KRZ WKH 86 JRYHUQPHQW FKRRVHV WR LQWHUYHQH DIWHU DQ\ Ànancial, social, or humanitarian crises now and into the future.
Carlos Figueroa
Ithaca, New York
February 2020
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Notes to Foreword

1. “Puerto Rico is not an independent country but rather an unincorporated territory under the plenary power of the US Congress.” Yes,
“Puerto Rico is under the absolute sovereign control of the US federal
government for its ÀQDQFLDODQGHFRQRPLFYLDELOLW\, which directly affects
its political and social life.” Carlos Figueroa, “The Puerto Rico Crisis: A
5HÁHFWLRQRID)ODZHG86'HPRFUDF\µFair Observer, August 27, 2019,
https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/puerto-rico-us
-territory-ricardo-rossello-world-news-34709/
2. José Trías Monge, Puerto Rico: The Trials of the Oldest Colony
in the World (1997); Pedro A. Malavet, America’s Colony: The Political
DQG&XOWXUDO&RQÁLFWEHWZHHQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG3XHUWR5LFR(2004);
César J. Ayala and Rafael Bernabe, Puerto Rico in the American Century: A History since 1898 (2007); Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A.
Scarano, eds., Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern
American State (2009); Nelson A. Denis, War against All Puerto Ricans:
Revolution and Terror in America’s Colony (2015); Jorge Duany, Puerto
Rico: What Everyone Needs to Know (2017); and Ed Morales, Fantasy
Island: Colonialism, Exploitation, and the Betrayal of Puerto Rico (2019),
as well as articles published in Centro: Journal of the Center for Puerto
Rican Studies.
3. Ironically, Guanica, was also the city where the US Navy invaded Puerto Rico in 1898 during the Spanish-American War.
4. “In 2016, then-US President Barack Obama signed into law
the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act

xv
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xvi
(PROMESA), a measure responsible for ‘restructuring [the island’s]
debt, and [expediting] procedures for approving critical infrastructure
projects’ in Puerto Rico. Ironically, or perhaps euphemistically, the
word promesa in Spanish means promise. In this case, the US federal
government expected Puerto Rico to keep its promise of paying ‘back’
its loans on time and with interest. Unfortunately, Rosselló’s government defaulted on about $2 million, exacerbating further the spiraling
ÀVFDO LQVWDELOLW\ RI WKH LVODQG 3ULRU WR WKHVH FOLPDWH FKDQJH²LQGXFHG
hurricane disasters, Puerto Rico had been in the midst of a long-time
ÀQDQFLDO FULVLV VHH WKH ¶.UXHJHU 5HSRUW· WKDW SUHGDWHV 5RVVHOOy·V UHgime). This led the much-maligned Governor Rosselló to announce the
privatization of the Commonwealth-owned Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority (PREPA), which is one of the largest public power suppliers in
the US. However, the federal Fiscal Oversight and Management Board
IRU3XHUWR5LFRHVWDEOLVKHGE\3520(6$GHYLVHGLWVRZQÀVFDOSODQWR
deal with the crisis. The board’s plan was vehemently opposed by the
governor because it recommended ‘steep cuts in government spending and pensions.’ This has been a long-running dispute between the
US territorial government and the US-controlled Fiscal Board. For inVWDQFH5RVVHOOyLQ0D\ÀOHGIRUZKDWDPRXQWVWRIHGHUDOEDQNruptcy protection in order to ‘restructure about $120 billion of debt
and pension obligations,’ despite opposition within and outside his own
party.” Carlos Figueroa, “The Puerto Rico Crisis.”
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INTRODUCTION

Setting the Scene

The twin issues of governmental structures and autonomy
became prominent in insular politics long before Puerto Rico was
acquired by the United States in the Spanish-American War of
1898. Puerto Rican liberals advanced plans for political and administrative reform on several occasions after 1815. The success
and permanence of such plans rested upon the political fortunes
of liberal elements in Spain. On at least three occasions when
the liberals were in power in Spain, for instance, Spain promised
to restore the Provincial Assembly and elective town councils.
Again in 1868, the Puerto Ricans won the right to nominate local
deputies to the national parliament in Spain. The concessions
were not permanent because they were made by Madrid under one
kind of pressure or another, and because the liberals by whom they
were made lost political ground in Spain. Puerto Rico's greatest
success came in November, 1897, when the liberal ministry in
Madrid, fearing open rebellion such as the one then raging in
Cuba, granted the island the Charter of Autonomy. The charter
gave Puerto Rico a quasi-dominion status and retained insular
representation in the Cortes. It provided for a bicameral insular
legislature in which one of the Houses was partially elective and
the other was completely elective.1

I
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2

The question as to whether Puerto Rico's newly acquired
quasi-dominion status would have become a lasting arrangement
in the relationship between the island and Spain became academic
as events interrupted its progress. The island's first assembly under
the charter had barely started operating when some eight months
later war broke out between Spain and the United States. American troops landed in Puerto Rico in August, 1898, and Spain ceded
to the United States sovereign and proprietary rights over the
island. The charter was of no practical consequence, as the United
States consolidated its sovereignty by military rule in ·the next
twoyears. 2
Puerto Rico's status and autonomy assumed new dimensions
under United States jurisdiction. The Colossus of the North was
economically powerful and geographically close. Puerto Ricans by
and large welcomed the opportunity to associate with a powerful
neighbor and hoped to share in its prosperity. They were fully
aware that their 3500-square-mile Caribbean island in the Greater
Antilles lacked adequate natural resources, and whatever economic
benefits that might accrue as a result of this new relationship
would afford many the opportunity to escape grinding poverty.
But they were also aware that the United States was culturally and
politically Anglo-Saxon and that any kind of continued association
with the mainland would require them to adjust to and accommodate the political and cultural traditions and values of the continental power. This, in short, has been the source of the unending
debate on the issue of political status: how to strike a happy balance between Puerto Rico's economic needs, which could be filled
through uninterrupted association with the United States, and the
cultural divergence between the mainland and the island. 3
Perhaps this question would never have been drawn out in
the perennial debate that has wrought "spiritual anguish" among
the Puerto Ricans, according to Luis Munoz Marin, had the Congress of the United States been certain as to what Puerto Rico's
eventual fate was going to be. But Congress was hesitant from the
very beginning. This was manifested in the position it took that
the territory of Puerto Rico was different from other United States
territories that were intended for eventual statehood. Nor was it
indicated whether Puerto Rico should some day be permitted to
be an independent state. Congress' ambiguity was further reinforced by Supreme Court decisions in a series of insular cases.
The Supreme Court differentiated in some fancy judicial double-
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talk between "incorporated territories" intended for eventual
statehood and " unincorporated territories" not intended for such
a status. Puerto Rico, it declared, was an "unincorporated territory." In effect, what the Supreme Court decision meant was that
the eventual fate of Puerto Rico must be decided by Congress.4
It was in this state of mind that Congress proceeded to grant
a measure of autonomy to Puerto Rico and to impose a unique
constitutional arrangement upon the island. The Foraker Act of
1900 permitted the people of Puerto Rico to elect a House of
Delegates, but the essential powers of administration were reserved in an appointed executive. The act also provided for a
limited application of a tariff schedule. Seventeen years later,
Congress acted once more on Puerto Rico. The Jones Act of 19 I 7
(also known as the Organic Act of 19 I 7) provided for a bicameral
legislature, and the powers of the appointed governor were somewhat restricted as he was required to seek the advice and consent of
the insular Senate in the appointment of the heads of some of the
executive departments. But the president continued to fill posts
such as the commissioner of education, the auditor, the attorney
general, and judges of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. Besides, he retained veto power over all insular legislation. In some
respects, the Spanish Charter of Autonomy of 1897 promised more.
But the feature of the act that continued to treat the island in a
unique constitutional arrangement was the provision that extended United States citizenship to the people of Puerto Rico
without their having to pay federal taxes. While this aspect pleased
the advocates of statehood in the island, it did not signify Congress' intentions as to what Puerto Rico's eventual fate was going
to be. 11
Congress' unwillingness to clarify the status issue turned it
gradually into what Gordon K. Lewis has called a "magnificent
obsession." 6 The platforms of the various political parties were
either for statehood or independence. The degree of commitment
to these goals, however, was diluted, for it was common for a party
favoring one goal to switch its loyalties to another. Indeed, to the
extent that the Puerto Ricans are responsible for this prolonged
debate, there has never been a strong enough movement for independence in Puerto Rico to which Congress might react. The
Nationalist party was so small in numbers that both the United
States and other Puerto Rican parties could disregard it as being
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unrepresentative of majority will. The same was true of other
thorough-going independentista groups.
A lack of clear preference of status position on the part of the
Puerto Ricans added to their frustration and feeling of uncertainty
and pervaded insular politics to the point of diverting the island's
attention from the most pressing problem of Puerto Rico, namely,
the low standard of living of most of its inhabitants. This fact
has persuaded at least two historians to label the status debate
as "sterile," "futile," and "needless frustration.'' 7 However useless
this debate might seem in terms of desirable goals, its very prevalence represented a force of considerable importance in the lives
of Puerto Ricans and denoted a need constantly nagging to be
fulfilled.
This study emphasizes the attempts of Luis Mufi.oz Marin
to define the needs of the Puerto Rican people and explains the
way in which he set out to fulfill them. He gradually abandoned
independence as a practical goal for Puerto Rico and embarked
instead upon the road of autonomy. This approach harmonized
well with Puerto Rico's economic needs, he argued. In effect, what
he told his compatriots was that Puerto Rico could not afford to
abandon the United States. They largely agreed, and he launched
a bold and innovative economic program called "Operation Bootstrap." The program strengthened both the economy and the
island's ties with the United States.
The approach suited the United States well. The United
States recognized the island's strategic value both during and after
World War II. Some members of Congress felt that Puerto Rico
as a somewhat Americanized Latin American entity might serve a
useful function in the dialogue necessary between the United
States and Latin America. Others felt a patronizing concern for
conditions on the island, believing that the United States should
not abandon those responsibilities that it implicitly undertook to
fulfill when it acquired Puerto Rico in 1898. Congress and the
administration, always concerned as to what Puerto Ricans might
do with self-government, precipitate or otherwise, decided to extend the island autonomy in progressive doses: the appointment
of a native Puerto Rican as governor in 1946, the passage of the
Elective Governor's Act in 1947, and the enactment of Public Law
600 in 1950 to permit the islanders to write their own constitution.
By June, 1952, none of the posts in Puerto Rican internal government was appointive. The administration and Congress were con-
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5

siderably persuaded in their progressive attitude toward Puerto
Rican self-government by the talents of the remarkable Puerto
Rican Mufi.oz Marin.
Even though Mufi.oz Marin succeeded in winning for Puerto
Rico a great amount of autonomy in 1952, the political agitation
that surrounded the status issue continued. The Puerto Rican
leader claimed the Commonwealth to be more than what it really
was. To him it was voluntary association with the United States,
with features that could be the basis of a permanent relationship
between the island and the mainland. It was really, however, . a
unique constitutional arrangement growing from the earlier pattern established by the Foraker Act and the Jones Act, with one
crucially important feature unchanged-namely, Congress had final
say in matters concerning Puerto Rico. This is what he discovered
in 1959 and thereafter when he attempted to get Congress to enhance the Commonwealth status. Mufioz Marin's failure in 1959
reopened the status controversy with much of its old fury. It will
likely continue at least until Puerto Rico becomes either a state
or an independent country, or finds a way to refine the Commonwealth status into a completely acceptable middle way.
Throughout this study, the word "autonomy" is used to mean
political freedom for Puerto Ricans in their internal affairs. The
~Jnited States can intervene if conditions warrant such a drastic
step. For instance, should civil disturbances in Puerto Rico endanger its relations with its Caribbean neighbors or with the
United States itself, Washington would possibly intervene in accordance with its constitutional responsibility over the island's
foreign affairs and its defense. Or, as in legal matters involving
mainland citizens, the United States Supreme Court has the power
of final arbitrament.
The word "status" is a term of general description of the
possible relationships between United States and Puerto Rico.
The three likely solutions over which the debate has taken place
are "independence," "stateh9od," and some dominion-like status.
The Commonwealth concept has dominion-like but unique features, and is likely not the final solution. "Autonomy" overlaps
all three terms of description. However, as it is used here, "autonomy" does not mean "independence," since its advocates, and
indeed Puerto Ricans generally, have always understood that it
implied limited political freedom.
The two terms "autonomy" and "status" were separated for
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6
practical political purposes at the start of the Truman administration, when the issue of Puerto Rico's permanent relationship with
the United States appeared to be. an insolvable problem. It was
decided then to grant "autonomy" first and to proceed to the
settlement of the "status" question on a permanent basis later
when conditions made it possible. "Autonomy" came to the
Puerto Ricans in large, progressive doses. The Commonwealth
arrangement gave considerable political freedom to the Puerto
Ricans; but when in 1959 and thereafter attempts were made to
define more clearly specific areas of authority as belonging to
Puerto Rico or the United States, it was realized that "autonomy"
was merely an inseparable part of the larger question of "status."
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CHAPTER ONE

Politics in Puerto Rico
and the Tydings Bill of 1936

There were four political parties in Puerto Rico in 1936, the
year in which Senator Millard E. Tydings of Maryland, Democratic chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, introduced an independence bill in Congress. They
were not separated by deep, divisive ideological differences, nor by
differentiable programs and policies. This was generally true of
all political parties, ever since the island became an American
possession in 1898. Personalities and patronage proved to be more
important factors in party organizations. Even the status question,
the only issue over which the party leadership adopted definite
positions, aroused "less than consistent zeal" among its supporters. 1
In 1936 the parties that were in control of the island legislature and the important post of resident commissioner were the
Union Republican and the Socialist. The two had fused in 1924
totoim the Coalition, as the group was generally called. The
Union Republicans by and large drew their leadership from the
business and professional classes,2 and their policies reflected the
interests of these classes. 3 The party was organized in 1899, and
commanded a majority in the legislature until 1904. It remained
out of power for nearly three decades as dissidents left its ranks
to join other political groups. In the 1920s, for instance, many

7
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Union Republicans transferred their loyalties to the Union party.
It was partly because of this that the party leadership combined
its forces with the Socialist party in 1924, an arrangement largely
born out of a desire to control the legislature of the island. The
Coalition had to wait until 1932, when under the leadership of
its Union Republican leader, Rafael Martinez Nadal, it secured
a majority in the Puerto Rican legislature. The group hung on to
the majority until 1940, when it was defeated by the newly formed
Partido Popular Democrdtico (PPD). 4 The Union Republican
party favored the continued presence of United States jurisdiction
in Puerto Rico, but it was not firmly committed to statehood in
1936.ll
The Socialist party was founded by Santiago Iglesias in 1915
as a political extension of his Free Federation of Labor. The
party had little to do with Marxism. Its leader took his cue from
Samuel Gompers, the head of the American Federation of Labor
on the mainland, as to what its political role should be. Iglesias
had suffered persecution at the hands of the Spanish authorities
for his unionist activities and had zealously welcomed the United
States in 1898 as a future guarantor of union rights. The Socialist
leader continued to exercise powerful influence over party affairs
until his death in 1940. Indeed, his expedient and undoctrinaire
approach to politics left its imprint on the party's course. In 1924
he led his followers into a political merger with the Union Republicans, and was happy to allow Martinez Nadal to play the
dominant role as chief of the Coalition. In 1932 when the Coalition won the elections, Iglesias was elected as resident commissioner in Washington for four years. The Coalition weathered
mild and serious crises over issues such as labor strikes, largely
due to the political finesse of Iglesias. 6 The Socialist party took
no hard position on the question of the island's political status.
Both statehood and independence were equally acceptable, although Iglesias personally leaned towards statehood because of his
strong pro-United States sentiments. 7
The third large political group formed the Liberal party.
Its roots can be traced to the Union party, which was founded in
1904 by a highly respected fighter for the political freedom for the
island, Luis Munoz Rivera. He fairly dominated insular politics
until his death in 1917, when Antonio Barcel6, another seasoned
politician, took over the leadership of the party. Barcel6 kept his
group in power in the 1920s by a series of political combinations.
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Shortly after the 1928 elections, however, the political alliance
he had forged with dissident elements of the Union Republican
party, known as the A lianza, began to come apart. The veteran
politician attempted to smooth out differences within the A lianza
without success. He tried to revive the Union party in the hope
of reasserting his leadership, but was blocked in doing so by the
maneuverings of his opponents. Forced to dissolve the Alianza,
he organized the Liberal party in 1929.8
At the time the new party was organized Barce16 stated that
its goal was not independence but autonomy in local matters. The
party's platform of March 13, 1932, however, suggests that his
position had changed markedly. The plank dealing with status
declared that the party's purpose was "to demand the immediate
recognition of the sovereignty of Puerto Rico." In a letter to
President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt on December 21, 1932, Barc~l6 reasoned that Puerto Rico's independence would help meet
the island's "moral and material" needs. 9
The party's position on status was elaborated by Mufioz
Marin, son of Munoz Rivera, who had been persuaded to run as
senator-at-large in 1932. As editor of La Democracia (San Juan),
Mufioz Marin examined the economic implications of the Liberal
party's independence plank with special reference to sugar production and United States tariff laws. He pointed out in a series
of three articles how the tariff laws of the United States had resulted in the abnormal growth of sugar production at the expense
of a diversified agricultural economy. Independence, he asserted,
would correct this imbalance. He insisted, however, that any independence program would of necessity have to include a period
of transition. Any abrupt changes would seriously dislocate the
Puerto Rican economy. The young editor offered no details except to say that the coffee industry might be revived, and that the
transition period should be "under the sovereignty of Puerto
Rico."10
In the 1932 elections the Liberal party polled 170,168 votes,
which, however, were not sufficient to beat the combined votes of
208,232 polled by the Union Republican (110,794) and the Socialist (97,438) parties. 11 The Coalition secured the legislative
majority and therefore looked forward to wielding political patronage in the next four years.
The Nationalist party, founded in 1920, constituted the
fourth political group. Small in numbers, but fanatical in convic-
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tion, the party regulars single-mindedly pursued the goal of total
and immediate independence. Their leader was Pedro Albizu
Campos, trained at Harvard Law School as a lawyer, who because
of his charisma and compelling eloquence quickly rose to leadership of the party in 1930, a few years after he had joined it. The
dark-skinned Albizu Campos had encountered racial discrimination when he enlisted in the United States Army during World
War I, an experience over which he harbored bitter thoughts and
which allegedly expressed itself in the party's violently anti-United
States stance. 12 Little is said about his views on government and
economics in official documents and published material. He did
maintain contact with other leftist groups in Latin America. Indeed, he married Laura Meneses, who was a member of Peru's
anti-United States group, the Alianza Popular R evolucionaria
Americana (APRA). 13
Until 1932 the Nationalist party had made no serious attempt
to participate in insular elections. The party relied heavily on
sensational tactics. In 1930, for instance, the party attempted to
sell bonds in order to tum the island into a republic. What success, if any, this and later attempts had is not known. The radical
group had more success in another incident involving a letter
written by a Dr. Cornelius Rhoads, who was connected with the
Rockefeller Foundation. The physician, while practicing on the
island, suggested a campaign to exterminate the islanders. The
Nationalists capitalized on the letter and reaped considerable
publicity. 14
In yet another sensation-seeking action, Albizu Campos and a
group of his followers disrupted a Liberal convention in March,
1932, and forced Barcel6 to share the floor with the fiery leader.
The evening ended amicably enough with the two leaders promising each other cooperation on matters of mutual interest. Differences, however, dissipated whatever warmth there had been--between the two groups in the next few months. At a huge Nationalist rally on July 9, 1932, the radical harangued his audience for
two-and-a-half hours, denouncing Barcel6 and others as traitors
and accusing Governor Blanton Winship of repression against
Nationalist supporters. Then, in words which were going to
haunt him four years later, he vowed that if any Nationalist lost
his life at police hands, the chief of insular police would pay for
it with his own. 15
Under a Puerto Rican electoral law, new parties were re-
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quired to prove . that they had support of at least 10 percent of
the total votes of the previous election. The Nationalists needed
about 24,000 signatures to get on the ballots in 1932. The signatures, ironically, were secured by the Union Republican party, a
political group that had little in common with the Nationalist
party. The Union Republican party helped because it desired to
split the votes of the Liberal party. As it turned out, the Nationalist party polled in 1932 a mere 5,257 votes . (the vote for Albizu
Campos personally was 11,634), which was less than 2 percent of
the total votes polled. 16
Their weak showing at the polls did not discourage many
Nationalists from continuing with the politics of agitation. One
such occasion before 1936 ended in violence and tragedy. In
October, Albizu Campos directed a virulent attack upon university
students for not being active in the independence movement. His
reference to the boys as "sissies" and to the girls as "drunkards"
stung the students into organizing a protest meeting on October
24, 1935. The police feared trouble and posted men outside the
gates; In the altercations that followed, three of the Nationalists
were shot dead, the fourth was seriously wounded, and a policeman was injured. 17 Albizu Campos delivered a long funeral oration for his three fallen compatriots, accused the governor of seeking to eliminate all Nationalists, and promised to trade the life
of a continental for every Nationalist killed. 18
Under the provisions of the Organic Act of 1917, the three
major parties19 of Puerto Rico could compete electorally for the
bicameral legislature of nineteen Senate seats, and thirty-nine
House seats, in addition to the important post of resident commissioner in Washington. 20 The political group that commanded a
majority in the insular legislature and selected one of its own
members to be resident commissioner had some leverage with the
United States-appointed representative on the island, the governor. The governor was empowered to appoint the executive heads
of the Interior, Agriculture and Labor, and Health departments:
The president named persons to fill the remaining posts: attorney
general, commissioner of education, the auditor, and the justices
of the Puerto Rican Supreme Court, positions which were regarded as too important to be left to the governor. As a further
check on the insular legislature, the president possessed the power
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of ultimate veto over insular legislation, 21 although this prerogative was seldom used.
This arrangement was clearly designed to insulate the executive branch from popular legislative supervision, as Gordon K.
Lewis points out. 22 The governor had in effect assumed many of
the powers of public policies normally exercised by the popularly
elected segments of the government in a typically noncolonial
situation.23 Outside of creating confusion as to the precise roles
of the executive and legislative branches in Puerto Rico, this
arrangement placed great store on good understanding and relationship between the party controlling the legislature and the
appointed governor. But should the governor cooperate too closely
with the party in power, he was sure to invite charges of partiality
by the political group or groups that did not control the insular
legislature. This is what did happen, as it will be seen later in
the chapter, when Governor Robert H. Gore insisted on offering
posts to the Coalition in 1933, excluding Liberals from patronage
because of their supposed anti-Americanism. 24 Then too, other
federal officials in charge of Puerto Rican affairs did not always
work through the governor because they felt that one or both were
not in sympathy with the general administration policy. Congressional committees in charge of the island also desired to make
their influence felt in the administration of the Caribbean possession. Under these conditions, a smooth coordination of the
various governmental agencies was impossible.
The political system was severely tried in the 1930s when the
island's economic and social problems reached new heights of
severity. Puerto Rico had suffered two devastating hurricanes,
in 1928 and 1932. These natural disasters helped to turn scholars'
attention to the island's economic plight. Two studies that were
to have considerable influence on administrators were the Brookings Institution study by Victor S. Clark, et al., Puerto Rico and
Its Problems, 25 and Justine and Bailey Diffie's Puerto Rico: A
Broken Pledge. 26 At the root of Puerto Rico's problems, the
studies pointed out, was the dominance of its economy by the
sugar industry, and its attendant evils of monocultural trends.
Four absentee sugar corporations held thousands of acres of land
in excess of the legal 500-acre limit; they yielded large profits for
the corporations, but there was not the corresponding increase in
real wages for their laborers. The scholars did not agree on all
aspects, but they did spotlight the need for an urgent and deter-
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mined effort to rehabilitate the lopsided economy of the overpopulated island.
The Roosevelt administration recognized that programs of
economic rehabilitation would require improved coordination
and a close watch on Puerto Rican affairs. This concern translated
itself into President Roosevelt's transfer of the island's administration from the Department of War to that of the Interior on
March 8, 1934, by Executive Order No. 6726. 27 Two months later
the president created in the Interior department the Division of
Territories and Insular Possessions (DTIP). In October, 1934,
Dr. Ernest Gruening of Maine, a liberal well versed in Latin
American affairs, was appointed as its first director. He was responsible for the administration of Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands. 28 On the occasion of naming Dr. Gruening
as the director, Assistant Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman defined the agency's immediate goals. It was the administration's policy, Chapman declared, to encourage "political and economic autonomy" in the territories. He stressed, however, that
the more compelling need was economic rehabilitation, especially
in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. "The people cannot be
self-sufficient," he said, "in either living or government without
the discovery of new methods and new resources." The sugar
corporations, he charged, had made profits but had not benefited
the island as a whole. Diversifying the territory's economy was an
answ:er, and the way this could be done was by reviving the coffee
industry and encouraging the growth of the citrus fruit industry.
The assistant secretary left no doubt that political autonomy was
not his overriding concern at the time. 29
The administrative reorganization did not eliminate the friction in the working of the political system. If anything, the introduction of the new division and its director merely exacerbated
the rivalry among the various political groups on the island. The
circumstances surrounding the creation and functioning of the
Puerto Rican Emergency Relief Administration (PRERA), superseded later by the Puerto Rican Reconstruction Administration
(PRRA), will illustrate this.
Before discussing the PRERA and PRRA it is necessary,
however, to point out that Governor Gore's brief but stormy term
of office had helped the Liberal party to establish closer contact
with the White House. Gore, appointed governor in 1933, mainly
in payment for his party loyalty, decided that the island's impor- ·
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tant political posts should go to the Coalition. He passed over
Liberals because as advocates of independence they were antiAmerican, so he maintained. In attempting to displace the commissioner of education, Dr. Jose Padin, from his cabinet for the
commissioner's supposed Liberal sympathies, and in naming a
Coalition member to the board of directors of the University of
Puerto Rico, he incurred the wrath of the Liberals and the university students, and lost much public support. Worst of all, he
lost the confidence of the Roosevelt administration and was forced
to retire. 30
If anybody came out on top in the whole affair it was Liberal
Senator Mufioz Marin. As editor of La Democracia, he had used
his political and literary gift to establish himself as a Liberal leader
of considerable rank. More importantly, his association with Ruby
Black, a Washington correspondent and a friend of Mrs. Eleanor
Roosevelt's, gained him access to the confidence of the first lady
and, through her, the president. On November 7, 1933, Mufioz
Marin had tea with Mrs. Roosevelt and briefly chatted with the
president. They no doubt conversed about economic conditions
in Puerto Rico, and about Gore's open partiality. Ruby Black
maintains, according to Mathews, that Mrs. Roosevelt was influential in increasing relief funds for the island. 31 Mrs. Roosevelt's
own account bears out at least her concern for the island and her
reminding the president of its needs. 32
In the next few years two federal agencies were to show a
pro-Liberal attitude. In August, 1933, James Bourne was named
the director of the first agency, the PRERA. Bourne was a friend
of the president's, and superintendent of canneries of Hill Brothers, Inc., in Puerto Rico. 33 The PRERA began its task with direct
relief, but soon expanded it to work relief programs with a view
towards future plans of reconstruction. 34 The director hired many
Liberals to work on the staff of the PRERA because he felt that
the Coalition members were generally opposed to the extension
of the New Deal programs on the island, and their presence would
hamper the agency's efficiency. In a meeting with Gore, when he
was still governor, and Coalition leader Martinez Nadal, Bourne
refused to drop Liberal members from his list of employees, a
stand in which he received the support of Federal Emergency
Relief Administration director Harry Hopkins. Soon thereafter,
in November, 1933, the Coalition declared Bo1,1rne persona non
grata. 85 When Blanton Winship became the governor, the Coali-
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tion tried through a legislative measure to control the agency.
Governor Winship and Dr. Gruening, upon reconsideration, supported the measure. However, because of an administrative mixup in Washington, the governor was called upon to veto the bill.36
There had been much talk both on the island and in Washington about instituting a program of rehabilitation to correct
many longstanding ills in Puerto Rico. On March 10, 1936, a
"Round Table Conference" was organized towards this end. Its
twenty-eight participants included the various insular interests
and continental representatives. Notable among the continentals
were Mrs. Roosevelt, then visiting the island, and Rexford G.
Tugwell of the Department of Agriculture. The first lady's presence, the president had argued, would underscore the concern and
sincerity of Assistant Secretary Tugwell.37 The meeting's primary
purpose was to air ideas and views concerning reconstruction.
One of those to suggest a plan was Dr. Carlos Chard6n, whose
homestead scheme, later to be the essential features of the Char-·
don Plan, may have germinated in the minds of Tugwell and his
fellow workers. 38
Soon thereafter, Roosevelt appointed a three-man Puerto
Rican Policy Commission under the chairmanship of Dr. Chard6n,
much to the discomfort of the Coalition. The Commission spent
May and June of 1934 in Washington working on its report. The
report, more commonly known as the Chard6n Plan, envisaged
acquiring a certain acreage of productive sugar land and marginal
cane land, together with the mill facilities on these lands, to
achieve the following: reduce sugar production; diversify agricultural production and grow more food crops; eliminate the land
monopoly of sugar corporations; create about 10,000 homesteads
with adequate housing and farming facilities; create employment
on a permanent basis for about 17,000 men. 39 The plan was not
to become public until about a year later.
In May, 1935, President Roosevelt created the Puerto Rican
Reconstruction Administration (PRRA), which was to supersede
the PRERA. Dr. Gruening was named the director. 40 He now
held two posts: as director of PRRA he was responsible to the
president; as director of DTIP he was responsible to Secretary of
the Interior Harold L. Ickes. Ickes was unhappy that he had not
been consulted on the appointment. Furthermore, he hoped that
since he did not have supervisory power over PRRA the president
would keep a close watch over its activities. The secretary feared

UnitedStatesAndTheDevelopmentOfThePuertoRicanStatusQuestion

Page 15

05/11/20 10:14 AM

16
a "blowout" in Puerto Rico, and if that should happen both he
and the president would be blamed. 41 James Bourne, too, was
unhappy because he had not been named PRRA's director. As
director of PRERA, Bourne had taken steps to initiate a rehabilitation program in the hope that he would be placed in charge of
the whole reconstruction program. The PRERA director was
passed over and the agency discontinued about a year later, presumably b.ecause of his estrangement with the Coalition group,
which had accused him of running the agency independently of
the local government and of favoring the Liberals. 42
Four groups in Puerto Rico, according to Mathews, vied for
control of the entire reconstruction program. The first was the
sugar central interests; the second was the Coalition; third, Governor Blanton Winship and Commissioner Menendez Ramos; and
fourth, the friends of the Chardon Plan and the New Deal, notably
Senator Munoz Marin and Jesus T. Pinero, president of the
island's independent sugar growers. 43 The newly appointed Dr.
Gruening appeared to favor working with the fourth group.
Munoz Marin had played his cards well when he had secured from
the president in December of 1934 a message for the Puerto Rican
people. The message had endorsed the Chardon Plan.44
The Coalition's worst fears were realized when Gruening appointed Dr. Chardon in June, 1935, as regional administrator of
PRRA. When the complete list of appointments became known,
the Coalition felt completely excluded. Of the thirteen appointees
four were Liberals, two were anti-Coalition, four continental
Americans, one Socialist, and two neutrals. Gruening had ex- eluded Coalition members, presumably because of their opposition to the Chardon Plan. 411 Earl Parker Hanson was one of the
continental Americans appointed as a planning consultant to the
PRRA. He states in his book that Munoz Marin had so strongly
supported the PRRA that he had become very closely identified
with the agency's efforts. Or as Hanson put it, "Munoz was the
PRRA, to be supported, or opposed as such according to individual orientations." 46
The Coalition opposed the PRRA, as was to be expected. It
was controlled by officials who were Liberal party supporters or
sympathizers. Furthermore, the PRRA's policy was to break up
the sugar monopoly, and the Interior department had already
taken steps to enforce the 500-acre law.4 7 The secretary himself
had 'confirmed the administration's intention of breaking up big
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sugar estates when he visited the island in January, 1936.48 In a
conversation with Luis Ferre, then an industrialist and later the
governor of Puerto Rico between 1968 and 1972, Ickes is reported
as having said about the sugar industry, "No industry has the
right to exist if it lives on the hunger and misery of the masses."
Asked whether the economic distress of the island could not be
relieved by taxing the industry, the secretary snapped back that
a legislature controlled by the sugar men was not likely to impose
such taxes.49
By 1936, then, the position briefly was as follows: the governor, Blanton Winship, a military man with a conservative background, managed as best he could with an insular legislature
dominated by the Coalition group. The Liberals did not particularly like him, as Ickes reflected in his diary, and would just as
soon be rid of him. 1io What is significant is that the governor, like
the Coalition, had no control over the PRRA, whose director, in
working closely with the Liberal party, merely widened the gap
between the governor and the Liberals, and added to the confusion
of the diffusion of federal power. Dr. Gruening believed that the
Liberal party stood closer to the goals of the New Deal. It was
generally believed that the party would win in 1936, and the secretary of the Interior seemed to accept the general sentiment. 51
In all this, Mufioz Marin emerged as the doyen of the Liberals,
whose status as son of Munoz Rivera, his good relations with the
White House, and his considerable flair for politics and writing
were placed at the party's disposal. The Nationalist party remained outside of the squabbles over patronage in deliberate contempt of insular politics, its goals being absolute severance of ties
with a country for which it had no love.
The murder of a police chief was to change the political situation greatly. Those who had formerly enjoyed the administration's blessing were soon to fall out of favor, among them Mufioz
Marin; the Liberal party suffered a split over the issue of independence, and was likely cheated out of an electoral victory in
1936; a new party was to emerge two years later, which fairly
sealed the doom of the Liberal party, all to the great satisfaction
of the Coalition. All this occurred because the administration
thought the assassination an opportune moment to offer Puerto
Rico political independence hastily, unexpectedly, and disingenuously.
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On his way home from mass, the insular police chief, Col.
E. Francis Riggs, was shot and killed on February 23, 1936, in a
plot involving two Nationalist youths, Elias Beauchamp and Hiran
Rosado. The two were taken to the police station, where, according to the police, they unexpectedly reached for a rack full of
riot guns, and were killed by a fusillade of police bullets. 52 There
was no death penalty in Puerto Rico, and to the crowd outside
that heard the volley of fire, it appeared like instant retribution.
There were sharp but differing reactions on the island. Governor Winship looked upon it as a matter of law and order, and
promised to get tough with those who broke the law. 53 He meant
what he said, because about two weeks later he had the federal
authorities arrest Albizu Campos and six other Nationalists on
charges of conspiring to overthrow the insular government, and
apparently had the backing of Secretary Ickes. 54 The earlier
utterances of the Nationalist leader had come to haunt him.
The overwhelming majority of Puerto Ricans denounced
the Nationalist violence but appeared to draw somewhat different
conclusions from it. At least two Puerto Rican newspapers, as
reported by the New York Times, believed that the events should
be viewed from their political perspective and called for an investigation into the police action that resulted in the death of
the two youths. 55 Martinez Nadal regarded both incidents as
tragedies. 56 In Washington, Resident Commissioner Santiago
Iglesias reassured Congress that the police chief's murder should
in no way reflect upon the loyalty of the Puerto Rican people,
but reminded Congress, with the aid of editorials in leading continental newspapers, of its duty in resolving the island's status
question. 57 The Liberal party organ, La Democracia, while in no
way condoning the murder of Colonel Riggs, believed the killing
by the police was indefensible. 58
Secretary Ickes appeared to be piqued by the islanders' criticism of the administration's handling of the whole affair, and its
tardiness over resolving the status question. He threatened to
stop further appropriations to the island, 59 with what serious
intentions it is not clear. A day later, March 9, 1936, he issued
the following statement:
The people of Puerto Rico have a perfect right within the
limits of the Constitution to seek whatever form of government they deem best for themselves. The administra-
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tion will give careful and sympathetic consideration to
any definite political demand which is demonstrably
backed by a majority of the people of Puerto Rico. 60
The statement foreshadowed the independence bill that was introduced on April 23, 1936, by Senator Tydings. There is no
evidence to suggest, however, that the secretary had such a bill
in mind when he made the statement. An examination into the
background of the bill shows that it originated with Dr. Gruening.
On March 13, 1936, Dr. Gruening dispatched a memorandum to the secretary expressing his willingness to allow Puerto
Ricans to decide in the November elections on independence.
If the vote should be yes the United States should provide a period
of transition to complete surrendering insular responsibility to
the islanders. If, on the other hand, the vote was no, the matter
should be considered settled "certainly for a generation." He
recommended that the legal division in the Interior department
be instructed to submit a draft of such a bill to the secretary,
the president, and Senator Tydings. 61
The matter was discussed at the March 18, 1936, cabinet
meeting. Ickes reiterated his desire to see the island obtain independence if it should choose it. He doubted, however, whether
the bill to be introduced in the present session had any chance
of becoming law. That did not matter, he seemed to think, because it was intended to have a "quieting effect . . . on Puerto
Rican public opinion." 62
A day after the cabinet meeting Ic~e~ instructed Gruening to
give the Maryland senator a draft of the independence bill, clearly
specifying that the senator not tag it as an administration measure.
He did not read the bill, he went on to say, but approved it because a discussion with Gruening had satisfied him that it was in
accordance with the administration's general policy. 63 Frederick
Bernays Wiener, a department lawyer, was selected to draft the
bill under Gruening's supervision. Two drafts of the bill emerged
from this, the second of which contained tariff schedules.64 The
second draft was forwarded by Gruening to the Senate chairman
of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs on March 27.
Gruening believed that the bill was "generous" and would meet
the possible charge that it did not offer.a "fair alternative." 611 The
bill that Senator Tydings introduced about a month later was
essentially the same as the Gruening draft bill.
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On April 23, 1936, Senator Tydings, who was a close friend
of the late Colonel Riggs' and was co-sponsor of the TydingsMcDuffie Act of 1935, which started the Philippines on a ten-year
road to independence, presented two bills. The first, S.4528,
provided for regulating the conduct of elections in Puerto Rico.
He cited instances of fraud and violence at the polls, and insisted
that only federal supervision could ensure honest elections. The
second bill, S.4529, called for a referendum in Puerto Rico on
independence in November, 1937. If the Puerto Ricans should
vote yes, a four-year transition period was to be provided for, with
a graduated tariff scale of 25 percent yearly. At the end of the
fourth year, Puerto Rico would pay duty on its commodities on
the same basis as other sovereign states. 66 Contrary to the wishes
of the president and the secretary, the senator said to the press
that the bill had the administration's backing. 67
The bill took Puerto Rican leaders by surprise. Munoz
Marin, who was in Washington at the time, said he had no prior
knowledge of the bill. He seemed to appear certain, however,
that it was not Tydings who had written the bill but someone
else.68 It is possible he had an inkling that Gruening was behind
the independence offer, because he stated in an unusually candid
memorandum to the secretary (see Appendix A for the complete
text) some ten months later that the bill had been "the fruit of
Dr. Gruening's twisted and unadmirable state of mind." 69 The
bill did not deserve serious consideration, he told newsmen, because it totally neglected giving the island economic safeguards.
"It would have to be a bill," he explained, "under which Puerto
Rico could produce most of its food and clothing, establish industries for local consumption and export a reasonable quota of its
cash crops, in exchange for which rights the United States would
have insured in Puerto Rico a permanent market for its wheat,
cotton, metals, machinery, coal, petroleum and other commodities
that cannot be produced in Puerto Rico." 70
Four days later the Liberal senator translated his objections
into a series of five amendments. The memorandum containing
the amendments, it should be noted, was submitted to Dr. Gruening. The first requested the omission of the four-year transition
period. The second provided for a referendum in June, 1937.
If the vote should be in the affirmative, a constitutional convention was to be elected around January, 1938. The third dealt
with the framing and subsequent approving of the constitution;
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this done, the convention delegates and United States representatives designated by the president would work out reciprocity
treaties and whatever other treaties deemed necessary. The
fourth referred to the signing and ratification of the treaties by
the Puerto Rican convention and the United States Senate, respectively. Thereafter, provision for the election of the island's .
first sovereign government was to be made. The fifth amendment
sought to continue the present status until the provisions under
the preceding four amendments were completed.71
Munoz Marin went on to point out by way of emphasis that
the reciprocity treaties should include: reasonable quotas for the
island's cash crops in the United States market; liberal tari.ff provisions in terms of Puerto Rican needs and the mainland's interests; permission to allow the island to negotiate treaties with certain other nations to sell certain products and to facilitate emigration schemes; huge loans from the United States, so that the
new insular government could continue with the program of
reconstruction. 72
The suggested amendments were sweeping in nature, and
in fact called for the rewriting of the Tydings bill. They were
presumably intended to show up the bill's gross inadequacy. The
Liberal advocate of independence, like others on the island,
doubted the administration's sincerity in the offer. 73 He did not
lose his enthusiasm for independence, but made clear under what
conditions he was prepared to accept it.
Other Puerto Rican leaders were equally critical of the bill,
many of them pointing to a conspicuous absence of economic safeguards. Martinez Nadal, president of the Puerto Rican Senate
and leader of the Coalition, called the bill a "betrayal" by the
United States of the advocates of independence and statehood
alike because it spelled economic ruin for the island. 74 Leader
of the Socialist party and Resident Commissioner Santiago Iglesias called the bill "unjust, arbitrary, and devastating for Puerto
Rico." 75 Puerto Rican interest groups and the press voiced similar criticism. Only the Nationalist group welcomed the bill. Indeed, Nationalist leader Albizu Campos said that only the withdrawal of the United States armed forces remained to be discussed.76
Except for Governor Winship, who remained silent, other
high United States officials outwardly remained enthusiastic about
the bill and denied charges of insincerity. Ickes called the bill
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"good" and flatly rejected the idea that it was meant to coerce
Puerto Rico into maintaining its present status. 77 Gruening
termed the measure "admirable" and added somewhat sarcastically
that "nothing could be any further from the spirit and purpose
of this administration than to keep a people which was not consulted originally about its annexation under our flag if they do
not desire to be there." 78
Privately, however, the secretary, Senator Tydings, and Dr.
Gruening must have felt differently. Secretary Ickes and Senator
Tydings were both appalled by the conditions in Puerto Rico
they found on visits to the island. They probably realized that
Puerto Rico could not afford independence. 79 Dr. Gruening did
not feel differently from the secretary or the senator. The director's role in the PRRA Planning Division report affair seems to
suggest that he did not wish to hear what he already knew. The
Planning Division, presumably unaware of its director's role in
the Tydings bill, prepared a report on May 2, 1936. The report
categorically stated that the bill did not provide adequate safeguards against economic disaster. 80 Hanson, one of those who
prepared the report, explains more dramatically in his book,
"From every conceivable vantage point, we dealt with Puerto
Rican realities; from every conceivable vantage point it was clear
that the terms of independence provided for in the Tydings bill
would double and treble the island's prevailing starvation and
could result in nothing short of chaos." The Planning staff dutifully submitted the report to their superior in Washington, only
to be rapped for doing so. Gruening, so Hanson maintains, directed him by cable to burn all copies in San Juan. 81 It must be
pointed out, however, that the DTIP chief instructed PRRA
regional director Dr. Chard6n to investigate the economic consequences of the bill.82
Two other instances dramatized the inadequacies of the bill.
On May 7, 1936, an American Labor party Congressman from
New York City, Vito Marcantonio, presented H.R.12611. The
bill provided for the island's independence on _ unrealisticalcy
liberal terms: no tariff barriers whatever on Puerto Rican goods,
no restrictions on insular emigration to the mainland, and a
total withdrawal of the United States in all respects within ninety
days, plus what he called "indemnity" without limitations. 83
The second concerned a report in the New York Times of
possible consequences to United States business interests on the
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island. Sugar and construction companies were reported as having
held back temporarily contemplated expansions; credit arrangements were being rejected; the Puerto Rican government bonds
suffered losses at first, but later recovered. Private bank deposits,
however, were not affected. 84
Insular and continental criticism of the serious weakness of
the bill convinced Senator Tydings to withdraw the message, if
that is not what he had intended to do from the very beginning.
He introduced Senate Joint Resolution 270 on May 25, 1936,
providing for the appointment of a joint Puerto Rican-United
States committee of seventeen to study all aspects relevant to independence. The resolution passed seven days later, except that
the committee membership was reduced to fifteen. 85
The Tydings bill was introduced and withdrawn in the
course of four to five weeks. In addition to causing bad and
bruised feelings among friends, it brought out issues that had
hitherto remained in the background. Dr. Gruening's relationship with the Liberals soured, particularly with Mufioz Marin,
as he moved to cooperate with the Coalition. Subsequently,
Mufioz Marin's relationship with the administration cooled somewhat. A serious consequence, however, was the splitting of the
Liberal party, the major issue being the party's stand on independence in the 1936 elections. The rupture was to be permanent,
and out of it was to emerge Mufioz Marin's new party, the Partido
Popular Democrdtico (PPD).

UnitedStatesAndTheDevelopmentOfThePuertoRicanStatusQuestion

Page 23

05/11/20 10:14 AM

UnitedStatesAndTheDevelopmentOfThePuertoRicanStatusQuestion

Page 24

05/11/20 10:14 AM

CHAPTER TWO

The Organization and Triumph
of the Partido Popular Democratico

The Liberal party was made up broadly of two groups of
followers. The first consisted of professional classes, which set
independence for the island as their immediate goal. This group
was in sympathy with Nationalist leader Albizu Campos' cause,
but looked to Munoz Marin as its leader. The second group was
comprised of persons, who, while believing in independence,
insisted that Puerto Rico's economic reconstruction would make
it necessary to hold off political severance with the United States
until sometime in the future. In the meanwhile, it was willing to
settle for greater autonomy. The leader of this group was Barcel6.
The unity and well-being of the party depended heavily upon the
harmonious relations of the two party leaders. 1
The Tydings bill placed a severe strain on this unity, and
was in part responsible for its undoing. Its introduction in Congress appeared to coincide with the struggle for leadership between Barcel6 and Munoz Marin. Differences between the two
were rumored in the press when Barcel6 visited Washington in
May, 1936, to discuss with Munoz Marin, who unofficially represented the Liberals in Washington, the party's position on the
Tydings bill. Barcel6's stand was that the party should settle for
greater autonomy for the time being without abandoning the goal
25
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of independence. Muiioz Marin was keenly aware that the independence bill had already split the party and that the party was
likely to suffer a defeat in the November elections. 2 He described the bill's effects to Secretary Ickes seven months later in
a memorandum, which has been and will be discussed in detail
elsewhere in this chapter: "It was obviously impossible for a
political force to win an election when the chief political plank
of its platform was apparently defined by the U.S. government,
which has the deciding power, as ruin and starvation." An election held "under such clear-cut economic duress," he continued,
could not be regarded as an expression of public opinion. 8
Muiioz Marin feared that an electoral defeat for the Liberal
party would undermine the goal of independence for the island.
He therefore urged Barcelo to direct the party not to participate
in the elections. Barcelo appeared to accept the argument, and
called upon all political parties to seek suspension of the elections.4 The Republican and Socialist parties, as Barcelo probably
knew, would have none of it. And the Liberal party itself, under
Barcelo's guidance, decided on July 27, 1936, to participate in the
elections. 11
Muiioz Marin's dilemma was understandable. He could not
very well reject the Tydings bill without his radical supporters at
least questioning the strength of his commitment to independence; still less could he accept it and hope to escape criticism
about its shortcomings. The course of action he pursued, while
not always easy to explain, reflected in part his pique about not
having been consulted by Washington officials about the Tydings
bill. He saw that lack of consultation as a slap in his face and
felt that it was representative of the "forces that had been supporting the Administration against the vicious attacks of the sugar
corporations and their representatives," as he argued in his Janu- ·
ary, 1937, memorandum to the secretary. 6
On June 22, 1936, he announced the resignation of his Senate
seat and made known his nonavailability for the post of resident
commissioner. He explained his action to Secretary Ickes as "proof
of the sincerity of [his] conviction." 7 His real reason appeared
to be to have a free hand in maintaining the loyalty of his followers, some of whom threatened to bolt the Liberal party, and
to be present on the island to exercise vigilant leadership. 8
Barcelo realized that a Liberal party ticket without Muiioz
Marin's name would greatly handicap the party's election cam-
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paign. But the veteran politician was shrewd enough to perceive
that if Muiioz Marin did not accept the resident commissioner's
post, which he thought the ex-senator had a good chance of winning, it would leave Muiioz Marin hunting the same political
grounds as he. He attempted, therefore, to pressure Muiioz Marin
into running for the Washington post, first by submitting his own
resignation from the party leadership, and second by getting the
Liberal party convention to reject Muiioz Marin's retraimiento.
For the moment he was able to prevent an open breach by permitting Muiioz Marin to write into the party platform a demand
for independence with "economic justice," but he could not
persuade him to run for the office of resident commissioner.9
Disagreements emerged, however, at the Liberal party's nominating convention of August 16-18, 1936. Munoz Marin and
some of his followers withdrew from the meeting in anger because, he claimed, Barcel6 had gone back on an informal agreement to prevent one Lastra Charriez from running for any public
office. A day after the convention Barcel6 strengthened his control
over the partts central committee by removing Munoz Marin's
supporters.10
Munoz Marin and 236 of his supporters responded by calling
a meeting at Coamo and demanding that they be given representation on the central committee. When this action failed, Munoz
Marin called a giant rally at Caguas on August 28, 1936, and
formed a new political ·group, ,A.ccion Social Independentista
(ASI), which, as it turned out, formed the nucleus of the PPD.
Munoz Marin's desire was to demonstrate his strength to Barcel6.11
The breach was to become absolute some ten months later.
In the meanwhile a divided Liberal party went to the polls;
and although it failed to elect its own member as resident commissioner, it performed unexpectedly well. The party received
252,457 votes, compared to 297,033 polled by the Coalition. 12 The
defeat of the Liberal forces, Munoz Marin maintained in his
memorandum to Ickes in January, 1937, was "through no fault
of their own," implying that it was partly the administration's in
supporting the Tydings bill. 13
Before discussing the final breach between Bacel6 and Munoz
Marin in June,. 1937, and the subsequent formation of the PPD,
it js necessary to examine the administration's estrangement with
the Liberal party following the assassination of Colonel Riggs.
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The Liberal party lost the grace it formerly enjoyed from the
administration. Gruening reversed his former policy of favoring
Liberals and turned to Coalition members for cooperation. He
desired to have little to do with known advocates of independence.
In his dual capacity as director of PRRA (until 1937) and DTIP,
Gruening exercised considerable influence on administration policies toward Puerto Rico, even though his relations with Secretary
Ickes were not completely harmonious.
He ordered the investigation of the PRRA with the intention
of purging it of the Liberal element, especially those employees
who believed in independence for the island. The witch-hunt
forced the resignation of Dr. Chardon, which killed all hopes of
pursuing a reconstruction policy along the lines of the Chardon
Plan. Furthermore, Gruening resigned as director of PRRA in
July, 1937. Indeed, its new director, Miles Fairbanks, wrote Secretary Ickes in February, 1938, about the possibility of liquidating
the agency. It would be true to say that in deserting the Liberal
group the administration turned away from the group most willing to help in the island's economic reconstruction. 14
In yet another matter, namely, the teaching of English on
the island, the administration acted hastily on Gruening's advice.
When Senator William H. King of Utah visited the island in
August, 1936, he became overly sensitive about the inability of
most Puerto Ricans to speak English. Soon thereafter, Gruening
polled many continentals and a few Puerto Ricans on the subject
of teaching English. 15 Whatever the result of this private poll,
Gruening decided that greater emphasis should be placed on the
teaching of English. He secured the resignation of Commissioner
of Education Jose Padin in November, 1936, and urged the president, much to the annoyance of Secretary Ickes, who felt that
Gruening was circumventing his authority, 16 to appoint Dr. Jose
Gallardo as the new commissioner. 17
When President Roosevelt appointed Dr. Gallardo the commissioner of education on April 17, 1937, he made clear the administration's attitude with regard to the teaching of English.
The president said he was disappointed that thousands of Puerto
Ricans had "little and often virtually no knowledge" of the language. "It is an indispensable part of American policy," he continued, "that the coming generation of American citizens in
Puerto Rico grow up with complete facility in the English
tongue. It is the language of our nation. Only through the ac-
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qumuon of this language will Puerto Ricans secure a better
understanding of American ideals and principles." He reassured
Puerto Ricans that he 'did not mean that the Spanish language
should be excluded, but meant that only by knowing the English
language could the islanders take full advantage of the economic
opportunities on the mainland. 18
Apart from treating an essentially pedagogical question in
political terms, the administration was also poorly advised as to
the timing of the reversal. Emotions among the Puerto Ricans
were high after the murder of Colonel Riggs and the subsequent
trial and conviction of Albizu Campos and six other Nationalists.
The Nationalists had secured a permit from the mayor of Ponce
to conduct a peaceful parade on March 21, 1937. Governor Winship was fearful of what might happen, and he directed the insular
police chief to cancel the permit. The cancellation arrived a few
hours before the parade, but the Nationalists could not be dissuaded to call off the march. They argued that it was impossible
to do so at such short notice and decided to go ahead as planned.
The insular police chief decided to encircle the town square with
a contingent of 150 police in case of trouble. A shot was fired by
somebody, triggering off more shooting, which left nineteen
persons dead, two of whom were policemen, and over a hundred
persons injured. The tragedy was referred to in the insular press
as the Ponce Massacre. 19 The islanders did not think that the
authorities were blameless, and were wont to accept the findings
of Arthur G. Hays, who investigated for the American Civil Liberties Union, instead of the one-sided report of Governor Winship, which appeared to exonerate the police action. 20
Under these circumstances the appointment of Dr. Gallardo
was interpreted by the Puerto Ricans as an administration attempt to impose a policy of Americanization upon the islanders.
Mufioz Marin reminded the president sharply in a radiogram
message that the president's sentiments, as expressed in his letter
appointing Gallardo, constituted a reversal of the administration's
position from one envisaging independence to that of "the permanency of United States jurisdiction over Puerto Rico." He
continued, "We protest against the attempt to impose educational
norms on our children, forcing us to adopt [a] new national language not our own, even though ours be incidentally respected." 21
Despite protests, the new commissioner of education promptly
began to remove teachers who were opposed to intensifying the
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teaching of English, and who supported the independence of the
island. 22
Gruening's displeasure with the Liberals was in part the result of his personal disagreement with Munoz Marin. His relationship with the former senator soured over a seemingly nonessential matter. At the time of the murder of Colonel Riggs,
the director had asked Munoz Marin to issue a public condemnation of the act. Munoz Marin hedged, thinking that to condemn
the murder would be politically inexpedient. He would make
such a statement, he finally agreed, if Gruening at the same time
issued a condemnation of the police action in the death of the
two Nationalist youths accused of the murder of Colonel Riggs.
Gruening refused to do so, and there the matter rested. It was
only after the introduction of the Tydings bill that Munoz Marin
realized that his refusal had offended Gruening. 23 Gruening was
a sensitive man who tended to interpret disagreements as a personal affront. However, the incident suggests that he did not
make a clear distinction between an independentista like Munoz
Marin and Albizu Campos. Indeed, even Secretary Ickes suspected
Munoz Marin of being connected with the Nationalists.2•
The effect of this was to deprive Munoz Marin of access to
official channels in Washington. Secretary Ickes directed Assistant
Secretary Chapman to be "more sparing" in the interviews granted
to the Puerto Rican leader. "I would also avoid," he continued,
"at least for the time being any social overtures such as having him
to luncheon or accepting luncheon engagements offered by him."
Ickes' pique appeared to be justified, because Munoz Marin was
capitalizing politically on his relationship with the officers of the
Interior department and with Mrs. Roosevelt. 211
Munoz Marin was convinced that the administration's reversal was the result of misinformation on the part of Gruening. In
the memorandum to the secretary referred to earlier, he attributed
the Tydings bill to Gruening's "twisted and unadmirable state of
mind." Later in the same memorandum he spoke of the director
in this way, "Even under the Roosevelt Administration, the state
of mind of one individual, in a key position, has been enough
to swamp the character of generosity of the Roosevelt-Puerto
Rican policy, to place the island unnecessarily in the hands of the
worst reactionary interests, poisoning the whole situation with
the spirit of distrust and revenge." 26 Three months later, Munoz
Marin pointed out to the president that Gruening, among others,
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was responsible for "presenting a jaundiced picture of Puerto
Rican realities." 27
It was presumably with the intention of clearing some of the
confusion and misinformation concerning his position on the
status question that he dispatched to Secretary Ickes the lengthy
memorandum already referred to several times in this study. 28
The January 5, 1937, document is notable for its detail and candor; and since its author was to assume a key position in the next
decade in the formulation of the 1952 Commonwealth Constitution of Puerto Rico, it is appropriate to examine it thoroughly.
All were opposed to the present "colonial status" because the
powers of the Puerto Rican government were "delegated and
therefore revocable." Puerto Ricans had, therefore, two options
before them, statehood and independence. He saw few advantages to the United States if the island became a state in the
Union. Mufi.oz Marin saw difficulties for the United States if it
were to incorporate a people "unassimilated and . . . [of] unassimilable nationality." Furthermore, the United States and
Puerto Rico should be terrified by the "perpetual quality of statehood," for whatever inherent weaknesses that it may hold for
both may be continued indefinitely. 29
Mufi.oz Marin saw few, if any, benefits to Puerto Rico if it
were to become a state. On the contrary, he saw the following
disadvantages for the island: the unsound economic system with ,
its heavy emphasis on sugar would be continued, Puerto Rico
would lose customs receipts and other forms of tax revenue that
then returned to the insular treasury, and the state government
would likely collapse under the burden of having to contribute
eight or nine million dollars to the federal treasury, assuming
that there were no replacement funds in the form of grants and
relief. If Puerto Rico became a state, he argued, the federal government would become "one more absentee extractor of the
wealth produced by the Puerto Ricans." 30
The leader of the ASI proceeded to point out why he favored
independence. He said that a colonial empire was built around
two motives: economic exploitation and the "white man's burden." The second was often used to cover up the first. However,
Mufi.oz Marin believed that the "white man's burden" could
reflect a sincere desire to help the people of the colony, and he
had no doubt that the period of the Roosevelt administration
was one of those rare times in United States history when sin-
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cerity was evident, even though it had been somewhat marred
by the "state of mind of one individual"-referring, of course, to
Gruening. But he was concerned that future administrations
would revert to "protecting exploitation of the people of Puerto
Rico by a few privileged interests." For this reason alone, he felt
that Puerto Rico should be given independence. 31
The future leader of the PPD then went on to spell out the
specific benefits of independence to Puerto Rico. As a sovereign
power, Puerto Rico would have tariff-making and treaty-making
powers to implement a desirable economic policy: by creating
a class of small landholders, and thereby ending the heavy emphasis on sugar; by beginning a program to produce tropical foods;
and by rehabilitating the coffee industry for the European market.
Without the threat of a Congressional veto, the government of the
island would have the power of broad policy-making over such
matters as birth control and emigration. Among other things,
the island's independence would put an end to the "spiritual
havoc" created by the colonial status. It would eliminate a situation in which "patronage and pie" tended to develop "an attitude
of bootlicking, toadying, proclamation of a 100% americanism." 32
M ufioz Marin reassured the secretary on two important aspects: the United States would be permitted to retain military
bases on the island; and the Puerto Ricans, after their thirty-eight
years of experience under American democracy could be trusted
not to elect bad governments. He did not seek to sever ties with
the United States, but sought to take full advantage of its markets
for Puerto Rican commodities by means of reciprocal arrangements.33
Fully aware of the way in which independence was offered
in the Tydings bill, Mufioz Marin described at length the procedure by which sovereignty could be extended to the island.
The most notable features of this procedure were his insistence
on a referendum among Puerto Ricans on the question of independence, and the adequate representation of Puerto Rican views
on the terms to be incorporated in mutual agreements. 84
The memorandum did not discuss many other important
aspects of the status question: how long the process should take,
what should happen if Puerto Ricans rejected independence, Congressional willingness or lack of it to grant the island independence or statehood. Furthermore, Mufioz Marin was overly optimistic as to what Puerto Rico could achieve economically as
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a sovereign entity. One fact, however, emerges clearly from the
document: the future leader recognized that the status issue, far
from being a political question, was actually an economic one.
And his broad thinking on economics was going to be incorporated in the program of the PPD.
In the months after the 1936 elections, both Barcelo and
Munoz Marin were under pressure from elements among their
supporters to call for an open break. Neither desired to be held
responsible for the disintegration of the Liberal party. Barcelo,
however, was the first to fire the shot when he expelled Munoz
Marin on May 31, 1937, in an informal meeting at a farm called
Naranjal. When Munoz Marin challenged this move, the Barcelo
group struck back by dissociating Munoz Marin, the ASI, and the
former senator's newspaper La Democracia from the Liberal party,
retroactive to December, 1936. Thereafter, the Liberal party's
central board under Barcelo's directive declared Munoz Marin
and his followers enemies of the party. 35
Charging that the party's executive committee had become
a "closed corporation," Munoz Marin a:qd his followers met on
June 4, 1937, and announced the formation of the Pure Authentic
and Complete Liberal party (Partido Liberal Neto A utentico y
Completo) .36 Twenty-three days later Munoz Marin called a
giant rally at which the new political group elected members to
its central committee and Munoz Marin as its president. Its platform called for independence. Munoz Marin said in his speech,
". . . there shall be social justice and independence for all . . . .
Deny it or not, we are the seed of Puerto Rico's independence." 37
The platform also included opposition to forced instruction of
English in the school system, and an appeal to the authorities
for the release of Nationalist prisoners in custody. 38
Even though Munoz Marin's new group was for all intents
and purposes a new political party, he still left the door slightly
ajar for reconciliation with the Liberal party, as the unconventional name of the group suggests. Barcelo, however, was not,
persuaded that there could be reconciliation. Instead he made
subtle overtures to the Coalition, which was also experiencing
dissension within its ranks. In the months after June, 1937,
Munoz Marin proceeded to convert the Pure Authentic and Complete Liberal party into a full-fledged organization, completely
separate and independent from the Liberal party. The new party
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was named the Partido Popular Democrdtico (PPD), and adopted
as its emblem the profile of a jibaro (countryman) wearing the
traditional Puerto Rican straw hat, the pava. For the next three
years Mufi.oz Marin and his faithful band of supporters traveled
the countryside and campaigned for endorsement of the PPD.
They stressed the party's commitment to improve economic, social, and health conditions, because they believed that living
conditions were of greater concern to the jibaros than the issue of
political status.39
By the time the constituent assembly of the PPD met at San
Juan on July 21, 1940, the party leadership was convinced not to
emphasize the status question in the forthcoming elections but
instead to concentrate its energies on economic and social issues.
The new party's decision to minimize the status issue had two
reasons: one, Mufi.oz Marin desired not to turn the elections into
some sort of a referendum on the political status question-he was
only too aware of what had happened in the 1936 elections-and,
two, to attract the widest possible support. The party platform
included independence as an objective at a special plebiscite, but
it was considerably weakened by stating that the party considered
statehood as of equal dignity. 40 Indeed, Mufi.oz Marin thwarted
some members from sending a message to the Pan American
Conference seeking recognition of Puerto Rico's right to sovereignty. Besides, the language on the status question was such
as to leave open the possibility of either statehood or independertce.41
Even if the platform was vague on the question of status, it
was · generally believed that the party leadership favored independence. And the Popular campaign booklet with a questionanswer format, The People's Catechism, left little doubt that its
author, Mufi.oz Marin, advocated independence. 42 Much of the
fervor among the leadership, however, had abated since 1936,
probably as the leaders became more aware of the economic implications surrounding status solutions. The shift is noticeable
in the rest of the party's platform. It called for enforcement of
the 5OO-acre land limit law; minimum wage laws; social security
for the unemployed and the physically disabled; liberalization of
credit to farmers, workers, businessmen, and manufacturers; a
program for the development and utilization of water resources;
laws to protect union rights; and, finally, legislation to make
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Spanish the official language of instruction in public schools,
without undermining the teaching of English. 43
Mufioz Marin campaigned strenuously, carefully playing up
his image as the "people's man." The party platform was heavily
oriented towards the interests of the laboring class and the middle
class. Those persons that Mufioz Marin could not personally visit
he hoped to reach through party newspapers like La Democracia
and the newly established El Batey. The Popular leader, however,
preferred to see and talk to the people, and he covered 500 of the
786 electoral districts. Among those he visited were the jibaros
in the hills and valleys of the island, urging them not to sell their
votes for two dollars, as had been the general practice in past
elections, but to give the PPD the votes in return for "justice"
long overdue to them. He talked to them in his shirtsleeves, went
without meals, slept at odd times, and generally ran the campaign
on much good will and little money, or so at least two of his
sympathetic biographers say.44
To further impress upon the electorate's mind the party's
sincerity and conviction in its program, the PPD called a massive
rally on September 15, 1940, in San Juan, at which all the bills
the party had campaigned for were approved and each Popular
candidate took an oath to vote for the bills if the party came into
power.411
In the meanwhile, Ramirez Santibanez had taken over the
leadership of the Liberal party after Barcel6's death in October,
1938. He moved to capitalize on the difficulties within the Coalition. The new Liberal leader joined forces with a dissident Republican faction under Miguel Angel Garcia Mendez and an
insurgent Socialist faction under Prudencio Rivera Martinez to
form a new political group, the Tripartite party. The new party's
platform included statehood, which it considered "the supreme
ideal of Puerto Rico." 46
The PPD was not completely happy with the 1940 election results, but it nevertheless proclaimed victory. The Coalition polled
222,423 votes compared to 214,857 for the Populares and 130,299
for the Tripartite party. The PPD failed to elect its own resident
commissioner-that post went to Socialist leader Bolivar Paganbut captured ten of the nineteen Senate seats, and shared equally
thirty-six of the thirty-nine House seats with the Coalition, the
three being won by the Tripartite party.47 Its success is remarkable when one considers that it was organized slightly over two
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years before the elections and that it had pitted itself against a
group well entrenched politically and well backed financially.
There are several possible reasons for the PPD's success. The
dissension among the Coalition and the disintegration of the Liberal party doubtless helped it. Mufioz Marin predicted before the
elections, "When the wolves begin to fight among themselves,
there's a chance the lambs will get through safely." 48 The vigorous
campaigning by the PPD candidates had an enormous impact on
the minds of the voters. But perhaps the most important factor
was the personality of Mufioz Marin himself. His charm and
persuasiveness were a great political asset. The Puerto Rican
leader could as easily move among jibaros as he could mix with
high-ranking government officials. George A. Malcolm, the attorney general of Puerto Rico at the time of the PPD's victory,
later wrote of Mufioz Marin, "One either surrenders unconditionally to his charm or as thoroughly dislikes him." "Don Luis
captivated me, as he has many other persons." 49 No less impressed
was William Brophy, legal counsel for the Interior department,
who commented about Mufioz Marin in his diary: "His eloquent
hands hypnotize. A clever, shrewd, calculating politician, not in
the sense of a job seeker or job giver, but in the sense of a philosophy [philosopher?] politician . . . . " 50 He had a rare quality of
engendering trust and understanding in most people who came
into contact with him.
Such a man was bound to command attention and respect
among a people who traditionally looked up to strong men to lead
them, 51 especially since two veteran politicians, Antonio Barcel6
and Santiago Iglesias, had died within the space of a year.
After the Tydings bill, a number of bills were introduced in
Congress purporting to give the island either independence or
statehood, none of which had the backing of the administration
or the enthusiasm of many Congressmen. On February 18, 1937,
Congressman Wilburn Cartwright, Democrat from Oklahoma,
introduced a bill enumerating steps to make the island a sovereign
state. 52 Gruening opposed it, saying that there could be no solution of Puerto Rico's status until the island was "rehabilitated
economically." 53 On several other occasions, Resident Commissioner Iglesias sponsored bills to turn Puerto Rico into an "incorporated territory" and to provide for its admission into the
the Union as a state, without any success. 54 Iglesias' failure did
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not discourage Bolivar Pagan, who replaced the Socialist leader
after his death in December, 1939. Pagan introduced in Congress
two bills at the same time, one providing for statehood, and the
other for greater autonomy, neither of which was acted upon by
the Committee on Insular Affairs. 55
The Roosevelt administration did not wish to support legislation concerning Puerto Rico's status without investigating its
political, legal, and economic implications. There are a number
of special reports in the files of the Office of Territories and the
Department of the Interior records, at least one of which was
undertaken at the specific request of the administration. The
first of these reports was submitted by H. Murray-Jacoby to Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring. The 65-page report, prepared
on March 11, 1937, ruled out independence and statehood but
recommended steps by which the island could arrive at dominion
status. Drawing upon his study of British colonial policy, the
author described a series of four two-year stages by which Puerto
Rican autonomy could be increased. The most notable aspect of
the report was its emphasis on gradualism, the next two-year
stage being contingent upon satisfactory performance during the
stage immediately preceding. 56
In another report, Benjamin Horton, a lawyer on the staff
of PRRA, offered his opinion as to the island's legal status. He
maintained that Puerto Rico was a "territory" of the United
States enjoying the same legal status that the states then in the
Union did when they were "territories." It had never been the
intention of the United States, he continued, to withdraw its
sovereignty, especially since it had extended United States citizenship to the islanders in 1917.57 Later in 1937, Walter F. McCaleh,
special advisor to the Department of the Interior, prepared a 173page report. It lacked any merit and appeared to be superficial
in its investigation and sometimes wild in its conclusions, as in
the assertion that M ufioz Marin and Gruening had conspired to
jockey themselves into power and position. 58
The most important of the reports to appear by 1940 was the
Zimmerman report. The study was requested by the Interdepartmental Commission, consisting of six high interdepartmental
officials, among them Interior's Assistant Secretary Chapman, who
served as the chairman. Dr. Erich W. Zimmerman was placed in
charge of the investigation. The 308-page report was published
in September, 1940. Its findings were not encouraging. The
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report stated that the island lacked industrial resources, and was
heavily dependent upon agriculture. It also stated that, because
of natural conditions and the desire for access to an expanding
market, sugar was the best crop, though not necessarily ideal.
Furthermore, there was little room for expansion of agricultural
resources, which was discouraging because of the rapid rate of
the island's population growth. The report recommended that
the island's trade restrictions with its Caribbean neighbors be
relaxed. 59
Even though the Zimmerman report did not give adequate
attention to truck-farm products and pineapples, which would
thrive given the same conditions under which sugar cane thrived
on the island, 60 the implications of its findings were ominous:
the island's economy was stagnant because of its dependence on
sugar, and yet, under the circumstances, it was the best crop. It
was apparently with this in mind that the administration appointed Tugwell, then chairman of the Planning Commission of
New York City, and formerly assistant secretary of Agriculture, to
undertake an investigation of the possibilities of enforcing the
500-acre land limit law in Puerto Rico, 61 especially since this was
the avowed objective of the newly elected PPD. Tugwell's recommendations and the PPD program will form the subject of
the next chapter. It is sufficient to say here that the call for an
investigation of the island's economic problems would indicate
the administration's concern for Puerto Rico's economic stability
rather than political status. This was a far cry from the 1936
Tydings bill. Since then, the European war had entirely changed
the complexity of the situation.
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CHAPTER THREE

Delayed New Deal under
Munoz Madn and Governor Tugwell

The year 1941 marked the beginning of a new direction in
Puerto Rican affairs. The newly formed PPD assumed control
of insular political affairs, and a new governor in the person of
Tugwell helped the Populares in their efforts to implement programs and policies for which they had campaigned in the 1940
elections. In Tugwell, Puerto Ricans found a champion of
greater autonomy and administrative reforms. The governor
partly succeeded in instituting administrative reforms, but his
attempts to grant the islanders wider self-government ran afoul
of Congressional opposition generated by wariness that comes
with the excessive powers of the administration during wartime,
and by some Congressmen's suspicions of New Dealers. 1 Indirectly, Tugwell's contribution to the islanders' political freedom
was enormous: in helping the PPD to carry out its forwardlooking policies, he aided in politically consolidating the party
under which the greatest political autonomy was to come in the
postwar period.
Although the Populares were able to persuade the three
Tripartite members in the insular House to support their cause,
thereby maintaining a tenuous majority,2 they needed a cooperative governor if they hoped to succeed in their policies. Both
39
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Governor Tugwell and the Popular leader Mufi.oz Marin were
New Deal enthusiasts who broadly agreed on the manner in
which the island's economic and social problems should be corrected. The governor appointed like-minded Populares to important government posts, which had the effect of reducing Puerto
Rico's traditional friction between the elected legislature and the
appointed executive, and generating considerable agreement and
coordination between the two. 3
A controversial figure in American politics, Tugwell did not
escape scrutiny and criticism at the time he was nominated for
the governor's post. A number of Coalition representatives insisted at the Senate hearings on Tugwell's nomination that the
former Agricultural undersecretary's appointment as governor
would inject disharmony into Puerto Rican politics, not only
because he was a close friend of Mufi.oz Marin's but also because
his economic views were certain to run counter to the interests
of the sugar corporations, and thus of Puerto Rico's. 4 The strongest opposition came from Senator Robert H. Taft of Ohio, who
accused Tugwell of being an opponent of the "traditional American system of individual initiative and enterprise" and therefore
incapable of representing American ideals. Taft sharply questioned Tugwell's competence as an administrator, asserting that
nothing in the New Dealer's record since 1933 could be regarded
as "successful accomplishment." 5
It was presumably the administration's strong backing and
Mufi.oz Marin's endorsement that led the Senate narrowly to
approve Tugwell's nomination. 6 He took the oath of office on
September 19, 1941, two days after he had resigned his post as
the chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico. 7
Tugwell brought to the office of governor a varied background of knowledge and administrative experience. A professor
of economics at Columbia University in 1931, he had become
known for his economic views through a series of books and
articles. He felt that laissez-faire capitalism was doomed, and
should make way for "undoctrinaire planned economy." 8 Tugwell drew national attention when he was appointed in 1932 as
one of the original members of the "brain trust" in the Roosevelt
administration. A year later, Tugwell was assigned to the post of
assistant secretary of Agriculture, and later became undersecretary
of Agriculture. In 1935 he organized the controversial Resettlement Administration, which was designed to handle rural pov-
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erty. This venture brought him much notoriety, and he left the
administration in 1936. Two years later Mayor Fiorello H. La
Guardia of New York City appointed him the first chairman of
the Planning Commission of the city, a post he held until 1941
when Muiioz Marin offered him the chancellorship of the University of Puerto Rico. 9
Soon after Tugwell was inaugurated he was confronted with
the problem that all his predecessors had faced in Puerto Rico,
namely, the question of patronage. The Populares had elected
their men to key legislative positions, the most important of
which, the Senate presidency, was held by Muiioz Marin himself.
With the help of the Tripartite members, the PPD leader secured
the election of fellow-party-founder Samuel Quinones as Speaker
of the House. Governor Tugwell, like his immediate predecessor,
Guy J. Swope, realized that no appointments opposed by Muiioz
Marin could hope to be confirmed by the Senate. 10
Thus, when a Coalition delegation, consisting of Bolivar
Pagan, Celestino Iriarte, and Jose Balseiro, visited the governor
for assurances that he would appoint Republicans and Socialists
to government posts, at least in proportion to their legislative
strength, he flatly turned it down. He could not but favor the
Populares, he argued later in his book, because they controlled
the legislature. He explained, "If I had to make a choice, I should
have to choose the Populares because that party had control of
the Senate, which, after all, did the confirming. If, however, I
was pressed to choose, I could often appoint Republicanos and
bargain for their confirmation." 11 The Coalition naturally became piqued about it, and soon declared the governor persona
non grata. What made it particularly difficult for the Coalition
to accept Tugwell as governor was his endorsement of Popular
policies, which clashed with the interests of other groups that it
traditionally represented. 12
Tugwell hoped to institute administrative reforms that would
give the executive a measure of freedom from the politics of
patronage. The Puerto Rican Senate wielded enormous influence
over even minor appointments by virtue of its power of confirmation; and cabinet members sedulously complied with the wishes
of the party in legislative control, even though they were in theory
directly responsible to the governor. In investigative functions,
too, the legislature had encroached on the powers of the executive.
And as to the executive powers over appropriations, the legislature
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had clearly circumvented them by creating a host of permanent
appropriations and many more special funds. 13
Tugwell made some progress in his reform attempt. The
former practice of formally submitting to the governor lists of
possible appointees was discontinued in favor of informal consultations between the majority party leaders and the governors. 14
The governor added specialists and technical experts to his staff
to help him in his administrative duties. Within a year of his
taking the office, his staff had doubled. In May, 1942, the Office
of Statistics was established, followed a month later by the Office
of Information. The Bureau of the Budget was created in August,
1942, to help him in fiscal matters, followed soon thereafter by
the appointment of a coordinator of Insular Affairs and a coordinator of Federal Affairs. These offices were designed to expedite the administrative efforts of the territorial and federal
capitals. The annual appropriations for the office of the governor
more than doubled, from $100,000 to $250,000, by the end of
1946.15
M uiioz · Marin was fearful that the increased powers of the
governor would undermine his position as leader of both his
party and the insular legislature. Furthermore, he was concerned
about the long-term effects of such reform measures, and many
times he invoked the name of "Ole Gandule," the mythical bad
governor of the future. 16 Tugwell reflected later in his book,
" . . . he [Munoz Marin] felt he could not give up his control. He
fought me insistently to keep intact the political machine. Moreover, he now continually called in cabinet members and gave
them orders without consulting me." 17 The Popular leader did,
however, begin to support Tugwell's civil service reforms by
1944, when he felt sufficiently strong politically; 18 but real progress
in this area came only after Muiioz Marin was elected the governor
and leadership in the executive and legislative branches was centralized in the majority party. 19
The governor's appointment of young, educated, talented,
and dedicated men to the various administrative posts was to serve
Puerto Rico's long-term interests. In hiring young Puerto Ricans
to do work that would normally be done by non-Puerto Ricans in
a typically colonial situation, Tugwell pointed to the political
maturity and responsibility of the islanders in general. He hoped
that their appointments would augur well for Puerto Rico's cause
for greater self-rule by making available competent personnel
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ready to serve administratively when the time came. 20 Most of
these men continued working in their positions after he left the
governorship in 1946, many of them reaching prominent positions
under the last appointed governor, Jesus T. Pinero, and the first
elected governor, Munoz Marin. 21
The leader of the Populares proceeded to implement a farreaching program of economic and social development with the
help of Governor Tugwell. In compliance with their campaign
promise, the Populares had succeeded in establishing the Land
Authority in April, 1941 (before Tugwell became governor), to
implement an equitable land policy along the line suggested by
the previously discussed Chardon Plan of 1936. The United
States Supreme Court had ruled in March, 1940, that the 5OOacre land law was constitutional. It was now the task of the Land
Authority to decide what should be done with the total of 580,788
acres of land, 249,000 of which were held by fifty-one corporations,
owned in violation of that law. Mufi.oz Marin realized that no
matter how the land was to be acquired and redistributed he
would need the wholehearted support of the governor. 22
Tugwell had investigated, at Secretary Ickes' direction, the
whole question of the 5OO-acre _law months before his appointment
as governor. His report, officially submitted to the secretary in
December, 1941, maintained that the land should be acquired by
purchase and redistributed by the Land Authority. He did not
elaborate as to how this might be done, but he did maintain that
in eliminating illegal large-scale sugar operations, efficiency should
not be sacrificed. The governor also suggested that the Land
Authority be given assistance from the Farm Security Administration.23 As it happened, the Puerto Rican agency received the help
of such federal agencies as the Agricultural Adjustment Agency,
the Farm Credit Administration, and the Insular Experiment
Station. 24
The Land Authority, authorized by the insular legislature
and approved by Secretary Ickes, decided to redistribute the purchased land in three ways. First, under the Individual Farm plan
it hoped to create small farm units between five to twenty-five
acres in size, to be purchased by individual households at a price
to be determined by the Authority, plus 5 percent interest, and
payable in installments over a period as long as forty years. Second, the "Proportional-profit" farm, ranging from I 00 to 500
acres, was designed to combine justice with the administrative
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efficiency necessary in large-scale operations. The farm was to be
run by an experienced manager and workers, all of whom were
to receive wages plus proportionate shares of the profits for the
whole operation. Third, the homesteading program for the
agregados (landless peasants) was to provide small tracts of land
made available nominally, one of the conditions being that the
owner of the land was to build or move his house on the land
within 120 days. 25
Tugwell cooperated fully in implementing the Popular land
policy. On several occasions between 1942 and 1946, the Puerto
Rican legislature amended the Land Law of 1941 upon the governor's advice to clarify certain provisions and to broaden the
scope of others to include a wider section of the people. By June
30, 1946, the Land Authority had acquired 2.9 percent of the
total land area of the island, almost all of which it redistributed
in the following way: 2,000 cuerdas (1940 acres) to 148 individual
farmers, 44,897.99 cuerdas (43,551.05 acres) as "Proportionalprofit" farms, and 15,648.83 cuerdas (15,179.37 acres) as homestead plots to the landless. 26
The Water Resources Authority (WRA) was created before
Tugwell took office, but its · final organization was completed
during his governorship. Its function was to facilitate irrigation
and to develop energy resources to produce cheaper electricity.
Tugwell recommended to the president the purchase of three
private utility companies. When the companies refused to sell
their properties, the federal government expropriated them. The
companies filed litigation against the government, and the matter
was not resolved until January, 1944, when, subsequent to the
court decision, the three companies were permanently transferred
to WRA. 27 The Tugwell administration created several public
utilities. The Transportation and Communications Authorities
were intended for improved roads and streets and for better public
conveyances at cheaper rates. Another public utility, the Aqueduct-and-Sewerage Authority, was established in 1945. Its function was to install and operate a modern system of sewage disposal
and to supply pure water to residents in towns and cities. 28
At the governor's request, the Puerto Rican legislature consolidated in 1942 several insular authorities into a central body
known as the Puerto Rico Housing Authority (PRHA). Despite
the interruption of federal loans because of the war, the PRHA
was able to undertake the development of new housing projects;
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and under the direction of the Planning, Urbanizing, and Zoning
Board, it was able to institute slum clearance programs. By June,
1946, the PRHA had built projects at a cost of over $4.5 billion
and had housed over 2,000 families. 29
An ambitious industrialization program was undertaken
when the Puerto Rican Development Company (after 1946 the
body was known as the Puerto Rican Industrial Development
Company, PRIDCO) was established in 1942. The company was
modeled closely after the Chilean Corporacion de Fomento, except that the former concentrated its efforts in fostering industrial
and commercial enterprises. The organization was authorized to
direct research into the island's resources, to make available loans
and technical information to persons willing to establish new
industrial enterprises or expand old ones, and to train personnel
that would be required for working the new facilities.so
The funds necessary to expand PRDCO's activities were
made available by an insular agency, the Development Bank.
Under Teodoro Moscoso as its general manager, PRDCO organized five subsidiary corporations in the next four years. These
were the Pureto Rico Glass Corporation, the Puerto Rico Cement
Corporation (first organized in February, 1938, under the Puerto
Rican Reconstruction Administration), the Puerto Rico Clay
Products Corporation, and the Puerto Rico Shoe and Leather
Corporation.st By June, 1946, PRIDCO, as it was then called,
owned properties estimated at $11,743,456, giving employment
to 1,379 persons.s2
The industrialization program was an attempt to tap fully
the benefits of the mineral-based industries and to utilize "idle
capital."ss It was a bold scheme made possible by the fantastic
rum "bonanza" during the war years (rum taxes netted the insular
treasury $160 million more than in normal times). However,
except for the Cement Corporation, the other government ventures were failures. They were plagued by lack of technical personnel, the difficulties of operating subsidiaries owned by the
government, such as debilitating labor disputes, and the competition from United States markets. Furthermore, PRIDCO failed
in its promise of creating thousands of jobs for the island's
workers. 34
The Chard6n Plan had maintained that the Puerto Rican
economy could improve only if an industrialization program accompanied plans for diversifying insular agriculture. The Land
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Authority hoped to break the monopoly over land that could
otherwise be used for growing other agricultural products; the
Puerto Rican Agricultural Development Company, organized in
1945, sought to use government efforts along the lines of PRDCO
to introduce to the island food crops other than those existing
already, and to improve upon those already being grown. 311 The
Populares and the Tugwell administration succeeded partially in
striking a reasonably happy balance between industry and agriculture. This indeed must be the conclusion from the figures
given by Harvey Perloff in writing about Puerto Rican economy
for the periods 1939-1940 and 1945-1946, considering the fact
that this was the first concerted effort in Puerto Rican history
and that trends do not clearly emerge over a short period of six
years. 36
But the increased economic activity in Puerto Rico came
during wartime, when it was able to capitalize on the rum industry
and the absence of aggressive mainland capital. Furthermore, the
government-sponsored enterprises had been plagued by a variety
of problems. A need was felt, therefore, to reorient its industrialization drive to accommodate the postwar economic exigencies.
After 1946 the insular government shifted its policy to rely less
upon government-sponsored programming and more upon privately organized efforts. The new policy, known as "Operation
Bootstrap," involved selling three of the PRIDCO-managed corporations to a private Puerto Rican industrialist and inviting
mainland capital to the island. 37 The decision to bolster Puerto
Rican industrialization with United States private capital was a
clear recognition of an already existing fact, namely, that the
island's economic future depended upon its continued relationship with the giant of the North. It was to have significant implications for Puerto Rico's political future.
The Populares and the Tugwell administration relied upon
bold and innovative methods that sometimes showed good results
but always raised a storm of controversy among insular and continental politicians. The pitch of political acrimony seldom
reached the point it did in the first two years of Tugwell's governorship when Coalicionistas were crying "Socialism, Communism,
Dictatorship!" in an attempt to dislodge the governor from his
office.
When the Coalition succeeded neither in its attempts to win
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Tugwell's political favor nor in its drive to deprive the Populares
of the support of the Tripartite party,38 it called upon the tireless
assistance of the resident commissioner in Washington, Pagan,
who belonged to the Coalition group. Together they hoped to
bring to the administration's and Congress' attention their opinion that Tugwell was undesirable as governor and should be
removed.
On February 17, 1942, Pagan had printed in the Congressional Record a resolution adopted at a mass Coalition convention.
The resolution accused Tugwell of being partisan, charged that his
policies were anti-sugar industry and pro-labor, and called for his
dismissal. 39 A day later the resident commissioner inserted into the
records a letter that Coalition leaders Iriarte and Lino Padron
Rivera had written to Secretary Ickes. Puerto Rico was, the letter
said, "sick and tired of undesirable Federal appointees whose incumbency would not be tolerated by any American community.'' 40
The resident commissioner accused Tugwell of being "an
American Quisling" because he was sowing disunity among the
islanders loyal to the United States and causing them to feel
"digust and distrust" towards American institutions.41 Even
though the charges by Pagan were distorted, many newspapers in
the United States appeared to be at least sympathetic to Coalition
complaints. And the Puerto Rican representative did not hesitate
to have printed in the Congressional Record newspaper editorials
that were favorable to his cause.42 The Washington Evening Star
spoke disapprovingly of the PPD's "secessionist or independence
plank" and of its program of "communistic distribution of land"
among the poor farmers and peasants of the land. The New Republic echoed Pagan's disapproval of Tugwell because he had
fostered "disunion and hatred" among the Puerto Ricans and
pointed out that an "overwhelming majority" of them desired
his removal.•3
In addition Pagan wrote to congressmen and senators whenever the opportunity presented itself. On February 24, 1942, he
addressed a letter to Senator Harry S. Truman-in response to
what he called a "sneak letter" by Munoz Marin to the senatorin which he accused the PPD leader of collaborating with Tugwell
in seeking to establish a "communistic 'new order.'" The resident
commissioner revealed what was probably the real reason for his
opposition to Tugwell: the governor was "disregarding and kick-
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ing the rights of the Coalition" and was "playing all the political
game exclusively with Luis Mufioz Marin." 44
The anti-Tugwell campaign reached its peak by the middle
of 1942. The governor's resolve to hold the office weakened somewhat, and his resignation was rumored. 45 Tugwell was persuaded
to continue as governor by the strong endorsement he received
from the Populares and Secretary Ickes. The PPD leader explained to the president in a cable on January 19, 1942, that the
move to oust the governor was the work simply of a few "reactionary Republican and Socialist politicians." 46 About a month
later he wrote to Senator Truman, telling him that Pagan's attacks were "false in [their] irresponsible allegations." 47
Mufioz Marin at the same time worked to get the insular
House to adopt and forward to President Roosevelt a resolution
denouncing Pagan's activities in Washington as unrepresentative
of the majority will. 48 Soon thereafter the Puerto Rican Senate,
under Mufioz Marin's leadership, adopted a resolution endorsing
the governorship of Tugwell. 49 In addition, a petition bearing
over 300,000 signatures was presented to Tugwell in support of
his administration of the island.110
Secretary Ickes consistently supported Tugwell. On January
27, 1942, the secretary informed the governor that he was not
going to trouble to respond to Tugwell's critics because to do so
would simply give "currency and dignity to an effort to put you
in a false light." 51 When Tugwell suggested that Pagan had an
"unlimited drawing account with the sugar producers association"
and that "serious" attempts were being made to "bore" into the
"Army, Navy, Interior, and Agriculture" departments, 52 the secretary directed Federal Bureau of Investigations director J. Edgar
Hoover to investigate the matter. 53 Relations between the secretary and the resident commissioner were at best strained. When
Pagan requested in somewhat intemperate language that the
secretary veto an insular law already approved by Tugwell, Ickes
rebuked him in a similar vein for even suggesting such a move.114
Four months later the head of the Department of the Interior
publicly chided two of Tugwell's critics who were also members
of Tugwell's cabinet. They were two continentals, Patrick J.
Fitzsimmons as auditor and George A. Malcolm as attorney general, 1111 both of whom later testified before Congressional investigating committees.
The attacks on Tugwell coincided with the difficulties created
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by the war and added to the fodder of Coalition cannons. The
Puerto Ricans suffered directly and indirectly as a result of the
shortage of shipping space. The War Shipping Administration
(WSA) fixed the monthly tonnage to the island at a much reduced
quota of 30,000 tons, the major portion of which was reserved for
essential items such as food. The Agricultural Marketing Administration (AMA), later the Food Distribution Administration
(FDA), was a federal agency that undertook to distribute the food
supplies on the island to ensure fair distribution and to prevent
profiteering. Puerto Rican business interests and insular representatives of mainland food processors complained about unnecessary interference. They maintained that the AMA policy was
undermining the business activities of the private interests, which
would lead to inefficiency and the supplying of low quality food.
Furthermore, they argued that the allotment of 30,000 tons per
month needed to be increased. (The tonnage in normal times
was 110,000 permonth.) 56
It was in response to the food crisis in Puerto Rico that
Senator Dennis Chavez of New Mexico introduced on October 20,
1942, Senate Resolution 309 to investigate the social and economic
conditions resulting from the war. 57 When the resolution reached
the Senate floor, Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan insisted
that the investigation be broadened to include the policies of
Tugwell, whom he referred to as the "chief commissar of Puerto
Rico" and the "Don Quixote of the New Deal," to find out
whether Tugwell's "half-baked" projects were the real causes of
Puerto Rico's problems. 58 A similar sentiment appeared to prevail
in the House Committee on Agriculture, which had a week before
approved a measure to provide an additional $15 million to encourage the production of foodstuff in Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands, with the provision that the Puerto Rican part of
the money could not be used so long as Tugwell remained the
govemor. 59
However, because many senators were opposed to taking
political advantage over the island's food problem, and Secretary
Ickes objected to any kind of investigation,60 the Chavez Subcommittee of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs
decided to limit its study to the food problem only. Even though
Coalicionistas like Pagan did not miss the opportunity to take
swipes at Governor Tugwell in their testimony at the hearings,
the Chavez Subcommittee's report exonerated Tugwell and Ickes
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from responsibility for the shipping shortage and the food crisis.
The report maintained that the investigation was far too general
for the subcommittee to say whether the other charges against
Tugwell were valid.61
The anti-Tugwell forces, having been thwarted by the administration's backing of the governor, decided to remove him by
legislative fiat. Senator Vandenberg and Resident Commissioner
Pagan capitalized on the anti-Tugwell momentum that had built
up in Congress by introducing S.40 and its companion bill H.R.
784. The bill did not specifically refer to Tugwell, but provided
that upon its enactment the term of office of the incumbent governor would expire and that the new governor would hold office
for a period of two years. The senator's remarks, however, left
little doubt that the bill was aimed specifically at Tugwell. He
said, "Governor Tugwell's removal has been prayerfully sought
by petitions from numerous Puerto Rican groups and other students of Puerto Rican affairs who believe that his swiftly expanding bureaucracy and his superlatively expensive administrationwith all its implicit national socialization-is a fateful threat to
our Island wards and is related to the Island's serious predicament."62 Eleven days later the Senate Committee on Territories
and Insular Affairs approved S.40 with two amendments: the
governor's office was to expire sixty days after enactment of the
bill, and future governors were to hold office for four years. The
committee chairman, Senator Tydings of Maryland, did not think
the bill was an ouster of Tugwell. 63
But the administration thought otherwise. In a letter to
Senator Tydings, Secretary Ickes strongly stated his objection to
S.40: it was aimed specifically at Tugwell; and since the responsibility of removing an executive-appointed official was that of the
president and not of the legislature, it was unconstitutional. The
legislature did have the right, he continued, to impeach, but
S.40 circumvented this provision and sought to punish a public
official without a judicial trial. Besides, the secretary pointed out,
the committee had acted hastily: it had succumbed to the insistence of a vocal minority in Puerto Rico, it had not held hearings or sought the opinion of the departments of State and Interior, it had not considered the implications that the bill would
have on the Caribbean and Latin America. 64
At a press conference on February 4, 1943, Ickes lived up to
his nickname "Old Curmudgeon" in attacking Pagan for his
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attempt to remove Tugwell. He said, "We think that that ought
to be a two-year term rather than a four-year term, and in that
connection we have in mind the [fact that the] legislature of
Puerto Rico sent a memorial to Commissioner Pagan asking him
to introduce a bill providing for his recall. But he's too busy trying to tear down other people to introduce a bill that the people
of his own Territory asked him to introduce." 65
On February 9, 1943, the secretary of Interior stated in a
long letter to Congressman Jasper Bell of Missouri, chairman of
the House Committee on Insular Affairs, his reasons for opposing
H.R.784. In addition to some of the reasons he gave in his letter
to Senator Tydings, the secretary expounded on others: Tugwell
had the backing of the insular legislature; 568,747 persons had
signed a memorial supporting him; and he was therefore a popular
governor; the controversial laws in Puerto Rico had been presented before the New Dealer took office; and governors in the
past had become the centers of great political controversy, irrespective of their political views. Furthermore, H.R.784 would
have the effect of superficially changing the Organic Act when a
thorough investigation of the law was necessary. The secretary intimated that the Department of the Interior was studying
how the Organic Act might be revised. 66
In the hearings on H.R.784 that followed a week later, no
new arguments were produced either for or against the bill's
passage. They were highlighted by the showdown between Secretary Ickes and the resident commissioner, which presumably
discredited Pagan and killed all hopes of the bill's success. Having
the advantage of testifying over a week after the resident commissioner, the secretary came well prepared with a rebuttal. 67 Ickes
questioned Pagan's integrity by accusing him of misrepresenting
facts to serve his own interests and those of a minority. " . . .
[T]his attack upon Governor Tugwell," the secretary charged,
"by Mr. Pagan and his associates has bigger game as its objective
. . . . They are attacking the wisdom of the people of Puerto
Rico in electing to the legislature a majority which is opposed to
Mr. Pagan's Socialist party and its Coalition allies. And they are
attacking the Legislature of Puerto Rico because it has passed
laws with which they do not agree and which are being faithfully
executed by Governor Tugwell as he is charged to do." The bill,
Ickes continued, was meant to build Pagan's own "political
fences," and as soon as the administration told Pagan that it was
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considering a bill for an elective governor, he "came in with a
badly digested, badly constructed bill. I think it is just politics." 68
The administration was able to beat back the attempt to oust
Tugwell. There were two other similar attempts, the first in
April, 1944, and the second in December, 1944. 69 Neither had
much chance of success.
Since the administration staunchly opposed Tugwell's removal, the United States Congress sought to assert its authority
in other ways. On January 11, 1943, four days after Senator Vandenberg introduced S.40, Representative Fred Crawford of Michigan introduced a bill to annul a whole range of sweeping laws
passed by the insular legislature. These laws were: the Land
Law, Water Resources Act, Puerto Rico Transportation Authority
Act, Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company Act, Puerto
Rico Communication Authority Act, and the Development Bank
Act. Crawford explained his bill in this way, "Inasmuch as the
administration for some strange reason seems reluctant to remove
him [Tugwell] in spite of the flood of violent criticism and the
disruption of economic life in Puerto Rico, the least we can do
at this time is to undo some of the evil he has perpetrated in our
territory.'' 7° Crawford sought to undo with one legislative stroke
the entire PPD program.
Crawford's bill raised deep and serious questions of Puerto
Rican autonomy. The United States Congress was seeking to
exercise its authority over insular affairs to the extent of annulling
laws duly passed by a popularly elected body, unless Crawford
merely intended to pressure the administration into firing Governor Tugwell. There was widespread opposition to the bill
among all Puerto Rican political groups. Mufioz Marin is reported as having said, ". . . [it would be] resisted with the same
tenacity and the same determination with which the free nations
of the world are resisting the attempts of the dictator Adolph
Hitler to destroy democracy." 71 The bill was opposed by the
administration, at least as it is reflected in the diary of the Interior
department's legal counsel William Brophy.72 Crawford's bill
probably strengthened the position of the Populares rather than
weakened it. 78
In yet another way Congress felt obliged to exercise its. powers. Both the Senate and the House called for investigations of
the political, economic, and social situation in Puerto Rico. That
the two bodies should initiate within a month of each other two
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separate investigations seemed a strange waste of Congressional
energy and public money. The Senate approved, in January,
I 943, Senate Resolution 26, which called for a study of "Economic
and Social Conditions in Puerto Rico"; while the House authorized the Committee on Insular Affairs, by House Resolution 159
in April, 1943, to undertake the "Investigation of Political, Economic and Social Conditions in Puerto Rico." 74
,
The Senate Subcommittee, known as the Chavez Subcommittee, after its chairman Dennis Chavez, approached its task in a
fairly impartial manner. Senator Chavez and four other senators,
among them Taft of Ohio, were interested in getting a crosssection of Puerto Rican views and opinions. They visited the
island and attempted to meet and hear all interest groups. In
all they heard forty-five witnesses testify before their subcommittee.75 By far the most- interesting development was Senator
Taft's appreciation of the sincerity of the attempts by the PPD
and Tugwell to eliminate the island's problems. He was impressed with the magnitude of Puerto Rico's problems and was
willing to permit bold approaches to solve them. "I'm not exactly
a radical," he is reported by Tugwell as having said, "but after
all I object to being classed with those who think public ownership unconstitutional. I may not be in favor of it, usually, but
Puerto Rico is a very special case." 76
Indeed, the Chavez Subcommittee's evenhanded approach
is reflected in its report. Far from being overly critical of the
Populares and Tugwell, it underscored the need for federal aid
to help alleviate conditions resulting from unemployment. The
report also stressed that programs for increasing food production
should be undertaken. Soon after the subcommittee's return to
Washington, it secured the adoption of Senate Resolution 981 to
appropriate funds ($25 million each for fiscal years 1943-1944
and 1944-1945) to ensure the continuation of the Works Progress
Administration. 77
The House subcommittee, under Congressman Bell, conducted its investigation in a different fashion, on the other hand.
In contrast to the Chavez Subcommittee, which sought to hear
all shades of political opinion, the Bell Subcommittee relied heavily upon witnesses who were opposed to Tugwell and the Populares. The hearings were stretched over a period of more than a
year, the subcommittee's purpose apparently being to keep the
Tugwell administration in Puerto Rico under constant watch. 78
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Its report certainly does not do justice to the massive and sometimes complex testimony that the subcommittee heard, presumably because the subcommittee did not consider it necessary to
obtain the professional help of an economist, a statistician, or a
historian. 79
The report concluded that the insular government was increasingly encroaching upon private enterprises, which, in the
subcommittee's opinion, corresponded with the situation of
Fascist Italy under Mussolini. The leaders of the island, the
report continued, had embarked upon policies and programs
bound to destroy "individual liberties of the people and enslave
them eventually by setting up a form of government wholly alien
to our own." 80 It recommended that the teaching of the English
language in public schools should be expanded, that the island's
industrialization policies should be re-examined, and that -the
House Committee on Insular Affairs should be given full authority to consider all legislative matters affecting Puerto Rico. 81
There is truth in Tugwell's assertion that the Bell Subcommittee proceeded about its business with prejudged notions82 and
that it was not sympathetic to the administration's explanation
of why government-sponsored projects were necessary, given the
conditions on the island. 83 Far from desiring to increase the
island's autonomy, the Bell Subcommittee sought to impose
stifling Congressional controls over the manner in which Puerto
Rico was going to handle its problems, especially where federal
funds were involved. When the Chavez Subcommittee sponsored
Senate Resolution 981 to provide work relief for the unemployed
in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, Congressman Bell argued
for an amendment that would have appropriated a portion of the
internal revenue taxes on rum that were returned to the insular
treasury to go to the Federal Works Agency, where the funds
would have been controlled by Congress. Secretary Ickes and the
Puerto Rican leaders of all parties registered strong protests,
and the bill was shelved until February, 1944. 84
The Vandenberg-Pagan bill, the Crawford measure, the two
Congressional investigations, and the intended amendment to
Senate Resolution 981 indicate Congress' desire to have a greater
say in the administration of the island. So long as Puerto Rico
was under the United States flag, and so long as it received federal funds, Congress should exercise its supervisory powers over
insular affairs, according to many Congressional members. At a
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time when the executive had assumed wide powers, such Congressional reaction seems understandable. But those legislators
who sought to remove Tugwell from the governorship one way
or another were confusing the constitutional issue of Congressional prerogative and the political issues surrounding his incumbency. They overlooked the fact that Tugwell had the support of the insular legislature, that the policies they were attributing to the governor originated in nearly all cases with the
Populares, and that the island's problems were such that bold
and innovative methods were necessary to handle them. But
above all, in singling out the New Dealer and the Populares, who
after all represented the majority will of the Puerto Rican electorate, they neglected questions about the island's desire for selfgovernment and greater autonomy.
Ironically, the man who insisted that the islanders be granted
at least the right to elect their own governor was the appointed
representative of the United States, Governor Tugwell. His experience with the United States Congress underscored the need
for such a reform measure.
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CHAPTER FOUR

An Attempt to End
~~Humiliating Suspense":
The Elective Governor Bill of 1943

Coalition attacks upon Tugwell strengthened the governor's
resolve to wor1'. for an amendment to the Organic Act to provide
for an elective governor. A popularly elected governor would end
some of the bickering over political patronage and pave the way
for a smoother and less confused administration by the party in
power, as it would normally control leadership in both the executive and legislative branches. An appointed governor was answerable to the president and the United States legislature, a fact
which confused and confounded his duties in the minds of the
Puerto Rican people, and made difficult his relationship with the
popularly elected insular legislature. Besides, the United States
was morally obliged to advance political freedom in its Caribbean
possession in terms of the professed Allied aim during World War
II to extend greater self-government in the colonial world.
Throughout 1942 and 1943 Tugwell worked towards this
end, even though he was given no active encouragement from a
skeptical Munoz Marin, who was at this time preoccupied with
consolidating his political power. 1 In a letter to President Roosevelt on March 11, 1942, Tugwell suggested that the president announce support for a change in Puerto Rican status after the war.
Allowing the Puerto Ricans to elect their own officials, Tugwell
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continued, would "abjure colonialism not in words but by a
deed," while the United States could retain military and naval
privileges, as in the case of Cuba and Guantanamo. 2 Apparently
sensitive to Caribbean criticism of colonialism, he prevailed upon
the Caribbean Advisory Committee, organized jointly by the
United States and Britain, to address a similar message to the
president in June, 1942.3
The administration was prodded into some action only after
Resident Commissioner Pagan introduced on July 6, 1942, H.R.
7352 to provide for an elective governor in Puerto Rico. 4 Secretary Ickes told Pagan, however, that the matter of revising the
Organic Act needed to be carefully studied before decisions
could be taken, 5 while Undersecretary Abe Fortas advised the
chairman of the Committee on Interior Affairs that the bill required substantial revision. 6 On the same day that the secretary
responded to Pagan, he requested Tugwell to consider preparing
legislation for the election of a governor beginning in 1944 and
every four years thereafter, and for any other changes to the Organic Act that were necessary. 7 It is not known what steps Tugwell
took after receiving this communication. In November, 1942, the
president reassured Pagan that the Department of the Interior
was studying the question, 8 which suggests, if nothing else, that the
administration had not forgotten about the subject of insular
autonomy.
There was increased reference to Puerto Rican autonomy
only after the Vandenberg-Pagan bill was introduced in January,
1943, seeking to remove Tugwell. The governor spoke briefly
about self-government for Puerto Rico in the fifteenth insular
legislature in February, 1943.9 He was more specific about what
steps should be taken when he testified at length before the
Chavez Subco:i;nmittee about the necessity of ending "older approaches to colonialism." The United States should permit the
election of a governor, who in turn should have the power to
appoint the auditor, the commissioner of education, the attorney
general, and the judges of the Supreme Court, all of these appointments then being submitted to the president for confirmation. The governor warned that this step should be taken soon
or else there would be "grave administrative difficulties," but he
ruled out independence for the island as a "cruel and delusive
ideaV' 10 The secretary of the Interior endorsed Tugwell's stand
in a press conference on February 4, 1943 .11
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The Puerto Rican leaders, too, backed the sentiment. A joint
cable was dispatched a day later by Mufi.oz Marin, Celestino Iriarte, and Ramirez Santibanez, leaders of the PPD, the Union
Republican party, and the Liberal party, respectively. They
called for an end to Puerto Rico's colonial status in accordance
with the anti-colonial affirmation as embodied in the Atlantic
Charter. 12 This was followed up by a concurrent resolution
adopted by the island's legislature urging Congress to terminate
"the colonial system of government . . . totally and definitely." 13
On March 9, 1943, the president, upon Ickes' recommendation, sent a message to Congress. 14 "It has long been the policy
of the United States," President Roosevelt said, "progressively to
reinforce the machinery of self-government in its territories." In
accordance with this policy he asked Congress to consider amending the Organic Act so as, among other things, to permit the
Puerto Ricans to elect their governor. The president informed
Congress that he had appointed a committee-subsequently to be
known as the President's Committee-consisting of an equal number of Puerto Ricans and mainland residents to advise the administration as to how the Organic Act might be changed. 15
Undersecretary Fortas was made the chairman of the President's Committee. Other continental members were: Benjamin
W. Thoron, director of DTIP, Governor Tugwell, and the Reverend R. A. McGowan, assistant director of the National Catholic
Welfare Council. The Puerto Rican members were Mufi.oz
Marin, Iriarte, Ramirez Santibanez, and Puerto Rico's Supreme
Court Justice Martin Travieso. 16 Neither the Socialist nor the
Nationalist parties was represented by members on the committee.
While the first had joined in a coalition with the Union Republican and therefore was presumably considered as having been
represented, the second was excluded apparently because its goal
was absolute and total independence and its members wished to
have nothing to do with the committee.
Administration officials, in particular Fortas, wanted a "balanced" committee in which all the dominant parties were represented. Tugwell did not think that choosing party presidents because of their loyalty and responsibility to goals and organizations
was a good idea. He preferred selecting prominent leaders. In
addition, he wished to have a mixed executive-legislative committee in which the United States Congress would also be represented.
This was, in retrospect, a good idea, because the administration
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measure on the elective governor emerging from the committee's
recommendation ran into endless trouble with the Congress. At
the time, however, the Interior department was opposed to the
suggestion because of the anti-Tugwell sentiment in Congress. 17
The governor succeeded at least in prevailing upon the administration to exclude Pagan because, Tugwell argued, the Socialist leader had "almost no following left and so counted for
nothing at home." 18 Pagan naturally protested his exclusion to
the president. After all, as resident commissioner he was the
official representative of the islanders. 19 The Puerto Rican legislature agreed with Pagan, for it adopted a resolution asking the
secretary to broaden the membership of the committee.20 Some
insular leaders accused Ickes of harboring a grudge against the
resident commissioner. 21 But the secretary withstood all pressures
to include Pagan in the committee. Relations between him and
the resident commissioner had never been good, and Ickes probably believed that Pagan's violently anti-Tugwell stance in Congress would jeopardize the work of the President's Committee.
The appointment of the President's Committee was received
by some Puerto Ricans and Congressional leaders with doubt and
skepticism. Iriarte feared that making provisions for an elective
governor was a ruse to keep Tugwell in office and that such a
change would postpone the Coalition's ultimate goal of statehood.22 Senator Tydings, who held the chairmanship of the
Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, and who had since
1936 advocated independence for Puerto Rico, stated that nothing
short of complete political freedom could solve the island's political status issue. 23 In response to these criticisms, Undersecretary
Fortas advised Secretary Ick~ to make clear at one of his scheduled
press conferences that the final political status of Puerto Rico
would be considered only after there had been "some experience
under an elective governor." 24
Despite the administration's insistence that it was willing to
consider only an elective governor then, Senator Tydings introduced on April 2, 1943, a bill designed to give Puerto Rico independence. The bill (S.952) provided for a three-year period in
which the transference of power was to take place constitutionally.
It was considerably different in its economic arrangement from the
independence bill of 1936. The measure provided for a twentyyear transition period to regulate the export-import relationship
between the United States and Puerto Rico at a duty-rate gradur
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ated at 5 percent per year. The bill did not change matters concerning United States military and naval installations, and the
presence of its armed forces on the island, nor did it seek to alter
United States control over Puerto Rico's foreign affairs. 211
Secretary Ickes opposed S.952 in a letter to the senator on
April 23, 1943. The reasons he gave for his opposition were,
among others, that the bill restricted Puerto Ricans' choice to
only independence, and that it came at an inopportune time when
the islanders were fighting on the side of the Allies. 26 The Puerto
Rican leaders appeared to agree with the secretary about having
several options from which the people of Puerto Rico should be
allowed to choose. A day later, the island's legislature adopted a
concurrent resolution establishing a Puerto Rican commission to
study the possible status options open to Puerto Ricans. Governor
Tugwell approved the measure. 27
In spite of these developments the chairman of the Senate
Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs proceeded to hold
hearings on S.952. It soon became apparent that there was little
support for the bill from some other departments in the administration or from some of the senator's colleagues. Assistant Secretary of War John T. McCloy categorically stated the Army's opposition to independence for Puerto Rico during the war because
the island was a "bulwark in the defense" of the Caribbean, but
he was unwilling to say what position the Army might take after
the war. "We ought to have a 'look-see,'" he said, "in regard to
what the Caribbean area is at the end of the war . . . ." 28 Senator
Homer T. Bone of Washington, a member of the committee, was
not satisfied that there would be a clear distinction of responsibilities between Puerto Rico and the United States if the island
became independent. Another member of the committee, Senator Taft of Ohio, would rather leave the question until after the
war because he felt it was related to the entire range of semiautonomous states in the Caribbean and elsewhere.29
Puerto Rican and non-Puerto Rican advocates of insular independence were given ample opportunity to state their views.
Puerto Rico was, they maintained, culturally and historically
Latin American and should be made sovereign so that it could
more rightly affiliate itself spiritually with the rest of Latin America. Their testimonies glibly passed over the question of what
might happen to the island economically if it became a separate
republic. In contrast, statehood adherents pointed out that the
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bill did not take sufficient cognizance of the economic realities in
Puerto Rico. The island would be subjected to economic disaster
if it were to sever its ties with the United States, they predicted.30
Ickes wrote to Tydings a second time and pointed out, among
other things, that serious economic consequences might affect the
entire Caribbean if Puerto Rico was granted independence, and
that the president was in favor of extending only autonomy in
local matters for the time being. 31 Mufi.oz Marin, who had not yet
indicated his position on S.952, stated to reporters that the bill
did not fully accommodate Puerto Rico's economic needs, and
that reforming the Organic Act appeared to him to have a greater
potential then. 32 Shortly thereafter, he sent a cable to Tydings
jointly with the president of the insular House, Rafael Arrillaga
Torrens, advising the senator to incorporate other forms of status
options besides independence from among which Puerto Ricans
could make a choice.33 In July, 1943, the Tariff Commission forwarded to Tydings its findings, which were that serious reprecussions would follow the reduction of trade and federal benefits. 34
In the same month the secretary of the Treasury, Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr., pointed out to the Senate committee chairman the
bill's unsound fiscal provisions, and the difficulties it would cause
in the application of United States navigation and coastwise
·
laws. 86
Senator Tydings was possibly aware of all this. Puerto Rico's
position was considerably different than that of the Philippines,
which he had helped in 1935 to set on a ten-year road to independence. The Philippines could sustain independence economically, and its inhabitants had indicated their support for it. On
the other hand, Puerto Rico's economy was so closely integrated
with that of the United States that the islanders stood to suffer
from any plan that provided for abrupt or gradual severance of
ties without proper economic safeguards. Nor had there been any
test of Puerto Rican public opinion on the status question. Moreover, there was hardly any support for the independence bill in
Congress. Why, then, did the Maryland senator introduce the bill
in the midst of a concerted effort by the administration? One
must assume that Tydings was piqued about having been bypassed by the administration. After all, he was the chairman of
the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, and his
committee was constitutionally responsible for sharing in the
administering of Puerto Rico.
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The administration proceeded, however, with the President's
Committee. Preparatory work by Governor Tugwell and the staff
of the Department of the Interior and DTIP gave Undersecretary
Fortas a general idea as to the anticipated positions of his Puerto
Rican colleagues. Tugwell warned, according to one memorandum, that all leaders would attempt to disagree with the committee's recommendations so as to emphasize to their followers that
they had not abandoned the search for a final solution to the status
question. The memorandum also pointed out that the Puerto
Rican leaders were opposed to the federal representative on the
island being termed "High Commissioner." 36 In his memorandum to the Interior secretary, Fortas intimated his desire to see
Puerto Rico achieve goals of self-government beyond those to be
provided by the anticipated elective governor bill. Anxious to
see that this trend of greater self-government continued after the
Puerto Ricans had an elected governor, Fortas believed that it was
necessary for the United States to reserve certain "essential executive powers" with respect to the insular legislature that might
have serious consequences on the island's basic internal organization and its external relations. Fortas perhaps implied that it was
the United States' responsibility to prevent things from going
wrong by means of "essential executive powers," thus averting a
setback to the policy of greater autonomy. 87
The Puerto Rican members of the President's Committee
were able to agree in a couple of meetings that the elective governor should be given powers greater than those enjoyed by the
appointed governor. Some other aspects upon which they agreed
were: electing a governor in 1944, increasing loan margins of
municipal and insular governments, creating a Department of
Public Welfare and Social Security, empowering the governor to
appoint all heads of the executive departments, permitting the
legislature to fix uniform salaries for all department heads, electing two resident commissioners instead of one, increasing the
Supreme Court justices from five to seven, allowing appeals direct
from the insular Supreme Court to the United States Supreme
Court, and giving no authority to the coordinator of federal
activities over insular officials. The Puerto Rican group reached
no agreement concerning the island's political status in the future.88
By the time that the President's Committee met for the first
session on July 19, 1943, the continental and insular members
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were substantially in agreement as to what changes should be
made to the Organic Act. The members knew fairly well which
issues would generate disagreement. The committee's function
did not include resolving questions about Puerto Rico's final
status, although its discussion could hardly be avoided. Still, the
secretary felt obliged to remind the members at the opening
session that it did not constitute a "Constitutional Convention but
an advisory body." 39
The President's Committee met for twelve days between July
19 and August 1, 1943. Its proceedings run over 300 pages in fine
print. On many occasions the Puerto Rican members insisted
that the committee could not discuss amending the Organic Act
without considering the larger question of the island's future
political status. Abe Fortas reminded his Puerto Rican colleagues
that the committee's function was restricted to the discussion of
the elective governor and to matters related to his powers and
office. He pointed out further that providing for an elective
governor then would not prevent solving Puerto Rico's final
political status later.4°
Another point of disagreement between the continental and
insular members was whether Congress' prior approval was necessary before the Puerto Rican people were asked to choose from
among several options. Fortas contended that no status solution
could hope to succeed if Congress did not at first approve of it.
If Congressional endorsement was necessary, the Puerto Ricans
countered, it raised serious questions about insular autonomy and
the value of a popular referendum. In the end the committee
decided to recommend the creation of an advisory council of
Puerto Ricans and United States residents, whose function it
would be to report within a period of time further desirable
changes in the Organic Act.41
As had been anticipated, there was disagreement as to what
coordinator might be called. Undersecretary Fortas
federal
the
the official as being responsible for the smooth funcupon
looked
agencies and representing the president. He
federal
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tioning
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accepted
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British
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In addition, the President's Committee agreed upon the
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following aspects: a governor was to be elected in 1944 and every
four years thereafter; he was to have increased powers-this at
Tugwell's insistence-such as naming the cabinet, including the
auditor, and the justices of the Supreme Court, with the advice
and consent of the insular Senate. The executive council as a
corporate body was to be abolished. The committee accepted
Tugwell's argument that a weak executive in Puerto Rico would
hamper efficient administration, and that the elective governor
should therefore have wider powers than those he wielded as an
appointed govemor. 43
The committee's recommendations were incorporated in a
bill by the Department of the Interior and forwarded to the
president .on August 31, 1943, for him to approve and send to
Congress. The bill proposed amending various sections of the
Organic Act and adding new ones. It provided for the creation
of a joint advisory council of twelve members to "assure constant
review" on the status question. Section I of the bill stated, "It
is further declared to be the intention of Congress that no further
changes in the Organic Act shall be made except with the concurrence of the people of Puerto Rico or their .duly elected representatives." The president retained the power of absolute veto
over insular laws that he considered in conflict with the "security
and international relations of the United States and Puerto Rico."
Furthermore, the United States reserved the right to intervene
"to prevent or suppress invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or (upon
the request of the Governor) lawless violence."44
President Roosevelt submitted to Senator Tydings on September 28, 1943, the proposed bill without any changes, accompanied by a brief message concerning the desire and need for selfgovernment in Puerto Rico. He reassured the senator that Congress would not be giving up its ultimate power of legislating on
the territory by its passage, nor would it threaten United States
strategic dominance in the area. 45 Three days later Senator Tydings introduced the bill as S.1407 to the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs. 48
The Puerto Rican press and public hailed the measure as
progressive, especially as it came in the midst of a war. 47 Congress,
however, was not so favorably disposed to submit to the administration's wishes. The Chavez Subcommittee had just completed
its investigation of insular matters, and had not shown too great
a concern about granting greater political autonomy. The Bell
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Subcommittee was in the process of conducting its own investigations, with unmistakable hostility towards the Tugwell administration. It was also clear that the anti-Tugwell sentiment among
certain other elements in Congress had not subsided. That the
administration measure was going to run into difficulties became
apparent soon.
A subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Territories and
Insular Affairs under the chairmanship of Senator Chavez of New
Mexico conducted hearings on S.1407. Despite the testimonies
of Secretary Ickes and DTIP director Thoron, members of the
subcommittee remained doubtful and skeptical about some of the
bill's provisions. Senator Ralph 0. Brewster of Maine doubted
the constitutionality of the provision that stipulated that changes
in the Organic Act could not be made except in consultation
with the Puerto Ricans. The present Congress, he argued, could
not bind future Congresses to the decisions it made. Senator Taft
of Ohio stated that the bill confused two separate issues, namely,
autonomy and Congressional sovereignty. Since the bill was considering only autonomy, he continued, there was no question
about Congress' power to oversee insular affairs. The Puerto
Rican witnesses, on the other hand, argued that the bill circumvented the real issue, that is, whether Congress was willing to
grant independence or statehood to the island. 48
Administration officials hoped to get Tydings to extend the
hearings so that some of the Puerto Rican members of the President's Committee might be able to be present to testify on behalf
of the bill, but met with no success.49
The extent of S.1407's troubles became known two months
later in February, 1944, when the Senate subcommittee reported
it .out with extensive changes. The subcommittee struck out the
provision concerning Congress' obligation to consult Puerto
Ricans before changing the Organic Act. One Congress could
not bind those succeeding it, it declared. The provision creating
a joint advisory council was omitted because, in the words of the
subcommittee, it was the responsibility of Congress "to study and
resolve on the relationships between the United States and Puerto
Rico and to determine for itself at the proper time and through
its regular procedure the ultimate destiny of the island." To
emphasize this point, the subcommittee added an amendment to
section two of the bill. The amendment stipulated that any excise
or sales taxes levied on "articles, goods, wares, and merchandise"
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imported into Puerto Rico for the purpose of re-exportation
would be refunded. 50
The subcommittee drastically cut the powers of the elective
governor, in most cases to the advantage of the insular legislature.
The terms of office for cabinet and lesser officials were to be decided by the Puerto Rican legislature, which was also to be given
the power to decide on the fate of the executive council. Further
to weaken the powers of the governor, the subcommittee increased
those of the auditor, and made the office of the attorney general
elective. The subcommittee was opposed to any increases in
insular departments and agencies, and limited to two the increase
in the number of Supreme Court justices. The bill was amended
accordingly. Nor was it in favor of the governor appointing the
new justices; it provided for the president to continue doing so
with the advice and consent of the United States Senate. The
Senate group eliminated the office of "Commissioner-General"
and replaced it with that of the "Federal Coordinator," its fear
being that the first might become a "supergovernor." Lastly, it
reinserted section 34 of the Organic Act, which read, "All laws
enacted by the legislature of Porto Rico shall be reported to the
Congress of the United States as provided in section 23 of this
Act, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul
the same."111
There was strong reaction to the Senate subcommittee's
amendments. Munoz Marin was reported as saying, "It would be
better not to have any reform at all. In this way the problem
would remain open for prompt consideration and could be solved
in consultation with the Puerto Rican people in an honorable,
democratic and definite manner." Iriarte and Pagan criticized
the omission of the policy statement regarding the consultation of
Puerto Ricans, and Ramirez Santibanez believed that the amendments eliminated the fundamental recommendations made by
the President's Committee. 112 Tugwell's unfavorable reaction to
S.1407 as amended was relayed to Undersecretary Fortas upon the
latter's request, first briefly, and later in a twelve-page memorandum.113
Whether or not Senator Chavez received official administration reaction to the much-amended S.1407, he introduced the bill
in the Senate on February 15, 1944, for the deliberation of his
not-too-enthusiastic colleagues. Senator Vandenberg, anxious to
see that Tugwell did not become the first elected governor, in-
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quired why the president could not appoint a native Puerto Rican
as governor for a few years before the islanders were permitted
to elect one. Senator Taft commented that the Puerto Ricans
were dissatisfied because the bill did not go far enough to determine the island's "ultimate status," but he believed that the
United States could not do so, at least while the war continued.
On the other hand, Senator Tydings was convinced that only
"complete, absolute, and unconditional independence" was the
solution because the "lines of cleavage in culture, speech, and
thought is [sic] wide as between Latin on the one hand [and] the
predominant Anglo-Saxon, characterized by the United States,
on the other." The Puerto Ricans, he believed, were being kept
in "slavery because of a few investments there by persons in this
country who are reaping handsome dividends as a result." Despite such sentiments, the Senate passed the bill. Three days later
it was referred to the House Committee on Insular Affairs. 114
But the House Committee on Insular Affairs was not in a
friendly mood at all. It brought up for discussion in February
and March a bill (S.981) that, as amended by the committee in
November, 1943, provided for returning 50 percent of the revenues on rum, tobacco, cigarettes, and cigars to a special fund
to be controlled by the federal government.Ci5 The bill sought to
introduce a drastic change in the fiscal arrangement between
Puerto Rico and the United States that had operated for forty
years. It was an ominous sign of how the committee might further
amend S.1407.
It would appear, furthermore, that the House committee
sought by direct and indirect ways to make known to the administration that the price of approving the elective governor billand that, too, in its amended form 56-was the ejection of Tugwell
from the governorship. On a number of occasions members of
the committee made public such a desire. Republican Representatives Sterling Cole of New York and Fred Crawford of Michigan appealed to Secretary Ickes on March 15, 1944, to fire Tugwell. A day later, the committee's Democratic chairman, Jasper
C. Bell of Missouri, joined his colleagues in a similar gesture
stated somewhat more strongly. 57 About two weeks thereafter,
Democratic Representative Dan R. McGehee of Mississippi, also
a committee member, introduced House Resolution 496 requesting the president to dismiss the governor. 58
The Union Republican party joined the chorus by adopting
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on April 30, 1944, a resolution condemning Tugwell, Thoron,
Fortas, and Ickes. 59 And Pagan, fearing that honest elections
could not take place while Tugwell governed, approached Undersecretary Fortas with the proposal of postponing the 1944 elections to 1945, which was rejected in no uncertain terms. 60 It is
not known whether other House committee members supported
Pagan's move.
As late as June 9, 1944, the administration did not know
whether the House Committee on Insular Affairs was going to
hold hearings. 61 Committee chairman Bell claimed that other
important business had delayed consideration of S.1407. 62 The
Department of the Interior moved to pressure Bell into taking
action, even though Tugwell was of the opinion that the administration should not urge passage of the bill in its emasculated
form. 63 The secretary wrote to Bell on June 23, 1944, urging him
to support S.1407 as originally introduced. The Senate amendments, he argued, would restrict insular efficiency in government.64
More than two months later the House committee held a
hearing. Undersecretary Fortas appeared as a witness for the
administration. The Interior department appeared to be willing
to accept S.1407 in its amended form, 65 because, as Fortas explained it, it would still be a significant step forward in selfgovernment for Puerto Rico. The islanders had reached "political
maturity," he continued, and an elective governor would add to
their sense of responsibility and confidence. Beyond that, the
bill's passage would reflect well in the eyes of Latin America and
the rest of the world. 66 Even though Fortas had tried through
Tugwell to persuade the Puerto Rican members of the President's
Committee to come to Washington to testify, none had come.67 It
was in part because, as Tugwell explained to Fortas, the insular
leaders did not wish to come to Washington if it involved the
political risk of bringing nothing home. 68 Two persons representing the Populares, however, did appear to urge the bill's passage.
They were Representatives Elmer Ellsworth and Jesus T.
Pifiero. 69
On the same day that he testified before the House Insular
Affairs Committee, Undersecretary Fortas addressed a letter to
presidential advisor Samuel Rosenman stating that a communication to Bell about the desirability of passing the elective governor
bill would prove effective. Fortas' letter was accompanied by a
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draft message for the president to send to Bell. 70 A couple of days
later, the undersecretary urged Congressman Richard J. Welch
of California to use his good offices with Bell to obtain quick
action on S.1407. 71
The president wrote to Bell on August 29, 1944 (made public
September 4, 1944), pointing out to the Congressman that the bill
had widespread Puerto Rican support, and that its passage would
"multiply the good will we have already gained throughout the
Western Hemisphere." 72 Bell replied on September 5, 1944, intimating to the president that Congressional preoccupation with
two other measures, which were in conference stages, had brought
the two Houses to a "standstill." Many of the twenty-six Congressmen serving on the House committee, he continued, were absent,
thus making quorums difficult to obtain. If under these circumstances the committee were to clear the bill, the "objections which
would be raised on account of the quorum would in all probability result in the defeat of the bill on the floor of the House." 73
By December 9, Bell believed it impossible to report out S.1407
in time for it to pass before the Congress adjourned. 74
By December, 1944, however, the political scene in Puerto
Rico had changed. The Populares had won thumping majorities
in both Houses in the November, 1944, elections, and had elected
one in their ranks, Jesus T. Pinero, as resident commissionerelect. An elated Mufi.oz Marin reported to Ickes that the electoral
majorities had vindicated the Popular policies, Tugwell's governorship, and the administration's backing of both. There was,
therefore, no need for hurried action. The bill, he told Secretary
Ickes, was "generally and deeply unsatisfactory." He had supported it "only on the certainty . . . [that] it would receive a
veto." The Popular leader continued, " . .. I am convinced that
we should wait until the people have spoken and then work out
a detailed solution on the basis of the wishes they may express." 711
Ickes agreed about letting S.14O7 die because any hope of its
passage, he said, was "academic." He was a little puzzled, however, as to what the Puerto Rican leader intended doing. Did he
want the elective governor bill reintroduced in the next Congressional session, or did he desire that the Organic Act remain
unaltered until a plebiscite was held in Puerto Rico? Whatever
it was that Mufi.oz Marin wanted to do, the secretary added, he
would have to review it first. 76
Tugwell's enemies in Congress, repeatedly thwarted in their
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moves to displace him, did not quite give up by the end of 1944,
although much of the wind out of the anti-Tugwell sail had dissipated. In December, 1944, Representative Cole of New York
introduced H.R.5570 to terminate Tugwell's governorship sixty
days after its enactment. 77 The House Committee on Insular
Affairs cleared the bill hastily, even though a quorum was allegedly not present. This prompted Secretary Ickes to write two
letters to majority floor leader John W. McCormack of Massachusetts. The first denounced the bill as unconstitutional. He was
particularly angry at the hasty action on H.R.5570, when the same
committee had allowed the administration-sponsored S.1407 to lie
"dormant" since February, 1944. He asked the majority leader
to have the bill "watched so that it will not be taken up with
unanimous consent and also to endeavor to prevent the granting
of a rule that would authorize its consideration." In the second
letter, Ickes pointed out to Representative McCormack that the
committee had capitulated to a vocal minority that had been
thoroughly beaten in the 1944 elections. 78 In any case, the bill
had little chance of passage because the House Democratic leadership was determined to block any attempt to obtain unanimous
consideration of the bill.79
There are a number of reasons why Congress dealt a cruel
blow to Puerto Rican aspirations of greater self-government.
Congress desired to exert its authority especially at a time when
it felt that the administration had assumed wide powers, some of
which encroached upon its traditional prerogatives. The House
Committee on Insular Affairs was particularly sensitive about this,
as it sought by means of its powers over appropriations to share
in the administration of Puerto Rico. In part the administration
was responsible for failing to cultivate harmonious relationships
with Congressional leadership. The administration might have
invited both the Senate and House committees to participate in
the President's Committee. The differences in points of view
among the administration, Congress, and the Puerto Rican leadership might conceivably have been ironed out before the measure, emerging out of such deliberations, reached Congress for its
consideration. As it happened, Congress virtually ignored the
recommendations of the President's Committee and proceeded to
chop and change S.1407 in a great show of its constitutional prerogative. 80 But beyond this, there are other reasons that lie in
public opinion, ignorance, and politics.
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The twenty-three members of the House committee and the
sixteen of its Senate counterpart were not directly responsible to
the Puerto Rican people, and any pressure of public opinion as
to their responsibility could only come from mainland citizens.
The continental citizenry remained indifferent and ignorant
about matters concerning Puerto Rico. And few questioned the
spirit of paternalism that prevailed among the more powerful
members of the two committees. 81
Under these circumstances it was easy for Congress to become entangled with the administration and insular politics
rather than policies. No doubt some of the members of the two
committees sought to use every instance to embarrass and oppose
the administration. 82 In this they found a cause in Tugwell's
occupancy of the island's governorship. A controversial figure,
the New Dealer's policies and support of the Popular program
easily made him the target of politicians who had never been too
fond of New Dealers. In this connection, Tugwell was more a
hindrance than a help because Congress refused to pass the elective governor bill, fearing his eligibility as the first elected governor. Thus, the 1943-1944 attempt by the United States to
extend to Puerto Rico greater self-government became sidetracked by the administration's endorsement of Tugwell's governorship and some Congressmen's desire to displace him.
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CHAPTER FIVE

Munoz Marfn's Shift
from Independence to Autonomy,
1944-1946

Those among the Populares who believed in independence
for Puerto Rico were encouraged by the international situation.
The Atlantic Charter had reaffirmed the colonial peoples' rights
to choose whatever form of government they desired; the Yalta
Conference in February, 1945, had agreed upon reviewing the
existing mandated territories; and at the San Francisco meeting
where the United Nations Organization was being formulated,
considerable attention was given to the whole colonial question.
Eventually the document that emerged from the San Francisco
meeting, the United Nations Charter, was to reserve three chapters for colonies and their aspirations. Chapter XI was entitled
"Declaration Regarding Non-self-governing Territories," while
chapters XII and XIII dealt with the "International Trusteeship
System" and the "Trusteeship Council," respectively. 1 On a number of occasions, independentista leaders in Puerto Rico capitalized on the situation to appeal to the international body and to
major Western leaders.
Their main efforts, however, were concentrated on domestic
politics in the hope of pressuring Popular leader Munoz Marin
into seizing the opportunity to win independence for the island.
Soon after Senator Tydings introduced in Congress the inde7J
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pendence bill discussed in the previous chapter, a pro-independence assembly of 200 persons was held in April, 1943, in San Juan.
The majority of those present were Populares, although Liberals,
Nationalists, and Communists were also present.2 The insular
advocates of independence turned out in force at the hearings in
May, 1943, to demonstrate to Congress the widespread support
for the Tydings bill. But the PPD leader did not openly endorse
the bill, thus leaving doubt in the minds of many United States
Congressmen as to how much support the independentistas had.
More importantly, there was little support for independence in
the administration or the Congress of the United States.3
Indeed, Mufioz Marin stated on a number of occasions his
qualified opposition to either statehood or independence. One
such occasion was at a roundtable conference at the University of
Chicago radio in July, 1943, when he expressed his desire to see
the "colonial" status ended, but ruled out independence and statehood on economic grounds. It was more realistic, he argued, to
work for an elective governor at the time. 4
Undaunted, the independentistas prepared for the organization in August of 1943 a Pro-Independence Congress (CPI).
Mufioz Marin was fearful that the CPI leadership, among whom
were prominent Populares, might develop into a new party. He
called, therefore, an informal meeting of the party leadership,
including the independentistas, and announced that he would not
attend the scheduled meeting because the PPD was officially neutral on the status issue. The Popular leader cautioned the independentistas that "the only interest which the Popular party as
such could have would be in the resolutions or actions of the
Congress that might be prejudicial to the party's work or lead to
confusion among the voters." 5
The independentistas proceeded to organize the Pro-Independence Congress. Mufioz Marin wished the Congress "much
success in the expression before the people and the Government
of the United States of the ideals that without doubt are those of
large numbers of Puerto Ricans." 6 The 1800 delegates at San
Juan hammered out statements of purpose and goal. The delegates expressed their desire in these statements to work for independence by peaceful methods, in part by means of marshaling
public sentiment behind, and lobbying for, their goals. Dr. Juan
Augusto Perea, once a political associate of Nationalist leader
Albizu Campos, was elected president. 7 He and Dr. Sergio Pefia
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were later named to represent the CPI in Washington, and Gilberto Concepcion de Gracia, residing in the United States, was
appointed the group's legal advisor. 8
Differences between the CPI leadership and Munoz Marin
were soon to emerge. The CPI condemned the elective governor
bill (S.1407), then being considered by Congress, as a "smoke
screen" for colonialism. 9 The more radical among the independentistas moved in March, 1944, for the creation of an independence party, but were thwarted by those who felt that the
establishment of a new party would only divide and weaken their
forces and benefit the Coalition. Dr. Augusto Perea and his
followers charged that the CPI had become a branch of the PPD
and resigned. Late in 1944, the CPI presidency was given to Concepcion de Gracia. 1° For the moment, a measure of harmony
was restored between the CPI and the Populares.
Munoz Marin could not afford a rupture just before the 1944
elections. He proceeded as gingerly as he could to keep the status
question out of the elections. As early as October, 1943, he had
maintained that independence would not be an issue in the elections a year hence. He said he was not willing to discuss the
status issue until Congress conceded that Puerto Rico had the
right of plebiscite to determine its final status.11
In this endeavor, the Puerto Rican senator could point to the
opposition to independence and statehood among United States
Congressmen. Rafael Soltero Peralta, representing the Masons of
Puerto Rico, interviewed influential legislators on the island's
future status. Representative Crawford of Michigan, who was a
member of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, was interviewed several times, Crawford stated that Puerto Rico should
not think of statehood or independence for the next twenty-five
years. He said bluntly, in a later interview, "I'm going to explain
the real reason. Puerto Rico cannot be independent because the
United States has to maintain an army, and a navy in the island
to defend the territory against the Russian menace, which after
this war will try to dismember this continent to take possession
of South America." To give Puerto Rico a free hand in making
treaties, he continued, would be to run the same risk as in the
case of Argentina. 12 He was apparently referring to Argentina's
resistance to supporting the Allied war effort.
Senator Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana echoed some of Crawford's sentiments. He doubted whether the Puerto Ricans were
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capable of self-government, and would rather grant autonomy in
small doses.13 Representative Cole of New York believed that
the United States could not give up control, especially as Puerto
Rico depended upon federal funds. 14 Nebraska's Senator Hugh
Butler believed that to grant the island independence would be
to abandon United States responsibility towards it. 15 Several
other senators and representatives were opposed to giving either
independence or statehood to the island. A few supported whatever the islanders desired. But the only influential legislator
willing to give Puerto Rico independence was the chairman of
the Senate Committee on Insular and Territorial Affairs, Senator
Tydings. 16
Partly in response to the challenge of the independentistas,
the November, 1944, PPD platform contained a promise to hold
a plebiscite on the definite status of the island "no later than the
moment of the structuring of world peace." But the PPD insisted
during the campaign that status was not an issue in the elections. 17
In a pamphlet called People's Catechism, Mufioz Marin directed
his remarks about the island's status to "impatient" Populares:
Then, if a Popular elected by the people on November
7, 1944, tries to use the position to which he was elected
to vote for independence, statehood, or any other form
of definite political status, would he be violating the
people's mandate?
Yes, clearly he would be violating the people's mandate. No Popular will act that way. He who would act
that way would no longer be considered a Popular by the
people. 18
The PPD won a landslide victory in 1944. The Republicans
and Socialists were effectively excluded from their positions of
power. Furthermore, a Popular, Jesus T. Pifiero, was elected to
the post of resident commissioner. Mufioz Mari.n 's power could
not now be threatened by the Coalition. The challenge to his
power came, however, from members of his own party who had
independentista leanings. For instance, newly elected Popular
representative Benjamin Ortiz, soon to become the House majority leader, declared his belief in independence for Puerto Rico
and offered financial support to the CPI. Another prominent
Popular, Antonio Pacheco Padr6, argued in a newspaper article
that since the issue of independence could disrupt the PPD Mufioz
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Marin, the only man capable of achieving independence, should
take the initiative.19
On December 10, 1944, the Pro-Independence group held
another meeting. It was attended by leading Populares. 20 A resolution was adopted by the CPI calling upon the insular legislature
to raise the issue of independence before the Congress of
the United States.21 Two weeks later the CPI president, Concepcion de Gracia, wrote letters to President Roosevelt, Prime
Minister Winston Churchill, and Marshal Stalin informing them
about Puerto Rico's desire for independence. 22 Munoz Marin
was concerned that the CPI political structure was gradually
assuming permanence in the form of delegations throughout the
island. To him it appeared too much like activities preliminary
to the organization of a new party, despite the CPI leadership's
assurances to the contrary.23
The CPI's intention was, as Tugwell explained, to maneuver
the Popular leader into announcing something concrete about his
1944 plebiscite promise. The governor advised Munoz Marin to
play down the plebiscite issue until he had discussed the matter
with the Department of the Interior. Tugwell told Undersecretary Fortas, "He [Munoz Marin] wants something beyond it [the
elective governor bill then bogged down in Congress]-though
just what that something is, is not quite clear, and could best
become clear, I believe, through conversations between Munoz,
the Secretary, and yourself." 24 Fortas replied to the governor
after consulting with Secretary Ickes,211 expressing the belief that
Munoz Marin should come to Washington to reach some understanding with the department on the elective governor bill, specifically, and the status question, generally. Fortas preferred for
the Puerto Rican leader not to make a public statement, for fear
of arousing "unwarranted hopes.'' 26
Apparently impressed by the independentista agitation in
Puerto Rico, Senator Tydings introduced on January 10, 1945, a
bill (S.227) to provide for the island's independence. 27 Like his
independence bill of 1943, the present measure provided for the
election of a Puerto Rican constitutional convention and the writing of a republican constitution. A year after the president of the
United States endorsed the constitution, a twenty-year transition
period was to follow. As in the earlier bill, the United States was
to reserve the right to expropriate insular land for defense purposes and to maintain military and naval bases in Puerto Rico.
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Section 3 (n) of the bill provided for United States intervention
in insular affairs under emergency situations. 28
Encouraged by the Tydings independence bill, the CPI
moved quickly to capitalize on the international situation. CPI
leader Concepcion de Gracia and Representative Vito Marcantonio of New York announced their intention of presenting
Puerto Rico's case before the forthcoming United Nations conference in San Francisco. 29 On March 26, 1945, the independentista leadership prevailed upon Representative Marcantonio to
introduce an independence bill that incorporated some of the
changes to the Tydings bill requested by the CPI. 30 In May the
CPI requested a seat in the future United Nations Organization
as a prelude to recognizing the island as an independent state. 31
Munoz Marin could not ignore the activities of the CPI,
among whose numbers were many Populares. 32 On January 21,
1945, Resident Commissioner Pinero declared that Congress
should clarify its position on the status question by permitting
the islanders to decide on a plebiscite. 38 Governor Tugwell echoed
Pinero's sentiments in his message to the Puerto Rican legislature
on February 13, 1945. He said, "Fairness to everyone requires
that the Congress offer the choices it is willing to accept rather
than to require that Puerto Ricans should petition for status with
the risk of rejection." 34
·
The Popular leader persuaded other insular legislators of the
wisdom of Tugwell's argument, as he explained to Secretary
lckes,35 for on February 20, 1945, the Puerto Rican legislature
passed a resolution requesting Congress to offer options of political status from among which the islanders could choose. But the
resolution insisted that it be done in such a manner "that our
people may have clear knowledge of the mutual economic relationships and the recognition of mutual moral obligations that
would exist under each of the alternative forms that Congress
may present to them." 36 Copies of the resolution were sent to
the president, the secretary of the Interior, the chairmen of the
Senate and House committees responsible for insular affairs, and
others.37
But if Munoz Marin had hoped to dissuade Senator Tydings
from proceeding with his independence bill, he was disappointed,
for the senator opened hearings on S.227. Tydings did, however,
postpone the hearings once he had heard independentistas until
after the insular legislative session came to an end. He sought to
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give all an opportunity to testify. 38 Secretary Ickes had made
clear the administration's position even before the hearings had
started. "I have repeatedly said," the secretary wrote on March 3,
1945, "that I consider it not only right but desirable that the
people of Puerto Rico should be given an opportunity to express
freely and democratically their desires in regard to their ultimate
relationship to the United States. This expression might well be
given in a plebiscite to be held under conditions prescribed by
the Congress of the United States, but it should be only after a
full consideration of alternatives which the Congress may be willing to grant to the people of Puerto Rico and full exploration
and exposition of the economic consequences to each of them,
both to Puerto Rico and to the United States." 39
To explore all possible avenues for a definitive solution to
the status issue, the Puerto Rican legislature named members to
the Joint Legislative Committee that it had created in 1943.
Munoz Marin was appointed as chairman of the committee. The
remaining eight members represented all political groups and
parties except the Nationalists. 40
The administration in Washington took steps to be informed
about the possible status alternatives and their economic implications. In April, 1945, special assistant to the secretary of the Interior, Jack B. Fahy, prepared an eleven-page memorandum. He
illustrated both United States and Puerto Rican interests with
facts and figures and considered how they would be affected in the
following alternatives: "quick statehood," "quick independence,"
"provisional statehood," and "provisional independence." In listing United States interests, Fahy pointed out that 94 percent of
the island's goods came from the mainland, making Puerto Rico
its seventh-best customer. In 1940, for instance, United States
farmers received $20 million for food consumed on the island,
while mainland manufacturers and processors sold $100 million
worth of merchandise. There were likewise interests in United
States railroads, truckers, and steamship lines. Continental sugar
industry, too, had money invested in Puerto Rico (no figures were
given), but Fahy pointed out that United States cane- and beetsugar growers probably desired to see the island become independent, and thus end insular competition. 41
The memorandum went on to point out the extent of Puerto
Rico's interests tied with the island's continued relationship with
the United States. Without tariff-free access to United States mar-
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kets for the island's sugar, tobacco, rum, fruits, and so on, Puerto
Rico would lose $50 million, which it was not likely to make up
as an independent country because it had very little to offer other
countries. Puerto Rico also desired to retain United States excise
revenues on its rum, which came to $25 million yearly, and it also
sought to be exempted from United States tariffs on imports like
rice, beans, and textiles because it would save the island about
$7 million. The list of benefits Puerto Rico wished to retain was
long: exemption from United States Coastwise Navigation Laws
so as to utilize cheaper foreign rates and thus save $8 million;
exemption from the Sugar Act of 1937, which in 1938 cost the
island 25,000 in unemployed, 100,000 in idle acres, and $20 million in income; change in agricultural policy because the existing
policy was exacerbating problems of unemployment; and, finally,
protection from State department tariff concessions to other countries. In 1939, for example, the United States treaty with Cuba
seriously affected the Puerto Rican pineapple industry. 42
Given these facts, Fahy continued, both "quick statehood"
and "quick independence" would be disastrous for the island.
Under immediate statehood the total drop in federal and state
expenditure in Puerto Rico would be from $51 per capita to $39.
With immediate independence the per capita insular government
expenditure would fall from $39 to $20. The island's population
density, its need to increase agricultural production, and other
special problems made it necessary that either "provisional statehood" or "provisional independence" be tried out for ten years,
at the end of which the whole situation should be reviewed. If
there was no satisfactory progress, then greater autonomy should
be implemented. Fahy ruled out dominion status because Puerto
Rico's present state of productivity could not sustain it.48
The memorandum completely ignored the island's potential
in industrialization, as was pointed out in a critique offered by
Interior's legal counsel William Brophy. 44 Nor did it explore in
any detail the dominion status. But Fahy's memorandum clearly
showed the extent to which Puerto Rico depended upon the
United States. Under such conditions the Department of the Interior could not possibly accept independence programs along the
lines suggested by the Tydings bill.
In the same month that Fahy prepared his memorandum,
Governor Tugwell addressed another to Secretary Ickes. His conclusions about Puerto Rico-United States relationships were the
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same as those of Fahy. Tugwell discussed what he considered to be
the ten essential points in the matter of status. The long association
between the two, the governor said, made it impossible to deal
with the island's problems except with the help of the United
States. Puerto Rico needed special treatment in social security
benefits, aid in education and health, and relief for the unemployed. Therefore, Tugwell continued, the island should not
expect a political arrangement in which control of the expenditure of federal funds would be in extent greater than in the case
of a state. So long as Puerto Rico received federal money, the
islanders should expect a measure of supervisory control by the
United States. Tugwell insisted, however, that changes in the
Organic Act should be subject not only to Congressional action
but to ratification by a convention of insular representatives. 45
Mufioz Marin's thinking was much like that of Fahy and
Tugwell to the extent that it was primarily concerned with economic matters. Early in May, 1945, the Popular leader and the
rest of the Joint Legislative Committee members arrived in Washington. Before Mufioz Marin testified at the Tydings hearings
on S.227, he met with administration officials to clarify his position on status. The Puerto Rican leader told Fahy, Interior's legal
advisor Fowler Harper, and DTIP director Benjamin W. Thoron
that he desired permanent economic ties with the United States
accompanied by maximum political freedom-"sovereign home
rule," he phrased it.46
"Here lives a free man," not "here lies a man," was the way
he summed it up. The Puerto Rican senator did not question
the United States' right to maintain military installations on the
island, nor its control in insular foreign affairs. But he insisted
that Congress should offer several alternatives, each one with
economic guarantees clearly spelled out. The PPD leader pointed
out that an elective-governor bill at that stage would not please
the islanders because they disliked "absentee sovereignty." The
memorandum from Thoron summed up Mufioz Marin's position
in this way, " . . . he desires an economic arrangement that will
be at least as favorable as the present one, with as many of the
attributes of complete independent sovereignty as possible. He
wants to be free to reject any proposal that does not appear sufficiently generous, but wants to avoid making the choice between
divorce without alimony and a wardship with generous maintenance allowance." 47
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Much the same caution was expressed by Undersecretary Abe
Fortas in an article in the Washington Post. Puerto Ricans, he
said, were in a "hopeless struggle with the Malthusian law: there
are just too many people on too little and too poor land." Political solutions must adjust to economic realities, he argued. "Perhaps the Puerto Ricans," he concluded, "do not want to sue for
divorce and perhaps we should not propose that the ties between
us be dissolved. But there is one thing we can all agree upon:
Puerto Rico should have complete home rule." 48
The Puerto Rican Joint Legislative Committee addressed a
letter to Senator Tydings as chairman of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs. The independence bill (S.227), the
letter said, should be amended so as to include other political
alternatives: statehood, and a "form of dominion government
based on full and final political rights." In all cases the bill should
provide for "certain minimum economic conditions," which were
stipulated: one, free trade between the island and the United
States, regulated by bilateral agreements periodically; two, exemption from United States internal-revenue taxes for insular
exports to the mainland, provided that Puerto Rico collected
export taxes on such products at the same rates imposed by the
United States; three, maintaining for a period of time favorable
conditions for the island's cane farmers; and four, temporary continuance of other grants and aids to the island, to be stopped only
when the island's productivity and commerce reached a certain
level. 49
In his testimony before the Senate committee on May 7, 1945,
M ufioz Marin argued that while he personally favored the dominion status he did not approve any status alternative that did
not have the backing of the Puerto Rican people. But he insisted
on economic guarantees. "It could be this or that, and submit
that to a vote of the people of Puerto Rico, with their knowledge
that under any circumstances they would have minimum economic conditions." 50 Senator Tydings believed that the Puerto
Rican Joint Legislative Committee's request was fair-minded, and
he asked its members to formulate a plan in accordance with its
recommendations. This the insular committee did. Its program
included a referendum on three options, each one to be accompanied by adequate economic guarantees. They were: independence, statehood, and dominion. 51
The insular committee's recommendations were incorporated
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in a bill, S.1002, and introduced by Senator Tydings on May 15,
1945. A day later the resident commissioner co-sponsored a
companion bill, H.R.3237.52 The Tydings-Pinero bill, as it
came to be known, amplified greatly the Maryland senator's independence bill, S.227. It provided for the Puerto Rican electorate
to choose from among independence, statehood, and dominion,
each with the necessary economic guarantees suggested by the
insular Joint Legislative Committee.53 The procedures for organizing a constitutional convention and drafting a constitution
were the same for independence and dominion. The independence status, however, differed in one important economic provision from the dominion status: under the first, federal aid was
to be gradually reduced on the recommendations of a five-man
economic commission and effected by presidential proclamations;
while under the second, federal aids and benefits were to continue
on the basis then prevailing. 54
Although Secretary Ickes supported the Tydings-Pinero bill
in principle,55 the Department of the Interior was not certain
about some of its legal aspects. It was still not sure a month after
the bill's introduction whether the dominion status would require
a constitutional amendment. 56 Munoz Marin, apparently concerned about the hesitancy in the administration and Congress,
wrote to Harry S. Truman, who had succeeded to the presidency
after Roosevelt's death in April, 1945. He requested President
Truman to urge Congressional action on S.1002. "I do not request," he went on to elaborate, "that you urge the approval of
the bill, as you may not wish to commit yourself on all details,
but that you send a message supporting the principle of selfdetermination under economic conditions that shall be workable
in Puerto Rico." 117
The Popular leader faced a barrage of criticism by the CPI.
He had, the independentista organization argued, deliberately
sabotaged the Tydings independence bill (S.227) by sponsoring
the Tydings-Pinero measure. The CPI believed that Munoz
Marin had sufficient influence among circles in Washington to
win independence for Puerto Rico. 58 By August, 1945, the CPI
leadership was accusing Munoz Marin of supporting "colonialism"
dressed up in a "new package." 59
Governor Tugwell, in Washington at the time, believed that
the Tydings-Pinero bill was lengthy and complicated and that a
simplified procedure would help to speed up Congressional con-
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sideration of a plebiscite in Puerto Rico. On August 29, 1945,
his aide dispatched for the president's consideration a seven-page
joint resolution to be adopted by Congress. The joint resolution
spelled out more clearly what each of the three status options
included in the Tydings-Pinero bill meant. The "Associated
State" (dominion) alternative envisaged, for instance, the continuation of existing relationship between the island and the
United States in all major respects, except that the supreme executive power was to be vested in an elective governor who would
have the authority to appoint executive heads and judges of all
insular courts. Under this status Congress could not nullify laws
enacted by the Puerto Rican legislature. Tugwell's plan called
for permitting the Puerto Ricans to decide in a plebiscite which
one of the three they preferred, after which Congress would enact
legislation effectuating the islanders' choice at the earliest possible
time. 60
Upon Truman's request, presidential advisor Samuel Rosenman took the matter up with Senator Tydings and chairman Bell
of the House Insular Committee. 61 Rosenman found Tydings
"violently opposed" to Tugwell's suggestion. Congress, Tydings
insisted, would not accept the proposal because for one thing it
was not disposed to grant statehood. Instead, the senator suggested that the president make a general statement that Congress
grant, "within such limits as may be set" by it, the kind of government that Puerto Rico desired. The president should include
in his message, Tydings insisted, the stipulation that Congress
should not submit any proposition it was not willing to carry
into execution.62
Even though Mufi.oz Marin was at this point considering the
establishment of a commission to study the status question113much to the annoyance of Tugwell, who thought the suggestion
was tangential64-Rosenman prepared a draft message for Congress
after consulting Secretary Ickes, Senator Tydings, and Governor
Tugwell. 611 On October 16, 1945, President Truman delivered
his brief message to Congress. The time had come, he said, for
the Puerto Ricans to decide on their political status. Congress
should permit the Puerto Ricans to choose from among four
possible alternatives: the right to elect their own governor, with
a wider measure of local self-government; statehood; "complete
independence"; and a dominion form of government. The president cautioned Congress not to submit any proposal that it was
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not prepared to enact finally into law. 66 The president's message
included elective governor as one of the alternatives, perhaps out
of the realization that Congress might not be willing at that time
to consider the other three alternatives.
And indeed, Senator Tydings had become by this time extremely doubtful about the referendum bill. As early as September, 1945, he had reservations about the bill, which he himself
had sponsored, and hinted that his independence bill, S.227,
should be considered instead. 67 A day after President Truman's
message, he made known his intention to submit only two alternatives, namely, independence and elective governor with greater
autonomy, because there was no support for statehood, and dominion status had not been properly defined. 68 It was a very
skeptical chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and
Insular Affairs who a week later sent four-column questionnaires
to his colleagues in the committee with the intention of discovering their positions on President Truman's four alternatives. There
was no point, Senator Tydings told his colleagues, in holding
hearings if there was no support for statehood and dominion. 69
Apparently there was little sentiment among the rest of the committee for statehood or dominion, for on November 27, 1945,
Senator Tydings canceled hearings on S. l 002 that he had scheduled for January, 1946. He was going to offer the island independence once more if the majority of the insular legislators should
request it. 70
Popular leader M uiioz Marin cabled Tydings on December 1,
1945, relaying to him the unanimous decision of the Permanent
Commission of Puerto Rican Legislature on Political Status that
hearings on S. l 002 should be held as scheduled. The insular
leader also requested a "round table conference" to discuss economic conditions to accompany the various status alternatives.
Tydings replied two days later: he was not prepared to consider
anything but independence, and Mufi.oz Marin should submit
more liberal economic provisions than those set forth in S.227.
His party's pledge was, the Popular leader wrote back, to have
"the broadest possible alternatives for the plebiscite under sound,
workable economic conditions." 71 Mufi.oz Marin's appeal to Representative Bell elicited a more categorical response: the Congressman did not think that the House Committee on Insular Affairs
would act favorably on the referendum bill. 72
The Puerto Ricans continued, however, to exert pressure on
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Congress. A petition bearing 300,000 signatures was forwarded
to the United States legislature; 73 Resident Commissioner Pifiero
announced his intention to confer with Congressional leaders ;74
and the Puerto Rican legislature authorized Mufioz Marin to lead
a delegation to Washington to discuss with Senator Tydings and
Congressman Bell all aspects of the status question. 75
But the most dramatic demonstration of Puerto Rican displeasure was shown when in February, 1946, the insular legislature passed two bills, S.195 and S.196. S.195 provided for a plebiscite in July, 1947, of Puerto Ricans on the island's political
status; and S.196 provided for taking a poll among the qualified
voters of Puerto Rico as to who should be recommended to President Truman as the next appointed governor, should that office
become vacant. 76 (Governor Tugwell had indicated in December,
1945, his desire to resign, and was expected to do so soon.)77 Tugwell vetoed S.195 on the grounds that it interfered with Congress'
power to legislate on the matter of status, and indeed would
jeopardize the chance of Congressional authorization of a plebiscite. The governor vetoed S.196 as well, arguing that the bill
constituted an interference with the powers of presidential appointment and senate confirmation. 78 Promptly the Puerto Rican
legislature passed the bills over Tugwell's vetoes.79 On only two
other previous occasions since 1898 had this happened, and both
times the president had upheld the veto. 80
Meanwhile, Mufioz Marin visited Washington in April, 1946,
as head of the ten-man delegation created by the insular legislature
in December, 1945.81 Newspaper reports spoke of his meetings
with Senator Tydings and of their discussions of economic arrangements to accompany each status alternative. Tydings agreed
to incorporate the delegation's request in the new bill.82 But disagreements emerged soon between Senator Tydings and Mufioz
Marin, specifically over what is not clear. 83 Mufioz Marin no
doubt met with administration officials, too, and their discussions
must have included the matter of Tugwell's vetoes, although
there is no record of this in the files of the Office of Territories or
the Department of the Interior.
Administration officials were uneasy about the vetoes. While
the Department of Justice approved the vetoes, DTIP's legal advisor Irwin W. Silverman believed that there would be serious
implications if the president upheld the vetoes on the two bills,
especially on S.195, because it would be construed as disapprov-
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ing the principle of self-government. 84 Secretary of the Interior
Julius A. Krug, who had been appointed to the office after Ickes'
resignation in February, 1946, wrote to F. J. Bailey, assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget, on May 3, 1946. He said he
agreed with Tugwell's action on S.196. "Unless and until," he
explained, "the Congress decided to permit the people of Puerto
Rico to elect their governor, or itself enacts a measure authorizing
an advisory poll such as the bill contemplates, the appointment
of a governor should be strictly complied with." He disagreed
with Tugwell's veto on S.195, however. The secretary conceded
that a "unilateral plebiscite" had an element of "unreality and a
wishful thinking quality," because Congress was sure to balk.
There was, however, the larger question of the right of selfdetermination involved in the matter. Krug continued, ". . . a
sustaining of the veto would be regarded by Puerto Rico, South
America and the European nations both large and small as a
denial in practice of an oft-expressed principle." 85
The new secretary of the Interior minimized the dangers
pointed out by Tugwell in his veto. He argued that a plebiscite
could be preceded by "an educational campaign" so that the voters
could "clearly and intelligently realize the precise character of the
alternatives to be placed before them." Greater care should be
given, Krug argued, as to the political, economic, and social consequences of the alternatives offered, since Congress would regard
the result of the plebiscite as a "conclusive expression of the will
of the Puerto Ricans." He concluded, "If the voters come to the
polls with such an understanding of the implications of their
choice, the plebiscite may well be a valuable guide to the Congress
and need not jeopardize the proposal made by the President to
that body in October [16, 1945], that it offer the Puerto Ricans
alternative forms of status." 86 Two draft letters with a similar
message were prepared by the Department of the Interior for the
president to send to Tugwell in the event that he accepted Krug's
recommendations. 87
But the president chose to follow the advice of Governor
Tugwell. On May 16, 1946, President Truman sustained Tugwell's vetoes on both bills. The approval of S.195 might have been
interpreted erroneously to mean that the United States was willing
to accept any plan selected by the Puerto Ricans. And the acceptance of S.196 "would [have] constitute[d] an interference with
the powers of the President and the Senate of the United States." 88
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Truman's action put a final damper on the hopes of a plebiscite,
which had been raised nearly a year ago when S.1002 was introduced.
Whatever lessons Mufi.oz Marin learned from his experience
with the Tydings-Pifiero bill, one thing emerged clearly. He
realized that he could not have either independence or statehood
with the kind of economic guarantees necessary to sustain a tolerable standard of living. Given the choice, he would naturally
select both political sovereignty and economic safeguards. But he
did not have the choice. Even if Congress were willing to grant
mdependence, it was unlikely that it would generously extend
for an indefinite period of time federal benefits that the Popular
leader considered adequate. Statehood was ruled out because
there was hardly any sentiment for it in Congress. Furthermore,
by most accounts the economic arrangements that would accompany statehood would spell disaster. There was much talk of
dominion status among prominent Puerto Ricans and non-Puerto
Ricans. But this alternative was yet politically vague and constitutionally uncertain, thus causing Congressmen to shy away from
it.
These were the realities that faced Mufi.oz Marin by 1946. In
contrast to his guarded enthusiasm and optimism for independence apparent in the previously discussed memorandum to Secretary Ickes in January, 1937,89 he had serious doubts in 1946 about
independence as a practical goal even for the foreseeable ·future.
This is not to say that he had no reservations about complete
political separation in 1937. Indeed, they must have been partly
the reason why he called for a moratorium on the status issue
in 1940. And his first years with the political responsibility of
carrying out the Popular programs must have added a few more.
But try as he might to avoid the issue of political independence,
it was thrust before him in 1943 when Senator Tydings introduced
his independence bill. Mufi.oz Marin remained cool to it, even
though the bill had incorporated many of the provisions requested
by the Puerto Rican in 1936 when the senator first offered the
island independence. The PPD leader was even less enthusiastic
when Senator Tydings offered independence again in 1945 and
persuaded the senator to sponsor instead the referendum bill
(S.1002). There was no point, he told officials of the Department
of the Interior, in being concerned merely about political labels. 90
No doubt his lack of enthusiasm was partly because Congress did
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not show any either. Besides, he was unable to obtain from Senator Tydings the kind of economic assurances that in his opinion
were necessary for the island to survive.
Mufi.oz Marin's growing disenchantment with independence
as an appropriate solution, at least for the time being, correlates
significantly with the widening political rift between him and the
CPI.. If before November, 1944, he did not feel politically safe
to challenge the independentistas, he felt sufficiently powerful by
the end of 1945 to demand strict loyalty from his followers on the
status question and to confront the CPI directly with some of the
reservations he had always harbored about independence. You
are a Popular or an independentista, not both, he told his followers by the end of 1945.
The hardening of positions occurred after Mufi.oz Marin
supported the Tydings-Pinero referendum bill instead of the
independence measure introduced earlier by Senator Tydings. In
a newspaper polemic in September, 1945, between CPI leader
Concepcion de Gracia and the PPD head, Mufi.oz Marin was accused of being an obstacle to the Popular party's goal of independence. Why include statehood in the bill, the independentista
leader asked, when there was no backing for it in Congress. Dominion status, Concepcion de Gracia continued, was a device to
perpetuate the "colonial" status. He charged that Mufi.oz Marin
had become the sole arbiter of the PPD. In reply, Mufi.oz Marin
insisted that the party was not opposed to independence and accused the CPI, by veiled references, of disrupting his efforts to get
Congress to approve the referendum bill. 91 In October, 1945, the
CPI formally repudiated the plebiscite measure and called for the
reconsideration of Tydings' S.227 .92 Soon thereafter, Mufi.oz
Marin declared that is was incompatible for a Popular to be a
member of CPI. Some of the independentistas determined to
organize the CPI into a new political party, but were thwarted
by moderate members in the organization. 98
By February, 1946, the Popular leader was willing to force
He classified the CPI as a partisan political moveshowdown.
a
of independence was in conflict with the aims of
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ment
party's central committee endorsed Mufi.oz
Popular
The
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Marin's
the PPD. Only the general assembly
abandon
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not
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of the PPD, the independentista leaders argued, could make a decision that amounted to the expulsion of a group of followers. 94
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At the same time that he virtually expelled the independentistas, Mufi.oz Marin laid the philosophical grounds for the
switch from independence to autonomy by writing a series of
articles in the San Juan daily newspaper, El Mundo. United
States aid to the island, he pointed out, had increased from $3
million in 1933 to $35 million in 1943. The benefits included
increased United States expenditure in the military and naval
activities in the island, and production heightened by war needs.
He called these benefits "artificial aids" because they were generated by the war. Puerto Rico had to develop without "artificial
aids" if it was going to be able to accommodate the needs of a
projected 3,000,000 people in 1960.96
In succeeding articles he criticized those who woµld ruin
everything in order to resolve hastily Puerto Rico's future status.
The island's future lay in industrialization, for which it needed
United States markets and dollars absolutely. This meant that
the existing relationship could continue for some time and that
there was no pressing need to resolve the island's status right
then. 96
The insular leader's conclusions were borne out by the findings of the Tariff Commission, which had investigated the economic aspects of the various political status alternatives. The
Tariff Commission reported that mere political change would
not solve the island's fundamental problems. It cautioned against
seeking quick solutions to problems that required long-term
planning and consideration. Independence, the Tariff Commission report concluded, would cause a depression, making it necessary for the United States to reestablish its authority over the
island. Nor would the lengthening of the transitional period be
of any help because Puerto Rico's fundamental problems would
remain unaffected. 97
In June of 1946, Mufi.oz Marin left no doubt as to the shift
in his position that was in evidence in February, 1946. He wrote
another series of articles, under the title "New Paths Toward Old
Objectives." This time he openly abandoned plans for independence or statehood in the immediate future and argued for the
continued relationship of United States and Puerto Rico. The
Puerto Rican leader admitted that the existing relationship was
not perfect but pointed out that it had been largely beneficial to
the island. He elaborated on arguments he had presented earlier
concerning Puerto Rico's drive for industrialization, its need for
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United States markets, and so on. These benefits could not be
continued by highly favorable bilateral treaty agreements under
independence because such arrangements tended to be inflexible.98
A political solution, the insular chief continued, could be
worked out without destroying the existing economic benefits
that accrue to Puerto Rico, outside the framework of the known
classical forms of independence and statehood. This would be
"Pueblo Asociado de Puerto Rico," a status under which Puerto
Ricans would have complete internal authority, and one which
would serve as transitory for some status in the future. The future
status, independence or statehood, would be considered when
certain economic indexes would be reached and when it would be
clear that the island could sustain its implementation. 99
For many Populares, Munoz Marin's new policy was hard to
swallow when for so long they had believed that the PPD's goal
was independence. But the central committee officially endorsed
the change signaled by the articles. 100 For the CPI, whose members had been effectively excluded from influential positions
within the Popular structure, the parting of the ways had come.
So, too, for many die-hard independentistas. After mass rallies
and executive meetings by the CPI in the months after July, the
Partido Independentista Puertorriqueno (PIP) was organized on
October 20, 1946. 1 01
The defeat of the referendum bill raises questions of motives.
Why did the Department of the Interior agree upon including
independence and statehood when it realized that economically
neither was practical and that Congress was not favorably disposed to granting either one? It was ironic, furthermore, for
Interior's secretary to object to Tydings' independence bills but
not to independence when it was offered with other status options.
The same might be said about statehood. In part, the ambivalence
stemmed from the United States' moral obligation to honor the
principle of allowing colonial peoples to choose their own government, and from the specter of possible economic and political
chaos on an island that had assumed strategic importance in postwar global politics. Besides, there was no clear and firm indication
as to what Munoz Marin, the island's most powerful politico,
desired. Beyond demanding absolute economic guarantees, he
was saying that the people should decide.
Then what did he hope to achieve by supporting the referen-
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dum bill? He, too, did not accept independence and statehood
as workable solutions. Mufioz Marin presumably hoped to diffuse
the challenge to his leadership by the independentistas. More
than that he hoped to get Congress to accept the principle of consulting with the Puerto Ricans to decide on the status question.
When he did not quite succeed in either, he decided to reorient
his whole approach to the issue. He consolidated his position by
expelling the lndependentistas from the PPD and shifting his
party's platform to some kind of dominion status, the details of
which were to be formulated in the next few years. Meanwhile,
he concentrated his efforts on getting a compatible Puerto Rican
appointed to the governor's post soon to be vacated by Tugwell
and urging Congress to permit elective governorship.
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CHAPTER SIX

Self-Government ~~Little by Little":
The Appointment of Governor Pinero,
and the Elective Governor Act of 194 7

When Harry S. Truman came to the presidency in April,
1945, he was confronted with a long history of tardiness and nonprogress on Puerto Rico's political status. The United States had
passed only two important pieces of legislation since the Caribbean
island was acquired in 1898. These were the Foraker Act of 1900
and the somewhat more liberal Jones Act of 1917. Other major
initiatives ended in failure: the 1936 attempt to grant Puerto
Rico independence never got off the ground; the efforts by the
Roosevelt administration in 1943 to provide for an elective governor became ensnarled in politics and personalities; and the 1945
Tydings-Pinero bill's provisions for substantial changes in Puerto
Rico's status found no support in Congress.
In view of Congressional conservatism and cautiousness on
self-government in Puerto Rico, the Truman administration decided to proceed on a gradualist basis and to shelve the issue of
the island's ultimate political status per se until such time as
conditions and circumstances might indicate how its solution was
to be approached.
The opportunity to formulate a new approach came when
Tugwell announced in December, 1945, his intention of resigning
as Puerto Rico's governor some six months later.1 DTIP's new
93
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director, Edwin G. Arnold, who had succeeded Thoron in June,
1945, believed that Tugwell's intended departure might serve a
dual purpose. He suggested that a bill be introduced in Congress
combining the features of the 1943 elective governor measure and
the 1945 referendum bill. Such a bill would permit the Puerto
Ricans to elect their next governor and at the same time allow
them to indicate which of the following they would prefer by
1950: independence, statehood, or dominion. 2
Not knowing, however, whether his suggestion of a dualpurpose bill would lead anywhere, Arnold addressed another
memorandum to the secretary on January 31, 1946. In it he listed
the names of people who might be considered for the governor's
office if legislation making the next governor elective could not
be passed before Tugwell left his post. He insisted that the next
appointee be, first, a Puerto Rican, and, second, in sympathy with
the program of the PPD, the party that was in control of the
insular legislature. Arnold proceeded to consider, one by one,
the six persons on his list of likely nominees. 3
The first name was that of Pinero, whom he considered to be
"far and away the best" person for the post. His experience in
government, Arnold believed, would help in securing "amicable"
executive-legislative relations. Pinero had been an official in municipal government between 1928 and 1932, and an insular PPD
Representative between 1940 and 1944, and he had been popularly
elected in 1944 as the resident commissioner, with a convincing
majority of 174,764 votes. Furthermore, his experience in sugar
cane and dairy farming would make him realistic in his handling
of the island's economic problems. Arnold listed a few other factors in Pinero's favor: his friendship with PPD leader Munoz
Marin; his "ingratiating" personality, which had won him many
friends in Congress and the administration ; and the fact that he
had few enemies.4
Arnold ruled out five other candidates for one reason or
another. He considered Pedro del Valle, a Marine general who
had given a good account of himself as a soldier at Guadalcanal
and Okinawa. Arnold believed that del Valle's war record made
him ineligible, by which he presumably meant that he was not
suitable for government work. A third candidate, Justice Cecil
Snyder of the Puerto Rican Supreme Court, had .the support of
Munoz Marin, but Arnold surmised that the Popular chief's endorsement was likely connected with the fact that "several suits
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challenging the constitutionality of the Authorities set up" under
the PPD program were about to be reviewed by the insular Supreme Court. The director of DTIP did not believe that Snyder's
colleague, Justice Martin Travieso, was suitable because he was
a "reactionary" whose legal opinions were colored by his political
beliefs. And Mufi.oz Marin? Arnold thought it unlikely that the
Popular head would relinquish his party leadership to become an
appointed governor. The last candidate was commissioner of
education Jose Gallardo. His disappointing record in office,
Arnold asserted, placed him out of the running. 5
While these names were being considered, the matter about
the dual-purpose bill was being aired among United States and
Puerto Rican officials in government. Mason Barr, chief of the
newly created Caribbean Branch under DTIP, found both Resident Commissioner Pifiero and Mufi.oz Marin favorable to the
idea. 6 However, because Congressional leaders had so recently
balked on the notion of a referendum, DTIP's legal counsel Silverman advised caution. He suggested to the new secretary of Interior, Krug, who had succeeded Ickes in February, 1946, that he
should consider instead appointing a committee of continentals
and Puerto Ricans to review all facets of the relationships between
Puerto Rico and the United States. The committee would advise
how the Organic Act might be revised. 7
Secretary Krug agreed. He communicated to the president
his intention of appointing such a committee, and even named
possible candidates to serve on it. 8 President Truman, Director
Arnold, and Interior's Undersecretary-until May, 1946, an assistant secretary-Oscar L. Chapman were all pleased to learn of
Krug's decision. 9 But nothing further was heard about the matter.
Presumably, as the emphasis shifted to autonomy, considerations
on the island's final status became less urgent, and the committee
plan was abandoned.
As it became apparent that the Truman administration was
considering the appointment of a native Puerto Rican as governor,
insular leaders moved to make known their preferences. M uiioz
Marin, the most important among them, naturally desired to have
a man who was sympathetic to the Popular program. If he could
persuade the White House to appoint a PPD member, so much
the better. In the months after February, 1946, he increasingly
applied pressure on administration officials to make the appointment from among candidates he found acceptable.
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In the middle of February, the PPD leader wrote to President
Truman, pointing out candidates he considered eligible. The
names he suggested were: Pifiero; Justice Cecil Snyder; Esteban
Bird, a liberal Puerto Rican banker; and Calvin B. Baldwin, at
one time an administrator of the Farm Security Administration
and then an executive of the Congress of Industrial Organization's
Committee on Political Action. The primary consideration in the
selection of the next governor, he added, should be "the sincere
possession of views as to policy similar to those overwhelmingly
supported by our people," that is, the policy of the PPD. "Birthplace," the Popular leader asserted, "is an entirely secondary
matter." 10
Although Mufi.oz Marin did not include the name of Pedro
del Valle as one of the acceptable candidates, the Marine general
had influential backers in the United States and Puerto Rico.
Senator Chavez of New Mexico had early supported del Valle's
candidacy, and the United States Navy found him at least appealing because of his Marine background. In Puerto Rico the Republican-Socialist coalition strongly supported del Valle. 11 His
chances were obviously boosted when President Truman interviewed him on February 19, 1946. 12
The possibility that the president might appoint a candidate
to the Populares precipitated the PPD-dominated
agreeable
not
to adopt on February 21, 1946, a joint resolulegislature
insular
bills, S.195 and S.196.13 The first measure
two
pass
to
and
tion,
(S.195) was intended to pressure Congress into committing itself
to a referendum on the political status of Puerto Rico. It provided
for the authorization of a plebiscite to be held in July, 1947, to
decide on the question. The joint resolution and the second
measure (S.196) concerned themselves directly with the possibility
that the next governor might still be appointed. The joint resolution provided that a candidate with popular approval, or an
elected representative, or a cabinet member should be appointed
if the governorship became vacant. If this was not possible, S.196
provided for a special election on July 4, 1946, through which
the people of Puerto Rico would express their preference for the
person they wished to recommend to the president as the next
appointed governor. Mufi.oz Marin forwarded the joint resolution
and the two bills to Interior's Chapman. 14
In a letter accompanying the documents, Munoz Marin explained to Chapman, "Since governors as a matter of reality must
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be recommended by some one, it is obvious that the best recommender . . . would be the people of Puerto Rico themselves,
either through the action already taken at the past elections or
through consultations provided for in our bills." The Popular
leader reiterated that birthplace of the next appointee was not
important. "We are interested in the democratic significance of
a policy," he asserted. "We would rather have, if it came to that,
a liberal Chinaman than a reactionary Puerto Rican." He categorically rejected the candidacy of del Valle, arguing that "his
public utterances lead to the fear that the relationship between
his military and civil abilities is somewhat the same as in the case
of General Ulysses S. Grant." Mufioz Marin openly endorsed
Pifiero's candidacy. If the president did not appoint the resident
commissioner, he asserted, Governor Tugwell should be persuaded
to approve S.196.15
But Tugwell vetoed both bills on March 2, 1946, on the
grounds that they interfered with the constitutional prerogative
of the president. 16 Hence, the governor and Chapman felt an
added obligation to get President Truman to appoint Pifiero as
the next governor. Chapman pointed out to Tugwell that, since
Senator Chavez was doing his best to get del Valle appointed, it
was important to get "our viewpoint to the President before
things had gone too far and any commitments were made." 17
Even by the time President Truman sustained, on May 16,
1946, Tugwell's vetoes on S.195 and S.196, he had not reached a
decision as to whom he was going to appoint. It is not clear why
the president was hesitant. Certainly Secretary Krug was not
happy about Pifiero. Mufioz Marin feared that the secretary was
considering del Valle and Justice Travieso and reminded Krug
that both fell in the "category of persons inimical" to the Popular
program. In response to Krug's question about the propriety of
appointing an elected man for a post designated as appointive
under the Organic Act, Mufioz Marin pointed out that if Pinero
resigned his post as resident commissioner he would become a
private citizen and thereafter would be eligible for any position
offered by the president. 18
Secretary Krug's reluctance stemmed, in what measure it is
uncertain, from the criticism by the National Democratic Committee chairman Robert Hannegan and "his crowd," who charged
that Pifiero would turn out to be a "stooge" of Mufioz Marin. He
even thought of submitting the names of Esteban Bird and Cecil
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Snyder. 19 Further conversation between Krug and Chapman two
days later revealed that the president was not firmly committed
to appointing a native Puerto Rican at all. 20 One can only surmise
that the president and the secretary worried over Pinero's close
association with the PPD head and how the Senate might interpret
this at the time of his confirmation.
What probably decided the matter was the action of the
Puerto Rican legislature. In a special session on July 9, the insular
legislature recommended, by a vote of 54 (all Populares) to 3, the
appointment of Pinero as the next governor. 21 Secretary Krug
realized that a non-Popular governor would run into endless
trouble with the PPD-dominated insular legislature. A week
later he recommended to the president the appointment of
Pinero,22 and made public his endorsement a few days later. 23 The
president accepted the secretary's recommendation. On July 25,
1946, he announced the appointment of Pinero as the next governor of Puerto Rico. The Senate confirmed the appointment on
July 31, 1946. 24 For the first time since 1898, when the island came
into United States hands, Puerto Rico was going to have a native
resident as governor.
The New York Times called it a "courageous forward step." 25
The Washington Post commented, "To the rest of the world, and
to the Western Hemisphere in particular, Mr. Truman's decision
cannot fail to seem a practical application of the liberal colonial
policies which this country has preached, and lately practiced." 26
Said the Washington Evening Star, ". . . Puerto Ricans in general will read into his appointment an encouraging confirmation
of our resolve to help them achieve a greater and greater measure
of self-rule; nor can that fact fail to reflect creditably on us
throughout Latin America." 27 La Prensa in New York, on the
other hand, believed that Pinero would have a "double preoccupation": one, to solve the island's profound economic and social
problems, and two, to demonstrate his worth as the first Puerto
Rican to fill the post.28
As significant as the step was in the advancement of Puerto
Rico's political rights, the appointment in itself fell short of the
aspirations of the island's people, as Governor Pinero himself
pointed out in his inauguration speech on September 3, 1946.29
From the point of view of the Truman administration, however,
it was a necessary stage because of the stalemate that had been
reached on Puerto Rico's final political status. The next stage
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would be the election of the governor. Such a gradualist approach
meant that the eventual settlement of Puerto Rico's status would
be postponed until some future date. Both Mufioz Marin and the
Truman administration were broadly in agreement with this new
approach.
The Popular leader's virtual control over insular politics was
vitally important to the administration. Pinero, even though he
was an appointed governor, belonged to the same party as Mufioz
Marin and was his close associate. Furthermore, Mufioz Marin
had expelled diehard independentistas from the party; and he
faced no challenge to his authority from the Coalition forces, traditional advocates of statehood, because they were weak and divided. The Truman administration could therefore go to Congress with its new approach in the sure knowledge that it had the
support of the most powerful man on the island.
For its part, the Truman administration had to make sure
that procedurally it did not offend the Eightieth Congress, dominated as it was by Republicans, 30 in presenting the case for greater
political autonomy for Puerto Rico. It might capitalize, incidentally, on the friendlier atmosphere that possibly followed the
departure of such controversial figures as Ickes and Tugwell,
whose relations with earlier Congresses were difficult. The administration succeeded, in point of fact, in striking very good
relations with the Congress. It benefited from the services of the
active and alert Antonio Fern6s-Isern, who had been appointed as
the new resident commissioner.31 He, together with such top
officials as Undersecretary Chapman,3 2 Arnold, and Barr, maintained close relations with Republican leadership in Congress, consulting it frequently before undertaking major actions concerning
Puerto Rico.
Congress offered close bipartisan support in the passage of the
elective governor bill of 1947. There was little or no opposition
that had accompanied earlier attempts at granting political freedom to Puerto Rico. Indeed, the climate in the Congress for insular autonomy was remarkably favorable. This was probably
because the postwar position and role of the United States in
international politics placed a certain obligation upon the legislators in Washington to show its commitment to the cause of
self-government everywhere. The Truman administration and
insular leadership fully exploited this friendly disposition in the
Congress. They combined careful consultation with clever par-
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liamentary maneuver and compromise to overcome Congressional
caution and secured passage of the elective governor measure.
Neither the Truman administration nor the Puerto Rican
leaders were deflected from this new approach by the language
issue, which once more surfaced following the insular legislature's
passage of a language bill (S.51) in April, 1946. (The bill provided that, beginning with the school year 1946-1947, instruction
in all public schools on the island, including the University of
Puerto Rico, would be in Spanish, except in certain special cases.)
Tugwell vetoed the measure just before his resignation on the
grounds that, as Krug reported to Truman, "no dispassionate
study of the desirability and consequences of the bill from a
pedagogical standpoint preceded its enactment." Furthermore,
Truman and Krug believed that the language issue might better
be postponed until the status question had been clarified. Congress might misconstrue its passage as indicative of Puerto Rico's
desire for independence. Both Pinero and Munoz Marin agreed.
Indeed, Munoz Marin did not see Truman's upholding of the
veto on October 26, 1946, as indicating the president's lack of
concern for Puerto Rican aspirations, although the insular protest
groups probably interpreted it as such. 33 Whatever his intentions
in supporting the bill in April, Munoz Marin did not allow them
to get in the way of the new approach when President Truman
sustained the veto on the measure six months later.
Governor Pinero and Munoz Marin separately visited Washington in January, 1947. In the conferences that the two had with
Congressional leaders, they agreed that an elective governor measure should precede a referendum to test insular opinion on the
final status. 34 But the effort to enact an elective governor measure
began, according to Fernos-Isern, with a meeting called by Chapman in the last days of January. The undersecretary told Munoz
Marin and Fernos-Isern that the administration had abandoned
any referendum plan temporarily and that it was considering an
elective governor measure, for which it desired the cooperation of
the Puerto Rican leaders. They agreed. 35
While Governor Pinero announced upon his return Congress'
friendly disposition towards an elective governor, 36 Chapman prepared to initiate the administration measure. He told reporters
that he was going to study the abortive elective governor bill of
1943, and informed them of his intention to confer with Senator
Taft of Ohio, a powerful Republican leader in the Congress.
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Meanwhile, Resident Commissioner Fernos-Isern laid the groundwork for Congressional support by writing to all congressmen and
senators about the proposed measure. 37
Despite the favorable attitude of leading members of Congress, the Senate Public Lands Committee decided to visit Puerto
Rico to see insular conditions for themselves. 38 Chairman Hugh
Butler from Nebraska, of the Senate Public Lands Committee, announced on February 11, 1947, that he and five other senators
(all but one were Republicans) would journey to Puerto Rico. 39
The Congressional visiting team was broadened a week later to
include ten representatives of the House Public Lands Committee.
The joint investigating committee of fifteen United States legislators-one of the senators had dropped out-visited the island to
discuss economic, social, and political questions with insular officials. The visitors returned some six days later, considerably impressed by Puerto Rico's needs and achievements. 40
More importantly, the legislators came back firmly persuaded
that Congress should permit the people of Puerto Rico to elect
their governor. 41 Senator Butler told a La Prensa reporter that
he believed Congress would pass such a bill. He insisted, however, that the United States continue to review fiscal matters on
the island by retaining the presidentially appointed auditor for
Puerto Rico. Clearly, Congress still wished to act cautiously, despite its commitment to self-government in Puerto Rico. 42
The administration proceeded to prepare the necessary legislation to forward to Congress. In March, 1947, Barr presented a
draft of an elective governor bill to Senator Guy Cordon of Oregon, a Public Lands Committee member. Copies of the draft bill
were also sent to Senators Taft and Butler. The draft measure
provided for an elected governor every four years, with the power
to appoint the entire cabinet, including the commissioner of education, the attorney general, and the auditor, as well as the justices
of the insular Supreme Court. All of these positions were then
being appointed by the president. Obviously, the administration
desired to incorporate in the bill as much as it dared, even though
it was aware that Congress was not favorably disposed to some
aspects of the measure. 43
The departments of the Interior and of State added to the
gathering momentum by expressing their support for self-government in Puerto Rico. 44 The administration was not prepared,
however, to give serious consideration to a statehood bill intro-
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duced in January, 1947, by Republican Senator William Langer
from North Dakota, 45 or to the independence bill sponsored on
April 24, 1947, by Maryland's Democratic Senator Tydings. Tydings believed that Puerto Rico could easily achieve independence.
He said, "If the people of Puerto Rico want independence, there
is a very simple way in which they can get it. If the legislature
of Puerto Rico will ask the Congress of the United States to give
them independence there is no doubt in my mind that Congress
will accede to the wishes of the people of Puerto Rico." 46 Undersecretary Chapman did not agree, and stated the administration's
opposition to the bill some three months later. 47 In any case, the
administration had become too firmly committed to a policy of
autonomy to revert to one of final political solutions.
On April 29, 1947, Senator Butler introduced the elective
governor bill (S.1184). It was presumably the same bill that had
been drafted by Barr. Three days later Representative Crawford
of Michigan co-sponsored a companion bill (H.R.3309). 48 The
measure was subsequently referred to as the Butler-Crawford
bill.49

A subcommittee of the House Committee on Public Lands,
under the chairmanship of Congressman Crawford, conducted a
hearing on May 19, 1947. Among those who testified on behalf of
the bill were Secretary Krug and Governor Pinero. The secretary
urged the passage of the bill in line with the administration's
policy of honoring Article 76 of the United Nations Charter, concerning the aspirations of the inhabitants of territories. He cautioned, however, that self-government should be given "little by
little." As to the island's final political status, the secretary believed that the Puerto Ricans should decide for themselves sometime in the future by means of a plebiscite. Governor Pinero
regarded the bill as a "necessary step" in the solution to the prob~
lem of the island's political status, pointing out that it left the
door open for Puerto Ricans to choose from among independence,
statehood, and dominion when conditions warranted a referendum.M
Advocates of independence and statehood opposed the ButlerCrawford bill on the grounds that it was not necessary in the
solution to the island's final status, and saw it as a diversionary
and delaying tactic. PIP's president, Concepcion de Gracia, called
it a "colonial reform" and a "fraud." Former Puerto Rican Governor James R. Beverly, an estadista, was doubtful whether the
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measure still left open the possibility of statehood. And a diehard
continental member of the American League for Puerto Rico's
Independence, Ruth M. Reynolds, interpreted the bill thus, "It
merely transfers from the President of the United States to the
people of Puerto Rico the questionable privilege of selecting one
more servant of the empire." 51
There was no opposition to the bill among members of the
subcommittee, except to certain aspects of it. Congressman Crawford endorsed the bill when he opened the hearing, although he
objected to the governor appointing the auditor. 52 Representative
William Lemke of North Dakota did not like, Fern6s-Isern wrote
later, the justices being appointed by the governor. He wanted
them to be elected by the Puerto Rican people, but apparently
there was no backing for his position among other members of the
Public Lands Committee. 53 On May 26, 1947, the bill was referred
to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union
with one major amendment: namely, that the post of the auditor
was to continue being appointed by the president. 54 The amendment indicated caution, not objection to the idea of self-government.
However, New York's Congressman Cole intended to object
to the consideration of the bill, a move that would have meant
defeat of the bill. When Fern6s-Isern learned of this, he enlisted
the help of Crawford and of Cole's fellow-Republican Congressman Dean P. Taylor of New York. The two gentlemen persuaded
Cole to offer instead an amendment later when the bill would
move from the Consent Calendar to the House floor for debate.
Crawford, it was agreed, would introduce the amendment on Cole's
behalf to eliminate the internal revenue taxes on Puerto Rican
rum sales on the mainland, which by special fiscal arrangement
had been reverting to the insular treasury. Cole must surely
have known that the Puerto Ricans would not agree to an amendment that threatened to cripple the insular economy; his apparent
intention was to defeat the bill. Meanwhile, Fem6s-Isem, Taylor,
and Crawford planned, upon consulting the parliamentarian, a
strategy that would defeat the amendment: Crawford would introduce the amendment, and Congressman Antonio M. Fernandez
of New Mexico would ask the speaker of the House to rule it
invalid because it was not relevant to the bill. 1111
The bill came up for debate on the House floor on June 16,
1947. Crawford duly offered the amendment as agreed, and Con-
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gressman Fernandez-supported unexpectedly by Representative
Marcantonio of New York-asked the speaker to rule it inadmissible because it was not germane. The speaker agreed, and the bill
was passed with one major amendment about the auditor as
recommended by the Public Lands Committee. Except perhaps
for Cole, no other representative opposed the measure seriously
enough to block its passage. Marcantonio called the bill "an embellishing facade of an ugly and rotten colonial structure." But
even the American Laborite, an advocate of Puerto Rican independence, supported it because, as he explained, " . . . I do not
want to deprive the people of Puerto Rico of even this gesture
after we have deprived them of so much and so often." 116
Perhaps Undersecretary Chapman explained most succinctly
and accurately the reason for the bill's success in the House: " . . .
the entire course of the bill was noteworthy for the cooperation
and understanding of the issues and of the broad significance of
the bill shown by representatives of the executive and legislative
branches. " 117
The passage of the elective governor measure in the Senate
is marked by a similar kind of cooperation and understanding,
although the additional amendments offered by the senators
would suggest that the degree of caution was much greater in the
upper chamber.
A day after the House passed the bill, it was referred to the
Senate Committee on Public Lands. 58 Senator Butler had not
planned to hold any hearing but had been persuaded to do so,
Chapman told Muiioz Marin, by several communications from
Puerto Rican independentistas. No hearing, lrowever, was held
on the scheduled day of June 21, 1947.119 Instead, Senator Butler
solicited Secretary Krug's views on the bill by correspondence.
The secretary endorsed the measure strongly, saying that its passage would place the Puerto Ricans "further along the road to
self-government.'' 60
The Senate Committee on Public Lands, however, requested
clarification on certain aspects concerning continental United
States citizens and the insular court system. DTIP's chief legal
counsel, Silverman, responded by stating that mainland citizens
would not be discriminated against by insular laws. In subsequent
memoranda, Silverman explained how the court system of Puerto
Rico operated in relation to the District Court of the United
States, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United
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States Supreme Court. Silverman stated that cases involving mainland citizens and begun in the courts of Puerto Rico might be
removed to the Federal District Court and proceed higher up.
Even in cases where the United States was not a party to the action
as originally brought in the Puerto Rican courts, it could become
a party "by intervention and thus eligible to remove the cause to
the Federal Court.'' 61
Assurances notwithstanding, the Senate Committee on Public
Lands reported the Butler-Crawford bill out on July 2, 1947, with
two new sections designed to clarify federal authority on the
island. Section 7 provided for a "Coordinator of Federal Agencies" responsible for correlating the activities of federal bodies on
the island, and for requesting from the governor reports concerning insular affairs. Section 8 added the following: "The rights,
privileges, and immunities of citizens of the United States shall
be respected in Puerto Rico to the same extent as though Puerto
Rico were a State of the Union and subject to the provisions of
paragraph 1 of section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution of the
United States.'' 62 Puerto Ricans had no objection to section 8.
But they were unhappy about the creation of a federal coordinator. Governor Pinero and Resident Commissioner Fern6sIsern both hoped that the amendment would be dropped in a
House-Senate conference. Fern6s-Isern preferred that the Department of the Interior continue to assume the role of a federal
coordinating agency. 63 Indeed, Executive Order No. 9383 had
empowered the Interior department to do just that, and a special
position as provided by the amendment, Chapman believed,
would be duplication. Opposition to it, Fern6s-Isern recalls,
would have placed the bill in jeopardy, especially as the idea of
a federal coordinator came from Senator Taft, who had considerable influence in the Senate. 64 Munoz Marin did not believe the
amendment important enough to risk failure of the bill, especially
since only three days remained in the session. Chapman agreed
but believed that opposition to it should be registered. And
Silverman duly expressed the Interior department's disapproval. 65
The bill was placed on the Senate Calendar for July 26, 1947,
the last day of the legislative session. It would appear that its
success or failure at this stage depended almost entirely on Senator
Taft. Fern6s-Isern claims that he had known of Taft's opposition
to the governor's appointing the insular Supreme Court Justices,
but that he did not know until a few hours before the legislative
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session whether the senator's intention was to kill the bill "outright" or to offer an amendment about the justices at the last
minute and thus force the House to accept the amended bill without a conference of the two chambers. 66 H. Rex Lee, who was a
DTIP official responsible for Alaskan matters, discovered on July
25, while canvassing for the bill, that Senator Taft wished to
amend it at the eleventh hour. If Lee did know about Taft's intention, he apparently did not disclose it to the resident commissioner. Lee, by his own account, consulted both Crawford and
Butler and elicited their prior approval, 67 a statement that is contested by Fern6s-Isern, who insists that Taft did not make his
position clear until the final hours of July 26 and that Crawford
first learned about the amendment from him.68
In any event, Crawford, Butler, and Fern6s-Isern could not
do otherwise but accept the Taft amendment. When the bill was
called up the second time for debate at 11:45 P .M., July 26, fifteen
minutes before the end of the legislative session, it was passed in
the Senate without debate. Crawford got the Senate president
to sign the bill, and at 11 :55 he and Fern6s-Isern rushed the bill
back to the House. Fortunately, three minutes before midnight
the House had decided to prolong the session so that all the Senate
amendments could be considered. The amendments were accepted, and the bill was passed-the last measure to be cleared by
the House.60
The administration and the insular leaders accepted the
three major amendments: the auditor and the justices of the
Puerto Rican Supreme Court were to continue being appointed
by the president, and the post of federal coordinator was created. 70
Puerto Ricans could enjoy in the elections of 1948 the long-sought
right to choose their governor. President Truman lamented the
fact that the islanders had not won complete autonomy but still
considered the measure "a great step toward complete self-government" when he signed, on August 15, 1947, the Butler-Crawford
bill into Public Law 362.71
The striking fact about the elective governor measure is the
relative ease with which it sailed through Congress. It contrasts
sharply with a similar measure a few short years before, in 1943,
which suffered from conservatism and caution, political bickering
and misunderstanding. Or again in 1945, the Tydings-Pinero
referendum bill hardly generated more than a casual interest
among congressmen and senators in Puerto Rico's right to self-
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government. Congress reacted unfavorably in large measure because of the absence of a properly articulated policy and program
for Puerto Rico's autonomy. To be sure, the Truman administration did not appear to have one either until about the time
Pinero was appointed governor. But by January, 1947, a major
feature of its policy was the separation for practical purposes of
the issues of autonomy and the final political status of Puerto
Rico, to the extent to which these inextricably intertwined questions could be separated. Herein lies the reason for the elective
governor measure's success.
Congress was in a conservative mood and acted with extreme
caution. The act did not introduce drastic changes in Puerto
Rico's political, constitutional, and fiscal status. The United
States retained the power of the purse in the appointive auditor;
and it reserved final responsibility in the insular legal machinery.
An undated, anonymous report entitled, "Work of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs," suggests further
that the revocability of the Elective Governor Act was an important factor in some of the lawmakers' supporting it. The generally
paternalistic report argued that a decision was not being made on
the final status of the island, which meant that Congress was still
in a position to take action if the need arose. "The elective governor bill for Puerto Rico . . . ," it stated, "can be repealed if
Communists should gain control of the Island government, or for
any other reason." It would be quite another thing, the report
continued, if Puerto Rico were being granted statehood. That
would have meant "that the new state could send Senators and
Representatives to Congress and would share in a selection of a
President. Such an ideal goes far beyond the ideal of self-government."7'2
Nor did the act impair Puerto Rico's strategic value to the
United States. In a period of heightened security-consciousness,
many legislators in the Capitol must have felt reassured that the
Navy and Army holdings and operations would remain unaffected
on an island that guarded the entrance to the Caribbean. The departments of the Navy and the Army held large amounts of land
as naval and military bases, and had the power to acquire more.
The Navy reclaimed, for instance, an entire half of Vieques island
in I 94 7, which had formerly been turned over to the insular
government by the Department of the Interior. It was able to do
this under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947.73
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Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal explained the need for
acquiring such lands in the following way:

In developing its post-war plans, the Navy Department
has found it necessary to give careful consideration to the
requirements of the Atlantic Fleet for adequate training
areas in the Caribbean area, particularly for amphibious
operations and firing practice. Its studies demonstrate
conclusively that this area will assume great strategic importance in the post-war era, that the Atlantic Fleet must
be maintained in a high state of readiness, and that amphibious training and shore target exercises must be
continued on an extensive and realistic basis. 74
All this is not to deny that Congress recognized its duty in
terms of the United States' obligation towards the advancement
of self-government. Many members of Congress felt that the
Puerto Ricans had earned the right to self-government by their
loyalty to the United States through times of war and peace. Furthermore, the new breed of administrators as exemplified by
Pinero and Munoz Marfn would prove worthy because it had
shown what Gordon K. Lewis calls a new "sense of public duty"
and "massive incorruptibility." 75
Indeed, Congress could not easily reverse the trend towards
greater self-rule in Puerto Rico, which it had established in enacting the law. Its action was morally binding. In this sense the act
paved the way for the successful implementation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico between 1950 and 1952.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

~~Polititiation Mutation":
Public Law 600, July, 1950

Although definite outlines of the Commonwealth status first
appeared in 1946, the concept of such a dominion-like plan was
not new. Groups of Puerto Ricans had advocated some form of
dominion status ever since the island fell under United States
rule. There were proposals in the 1920s and the early 1940s that
were somewhat like the Commonwealth concept. In 1922, the
Union party, which had earlier supported independence, adopted
a political formula it called "Associated Free State." 1 It merged
in 1924 with the Republican party whose earlier platform of
statehood did not prevent the new alliance from working under
the common slogan, "sovereignty within the American sovereignty."2 The status position of the alliance did not · appear to
make a significant impression upon either the United States or
the insular electorate by the time that it ruptured in 1930.3
In 1943 two groups of Puerto Ricans separately submitted
bills to the Roosevelt administration providing for the establishment of a dominion status. Their proposals were in part prompted
by the scheduled meeting of the President's Committee then authorized to consider ways of reforming the Organic Act, and by
Senator Tydings' independence measure then before Congress.4
The first group consisted of Enrique Campos del Toro, for109
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merly a professor at the University of Puerto Rico, and four others
who also had a professional and legal background. It suggested
in a twenty-page memorandum that Puerto Rico might develop
"a higher degree of statehood" in its relationship with the United
States, much as that of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand with
Britain within the Commonwealth. The bill accompanying the
memorandum proposed extending complete self-government in
insular matters, and permitting the Puerto Rican government to
enter into trade agreements with foreign governments. The measure also proposed repealing coastwise laws that were adversely
affecting Puerto Rican trade. 5
The second group to offer an alternative bill to the Tydings
measure consisted of Teodoro Moscoso and seven other Puerto
Ricans representing the professional and business classes. The
bill reflected greater concern with economic aspects of the envisaged relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States.
The "Free State" proposed by the group was roughly equivalent,
by its own description, to the Irish Free State within the British
Commonwealth. Under such a status, the United States would
continue "Free State" relations with Puerto Rico for at least
fifteen years. In addition, the United States was to provide for
protective measures to help insular industries, establish a minimum sugar quota, and continue refunding customs duties on
Puerto Rican goods for twenty years. It was not made clear what
was to happen thereafter. 6
Neither group's proposal was seriously entertained by the
administration, largely because it was limiting itself at the time
to the consideration of permitting the Puerto Ricans to elect
their own governor. Furthermore, Congress was not favorably
disposed towards considering at that time any question that involved major changes in the island's political status as long as
World War II continued. Nor did the Puerto Ricans show much
enthusiasm, primarily because most of them continued to think
in terms of independence or statehood. 7
Two years later M ufioz Marin succeeded in persuading Senator Tydings to incorporate dominion in his 1945 independence
bill as one of the alternatives from among which Puerto Ricans
could choose. The measure that emerged was the Tydings-Pinero
referendum bill. The bill did not adequately define in practical
terms what the concept of dominion involved, which was one of
the reasons why it failed to excite enthusiasm among members of
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the United States Congress. In any case, Senator Tydings himself
abandoned it in favor of his conviction that only independence
was the right solution to the status question. 8
By 1946, Munoz Marin was convinced that both independence and statehood were impractical goals for the immediate and
even the near future, the first because of economic reasons and the
second because Congress was not favorably disposed to it. The
Popular leader was fully aware that he had to wean his supporters
gradually from the "either independence or statehood" syndrome.
He had to persuade Puerto Ricans, many of whom looked to the
Popular party for the cherished goal of independence, that a
dominion status was an honorable alternative that would not
compromise their sense of what Tugwell called "dignidad." 9
Furthermore, the United States, too, had to be persuaded that
such a status was a practical solution that in no way would detract
from the island's strategic value.
The campaign to reorient the thinking of Puerto Ricans
began in earnest in June, 1946, when Munoz Marin wrote two
articles in the San Juan newspaper El Mundo at about the time
he expelled independentistas from the PPD, and to which reference has been made earlier in this study. In these articles, he
pointed out Puerto Rico's absolute need of the United States for
its economic survival. He argued that production had not kept
pace with the population growth, and that the island needed to
step up its pace through increased industrialization. Such a program, Munoz Marin continued, required Puerto Rico's continued
free access to United States markets. Since Puerto Rico could not
afford to give up its economic relations with the United States, a
political solution had to be found outside of the "known classical
forms" of independence and statehood. One such solution that
the Popular leader suggested was what he called Pueblo Asociado
de Puerto Rico. He did not give any details about it except to
say that under it the Puerto Ricans would enjoy complete internal
authority, and that sometime in the future, when the island
reached certain economic indices, its inhabitants could decide
between independence and statehood.10
As co-founder and member of the governing body of the
PPD, Fem6s-Isern also played an influential role in the formulation and implementation of the Commonwealth. He wrote an
article in the July 4, 1946, issue of El Mundo proposing what was
to become later the Commonwealth status.1 1 On February 27,
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1947, by which time Fernos-Isern had been appointed the new
resident commissioner in Washington, he spoke about a "third
point of view" at Rollins College, Florida. Careful not to offer
the formula as officially that of the insular government, he raised
the question, "Why they [the advocates of the "third point of
view"] ask, cannot Puerto Rico become a self-governing community with its own democratic constitution, and still retain its
present economic relationship with the United States within an
adequate political association pattern?"12
A year later President Truman visited Puerto Rico (and the
Virgin Islands), but it is not known whether insular leaders discussed with him the new plan for dominion status. 13 In May, 1948,
however, Fernos-Isern translated the "third point of view" into
what he called the "Federated Free Commonwealth" in an address
before a group of graduate students from Princeton. In contrast
to his Rollins College speech, the resident commissioner openly
declared that the Puerto Rican government favored this new
status, although not as a permanent but an intermediate solution.
He described the process by which the "Federated Free Commonwealth" could be achieved. First, Puerto Ricans must be permitted to appoint their own auditor and justices of the Supreme
Court, positions then being named by the president. Second, the
limits to which the federal government could intervene in insular
matters should be established. Third, the islanders should be permitted to write their own constitution. Fourth, the political and
economic relations between the island and the mainland should
be perfected, subject to change only by mutual consent. 14 The
speech contained the essential features of what was to be the
constitution bill two years later.
Munoz Marin followed up the resident commissioner's suggestion with a major address on July 4, 1948.15 It also served as
a basis for the PPD's campaign in the forthcoming insular elections. The question of political status, the Popular leader said,
was part of the "whole problem of life" for the Puerto Ricans.
Whoever promised to achieve immediate independence or statehood, he continued, "would not be a liberator; he would be an
enslaver, a destroyer of freedom in the life of men and women
who make up our people; he would be an annihilator of all hope
of being able to add political liberty permanently to the other
essentials of freedom of the people of Puerto Rico." Mufi.oz Marin
suggested dominion form of government, and urged Congress to
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"complete by law" self-government in Puerto Rico without making it a state, but "within the constitutional structure of the
United States." By this he meant that Congress should authorize
the Puerto Rican people to draw up their own constitution.16
The economic relations between Puerto Rico and the United
States, Mufi.oz Marin continued, must remain basically the same
except for lifting the restriction upon the refining of insular
sugar. When all this was done, self-government in Puerto Rico
would reach the "maximum point," "which sometimes under the
name of autonomy, sometimes under the name of dominion, and
sometimes under other names, has been one of the solutions which
have, in the past, been put forward in Puerto Rico." The Popular
leader clearly stated that this status was to be transitional, for he
wanted Congress to pass a law authorizing the insular legislature
to submit to a plebiscitary vote the question as to whether Puerto
Rico desired independence or statehood "at any time when the
Legislature may judge that the economic development will allow
it."17
Mufi.oz Marin's Fourth of July address was incorporated in
the Popular party's platform on August 15, 1948, and therefore
also served to initiate the campaign in the first elective governor's
contest in 1948. The PPD platform called first, for the preservation of the economic and fiscal relationship between the island
and the mainland. Second, it made public its intention of seeking
a constitution drafted by the Puerto Ricans themselves. Third,
the party promised that the island's legislature would convoke,
"when it deem[ed] that favorable conditions exist[ed]," a plebiscite to poll Puerto Ricans on three alternatives: independence,
statehood, and continuation of dominion status because economic
conditions were not yet ripe. The party was having the electorate
believe that it did not rule out independence under certain circumstances, partly to undermine the strength of the independentistas. Fourth, it would call upon the Congress of the United
States to act in accordance with the wishes of the people of Puerto
Rico as reflected in the plebiscite on the third point. 18 The PPD
nominated Mufi.oz Marin to run for the governor's post and
Femos-Isem to continue as the resident commissioner. 19 The
mainland Democratic party platform of 1948, incidentally, promised "immediate determination by the people of Puerto Rico as
to their final form of government and their ultimate status with
respect to the United States." 20
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The Partido Estadista Puertorriqueiio (PEP) joined forces
with the Socialist party of Bolivar Pagan, and the newly-formed
Reform party of Santiago Iglesias Silva, the last party consisting
of followers of the defunct Liberal party.21 The Coalition's candidates for the posts of governor and resident commissioner were
Martin Travieso and Luis Ferre, respectively.22 Its platform advocated statehood as an eventual goal, which was in conformity
with the plank offered by the Republican party on the mainland
advocating eventual statehood for Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto
Rico. 23
In contrast, the PIP promised in their platform the appointment of a legislative committee to decide how indpendence for
Puerto Rico was to be instituted. Its two candidates for governor
and resident commissioner were both formerly prominent members of the PPD. They were Dr. Francisco Susoni and Rafael
Arjona-Siaca. 24 Corresponding to the PIP's aspirations was the
plank of the mainland Progressive party, which stated that the
people of Puerto Rico had a right to independence, and that the
United States had "an obligation toward . . . [them] to see that
they [were] started on the road toward economic success." 211
The 1948 elections were significant because it was the
first time in Puerto Rico's 450 years of history since Columbus'
time that its citizens were being permitted to elect their own
governor. Furthermore, the island's 872,114 registered voters
were being called upon to choose from three major sets of candidates, each one fairly clear on where it stood on ·the status question.26 The Popular party injected, perhaps deliberately, some
confusion by advocating a plebiscite on three alternatives sometime in the future. For the moment, however, Mufi.oz Marin
referred to independentistas27 as dreamers because they failed to
realize that Puerto Rico needed the United States for its economic
well-being. 28
Fernos-lsern emerged in the campaign as a leading spokesman
for the party's goal of dominion status. Twelve days before the
elections, he addressed Puerto Ricans over the air. The resident
commissioner spent considerable time explaining how Puerto
Rican's fixation with statehood and independence had made their
advocates "worshippers in separate sects" when in fact neither was
immediately realizable because of the island's economic conditions and because neither could be obtained from Congress. He
suggested, therefore, a political and economic union in the form
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of a dominion "founded on complete equality" with the United
States. Fern6s-Isern did not believe that such a status was not "a
respectable political status," or that Puerto Rico would deserve
to be referred to as a "colony" thereafter. He pointed to the
Commonwealth of British Nations and to the statuses of Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand within it. "You cannot say," he insisted, "they are inferior or politically subordinate to Britain.
They live united by common allegiance to the British Crown.
But they live under a democratic regime where the Crown merely
represents common citizenship." Fern6s-Isern told his listeners
how the new status might be implemented: obtaining the right
to draw up their own constitution and the authority to elect their
auditor and appoint their justices of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, a statute would replace that part of the Organic Act that
then served to regulate Puerto Rico-United States relations. He
also suggested adjustments to clarify the application of federal
laws in Puerto Rico. 29
The Coalition pointed to the advantages that would follow
statehood. With Puerto Ricans in the Senate and the House of
the United States, the island would be able to secure the best
possible terms for all its marketable commodities, including the
lifting of restrictions then on sugar acreage and refining. The
PIP accused Mufioz Marin of having abandoned independence
as a goal and said that the status could be achieved with the close
cooperation of Untied States legislators. 30
The PPD scored victories even more convincing than its
achievements in 1944. In the gubernatorial contest it received
392,386 votes (over 61 percent), as opposed to the combined votes
of 248,328 for the opposition parties. The votes for the opposition
were distributed thus: PEP 89,441, Socialist party 64,396, Reform
party 29,140, and PIP 65,351. The Populares won 17 of the total
19 seats in the Senate and 37 of the 39 seats in the House. 31
Governor-elect Mufioz Marin interpreted the support his
party received as endorsement of the dominion status, and the
day after the elections he made public his intention of asking
Congress to allow the islanders to write their own constitution. 32
In his inaugural address on January 2, 1949, the governor argued
that colonialism was "obsolete" but that ending it with "narrow
nationalism" was bad. He pointed out that it was Puerto Rico
that needed the United States, and not the other way around,
and promised that traces of colonialism in United States-Puerto
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Rican relationships would soon be ended. 33 Undersecretary Chapman, who was present at the inauguration, read to the assembly
the president's message of felicitation and expressed his faith in
the leadership of Mufioz Marin and in the islanders' ability to
run their own affairs. 34
Congress appeared generally willing to extend greater responsibility to Puerto Rico. On January I 7, 1949, for instance,
Senator Butler of Nebraska introduced a bill to establish in a
single man the post of resident commissioner for Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands, and to extend to him, together with delegates
from Alaska and Hawaii, the right to vote in the House of Representatives.35 Governor Mufioz Marin was not too happy about
having one man representing both Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands. 36 Besides, the Puerto Rican government based the island's
unique tax structure, in part, on the general principle that the
islanders could not be taxed without representation. Giving a
vote to the resident commissioner might open the door in the
future for the Puerto Ricans to become eligible for federal taxation and for the tax-exemption laws to be ruled invalid.
In any event, Undersecretary Chapman opposed the bill. In
a letter to Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney, chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, he pointed out that there
were nearly 2,000,000 Puerto Ricans in contrast to 30,000 Virgin
Islanders. Under such circumstances, the needs of the two groups
of people could not be adequately represented by one resident
commissioner. 37
In pursuit of the insular government's announced intention
of clarifying the rule regarding the application of federal laws
in Puerto Rico, Fernos-Isern introduced H.R.3848 in Congress
in March, 1949.38 The bill proposed amending section 58 of the
Organic Act so as to provide that all laws originating in Congress
should be made specifically applicable to Puerto Rico. The measure aimed at preventing "indirect, automatic, undetected, and
accidental amendments" to the Organic Act, the resident commissioner explained to DTIP's new director, James P. Davis. In
Fernos-Isern's opinion, the Organic Act was not a general but a
special law operating both as a constitution for Puerto Rico as
well as a statute of relations between the island and the mainland.39 The bill did not make any headway, and its provisions
would be written into the constitution bill a year later.
In July, 1949, Governor Mufioz Marin visited Washington
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to take up the constitution project. 40 On July 5, he discussed it
with President Truman. He referred to Puerto Rico, according
to Secretary Krug, as a "new state," not in a legal or formal sense
but in the sense that it was in charge of its "own destiny." There
were also references in the memorandum to Puerto Rico's desire
to participate in the Point Four program then being developed
by the United States.41 The governor's desire to offer technical
aid to under-developed countries reflected Puerto Rico's pride in
its progress and confidence in its future. The offer was made
partly in response to Puerto Rico's detractors who claimed that
the island was still a colony of the United States. The reactions
of the president and the secretary to Muiioz Marin's "new state"
at this stage are not known, but Krug reported later to the president that the State department was favorable to Puerto Rico's
joining the Point Four program. 42
The governor's optimism in the coming days suggests that
his July 5 meeting with President Truman and Secretary Krug
was a favorable one. At a press conference on July 9, 1949, he told
reporters, "Our new state is not defined by law but it is already a
reality. There are no documents which say that Puerto Rico is a
forty-ninth state, but we have facts not documents to demonstrate
it." Since Puerto Rico was already a "new state," the next step
was for the islanders to write their own constitution as in the case
of established states, the governor added. 43
Three days later Muiioz Marin appeared before the House
Public Lands Committee to report to it Puerto Rico's progress.
The major part of the more than one hour he spent before a wellattended meeting of the committee was devoted to describing the
island's economic program. Muiioz Marin referred only briefly
to the matter of the constitution, assuring the congressmen that
the Puerto Ricans' writing their own constitution did not signify
a step toward statehood but the extension of self-government. He
concluded, " . . . I would like to leave it [the constitution idea]
with you gentlemen for your consideration for action during a
future session."44 The governor also spoke to full attendance of
the House Ways and Means Committee, and was met by individual congressmen interested in Puerto Rico. 45
Muiioz Marin made an overwhelming impression upon the
legislators. The Public Lands Committee, for instance, broke
tradition by giving the governor a standing ovation.46 Secretary
Krug noted in his memorandum to the president that the Popular
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leader had been received by congressmen with "extraordinary
cordiality." The secretary continued, "On the whole there is no
question that our relations with Puerto Rico are very much better
than at any previous period." 47 The reason for the governor's
popularity, La Prensa reflected, was his ability to be both idealistic
and practical, and his emphasis upon the importance of Puerto
Rico as a link between Latin America and the United States.
Besides, Munoz Marin was living proof, in the minds of many
congressmen, that the United States was opposed to a policy of
territorial expansion. 48 The governor himself was pleased with
the favorable response that the constitution project had received
from congressmen.49
But other Puerto Rican leaders were not wholly satisfied
about the constitution plan. PEP's leader Celestino Iriarte said
that if the new constitution was merely a change in the Organic
Act it was not consequential. Socialist leader Pagan argued that
true sovereignty could be attained only under statehood or independence. And PIP head Concepcion de Gracia insisted that the
constitution would not be Puerto Rico's own, but merely an addition to the Organic Act. Two leading insular newspapers were
also critical. El Imparcial believed that the so-called "new state"
was neither "new" nor a "state," while El Mundo charged that
Munoz Marin was falsely claiming that Puerto Ricans were in
agreement with his plan when he had not consulted them in
deciding on the new status.50
The governor replied to these charges to the United Press
in Washington. He said he was sure that the islanders supported
his plan because he was doing no more than fulfilling the program
he had campaigned for in 1948. In any case, whatever the final
political solution, Puerto Ricans would have the opportunity to
decide for themselves in a referendum. Resident Commissioner
Fernos-Isern also claimed that the Puerto Rican people knew and
understood the distinct type of political state envisaged by the
insular government as reflected by their support of the PPD in
the 1948 elections. 51 Despite his confidence in the wide support
for the constitution plan, Fernos-Isem announced that the bill
providing for the constitution would not be presented in 1949
because he wanted Congress to have the maximum time and attention in considering it. 52
No further reference to the projected constitution appears in
the records until December, 1949, when presidential aide Philleo
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Nash dispatched a memorandum to one of his colleagues, Stephen
Spingarn. Nash informed Spingarn that the Interior department had received a request from Mufioz Marin to make an announcement about the constitution plan. The aide believed that
the governor had injected a "new note" into the unending debate
on political status largely as a reaction to pressures he was feeling
from independentistas and estadistas. He also felt that the project
would take about two to three years to complete. It does not
appear as if Nash was fully acquainted with the details of the
Puerto Rican plan. 53
On December 28, 1949, the chief of the Caribbean Division
of DTIP, Mason Barr, addressed a memorandum to Nash. Barr
did not feel that the projected constitution would differ much
from that part of the Organic Act providing for autonomy. He
felt that its great merit lay in the "psychological advantage" it
held out for Puerto Ricans and the rest of the world as another
example of the "progressive attitude of the United States toward
its territories and so-called 'non-self-governing' areas." He
seemed to have some reservations about the dominion concept.
Barr said, " . . . dominion, federated state, autonomous state or
some other semantical juggling, would be a difficult concept for
either Congress, the American people, or the Puerto Rican people
to understand." 54 The drafting of the constitution, on the other
hand, would not meet opposition, and Barr recommended that
the president support this general principle in his State of the
Union address. 55 The president, however, did not refer specifically
to Puerto Rico or the projected constitution plan in his annual
message to Congress in January, 1950, but simply endorsed the
policy of a greater measure of self-government for all of the
island possessions of the United States. 56
In January, 1950, Governor Munoz Marin announced that
he would be visiting Washington to work out, among other things,
the details of the constitution plan.57 A few days thereafter, the
governor described the process by which Puerto Rico had naturally evolved into a "new kind of statehood" as "polititiation (of
polity?] mutation" and stated that the time had come for formalizing it by deliberate action. Three factors, according to Munoz
Marin, had helped in bringing about the "new kind of statehood":
first, the island's racial affiliation to Latin America and its political
connection with the United States, which made it culturally a
"harbor [of] understanding for both main cultures of the hemi-
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sphere"; second, Puerto Rico's practically complete self-government; third, its unique fiscal and political arrangement with the
United States. 58
He listed in the same memorandum two ways by which the
evolved state could be formalized into a constitutional reality.
One, the people of Puerto Rico should be authorized to draft
their own constitution and to establish a procedure for amending
it, subject only to the limitations continued in Congress' enabling
act, such as a bill of rights. Two, Congress should elicit the consent of the insular legislature or of the Puerto Rican people
before passing laws that concerned the island's affairs. 59
Fern6s-Isern recalls that he left with Mufioz Marin in December, 1949, the last of the many drafts on the projected constitution bill that he had been working on since his speech of
July 4, 1946. The governor was to consult his legal advisors about
it and report changes to Fern6s-Isern when he arrived in Washington.60 Meanwhile, the resident commissioner, now back in
Washington, worked to secure the passage of bills that would
complement the proposed constitution bill. He happily reported
White House support of a bill (H.R.3848) he had sponsored ten
months earlier. The measure provided that, unless specifically
stated to the contrary, federal laws would not apply to Puerto
Rico.61 Soon thereafter, Fem6s-Isern appeared before the Senate
Finance Committee to argue in favor of extending the Social
Security Act to Puerto Rico. 62
At the beginning of February, 1950, the resident commissioner announced his intention of introducing a bill providing
for the constitution early in the session. In an effort to inform
and engender support for the proposed bill, Puerto Rico's Washington office published 15,000 copies of its monthly bulletin containing information about the projected constitution plan and
about the island's political status as compared with other nonUnited States territories whose relationships with a major power
were similar. 63
On February 21, 1950, DTIP's legal counsel Silverman wrote
to Fern6s-Isem, referring to him in the salutation as "My dear
Tony." There was reference in the communication to an earlier
discussion of the proposed measure by the two. Silverman said
that laws that were going to remain in force after the bill's passage should be mentioned in the measure. He was opposed to
using "enabling" in the proposed bill because of its statehood
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connotation, and suggested that the word be omitted. Instead
he preferred "authorizing." Silverman requested a conference
among Fernos-Isern, James Davis, and himself when Governor
Munoz Marin arrived in Washington. 64
Munoz Marin arrived in the United States on February 27,
1950. 65 Sometime thereafter the governor met DTIP's director
Davis and Silverman. The Popular leader told the two administration officials that he envisaged the introduction of a simple bill
in Congress authorizing the calling of a constitutional convention
to draft a constitution. He listed two absolute conditions that
the Puerto Ricans had to honor in writing such a document,
namely, that the form of government be republican and that it
include a bill of rights. The governor hoped that the proposed
measure would contain a provision to exempt federal laws, or
parts thereof, from applying to Puerto Rico whenever circumstances warranted it. Such a provision, it was Munoz Marin's
contention, would further the principle of self-government, especially as Puerto Rico did not have voting rights in Congress.
The Popular leader was careful to point out that the provision
was not intended to usurp Congress' power since it would still
have the authority of re-enacting laws considered invalid for
Puerto Rico by the president. 66
The governor confided in Davis and Silverman that he preferred to see the bill being presented as an administration measure
so as "to preclude any embarrassment in Puerto Rico should it
fail of enactment or be passed in some form unacceptable to the
Puerto Ricans." The request seems inconsistent with the facts
of the entire matter. The constitution project had been advanced
by the PPD as part of its program in the 1948 elections. It had
received wide publicity. It would appear, therefore, that the
governor's position had been misinterpreted or that the memorandum had misstated Munoz Marin's position. In any event,
Munoz Marin made that request and expressed his intention of
conferring with the president and Chapman (who had been promoted from an undersecretary to secretary in place of Krug)
and of canvassing for support among majority and minority
leaders in Congress. 67
The governor met with Congressional leaders in the next
few days. He visited Representatives Crawford of Michigan, John
W. Byrnes of Wisconsin, Stephen M. Young of Ohio, and A.
Sidney Camp of Georgia, thanking them for their help in the
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past and bidding for their support in the constitution matter. 68
Later he conferred with Senator Butler of Nebraska. 69 On March
5, 1950, the House Public Lands Committee chairman, J. Hardin
Peterson, announced his promise to hold hearings on the proposed
measure within twenty-four hours of its introduction. 70
A day later the Popular leader conferred for thirty minutes
with President Truman in the company of Secretary Chapman.
Although no details of the meeting were announced, M ufioz
. Marin was said to be pleased about its outcome. 71 Sometime during the governor's visit, he conferred with Fern6s-Isern about the
draft measure that the resident commissioner had left behind in
Puerto Rico. The changes of style as recommended by the governor's legal advisors were agreed to. 72 Both the governor and the
resident commissioner believed there was no cause for confusion
about their plan, despite criticism to the contrary about it by other
Puerto Ricans. 73
Senators O'Mahoney and Butler, who had agreed to be bipartisan co-sponsors of the proposed measure in the Senate, received a draft of the legislation from the governor and the resident
commissioner. The draft bill was examined by Stewart French,
an aide to Senator O'Mahoney. The memorandum prepared by
French found at least three technical defects, one of which was
that there was no clearly expressed enabling clause to authorize
the election of delegates to the constitutional convention. Even
though Puerto Rico was an unincorporated territory, an "enabling
or resolving clause" was necessary, much as in the case of incorporated territories that wrote their constitutions preparatory to their
becoming states in the Union. 74
The draft bill represented, according to French's memorandum, all the changes that Governor Munoz Marin was prepared
to accept. For political reasons, the governor wanted the bill
introduced without giving the impression that the constitution
was a "gift from On High." He wanted it believed that it was
Puerto Rico's own idea and that acceptance of the idea of "Associated Statehood" was an independet act freely expressed by the
people of Puerto Rico. Furthermore, if the bill was introduced
in the present form, Silverman had told French, it would have
"the greatest propaganda value in Latin America." French advised the senator to discuss the proposed changes with the governor and the resident commissioner.75
An aide to Senator Butler also prepared a memorandum on
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the proposed bill. The memorandum stated that the bill, if approved, would not alter the island's status as an incorporated
territory. Nor would it deprive Congress of its power to legislate
over Puerto Rican matters. "The Congress," the memorandum
continued, "can still make any Federal law applicable or inapplicable to Puerto Rico as it sees fit, or pass laws affecting Puerto
Rico alone when it is desirable. It can also nullify the Puerto
Rican constitution if it wishes, since, technically, Puerto Rico is
still a territory subject to the rules and regulations of Congress
under the Constitution." 76
On March 13, 1950, Governor Munoz Marin appeared before
the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. The governor reported to the committee the economic progress Puerto
Rico had made, much as he had done over a year ago before the
House Public Lands Committee. In addition, he elaborated upon
his constitution project. Munoz Marin argued that Congress' authorization of Puerto Ricans to write their own constitution was
in practice a "shorter step" than the permission it gave to the
islanders in 1947 to elect their own governor, yet more "deeply
important . . . morally and spiritually." He continued, "It will
put them politically and morally on the level with their great
democratic practice and their great effort to continue solving the
difficult economic problems of Puerto Rico." 77 The senators
raised few questions, presumably because by this time most of
them had been personally briefed by Munoz Marin or Fern6sIsern, or otherwise informed by the governor's team of advisors.
Indeed, the committee members were so thoroughly impressed
by the governor that they gave him a standing ovation at the end
of the proceedings.18
In this cordial atmosphere, Resident Commissioner Fern6sIsern introduced the constitution bill (H.R.7674) on March 13,
1950.79 The bill recognized the principle of government by "consent," and its passage would be regarded as having been adopted
"in the nature of a compact." It further provided for Congress
to authorize the drafting and adopting of a constitution by Puerto
Rico, which was to be republican and was to contain a bill of
rights. Once the bill passed Congress to become an act, it would
be submitted to Puerto Ricans for their approval. The completed
constitution was then to be transmitted by the president to Congress. If the transmittal occurred ninety days before the adjournment of the session, and if Congress should fail to act upon the
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constitution before the session's termination, the document was
to be deemed approved. 80
Sections 4 and 5 provided that those sections of the Organic
Act of 1917 dealing with Puerto Rico-United States relations
would be continued under the "Puerto Rican Federal Relations
Act." The "Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act" in effect guaranteed the continuance of the fiscal and political relations between
the island and the mainland. Section 6 of H.R.7674 incorporated
the provisions of a bill that Fernos-Isern had sponsored on March
28, 1949. It stipulated that upon the request of the insular legislature the president might except Puerto Rico from the application of any federal law that did not specifically apply to the
island.81
In short, the constitution bill sought to separate the dual
functions of the Organic Act of 1917. That part of the Organic
Act that dealt with Puerto Rico's internal matters was to be embodied in a constitution drawn up by the island. If the bill should
become law, the governor was guaranteed the right of naming
his own auditor and justices of the Supreme Court. That part of
the Organic Act that was concerned with insular-mainland relations was to be known as the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act.
In this connection, the phrase "in the nature of a compact" was
important because, as Mufioz Marin and Fernos-Isern interpreted
it, there could be no further changes in the Federal Relations Act
except with mutual agreement. The phrase was to become a
bone of contention two years later.
True to the promise he made a week earlier, House Public
Lands Committee chairman Peterson held the first hearing on
the constitution bill the day after it was introduced. Governor
Mufioz Marin was the only witness to testify on that day. The
constitution bill, the governor insisted, did not represent a step
either to independence or statehood, and Congress' passage of the
measure did not imply its commitment in the future to grant
either one of the two. Mufioz Marin believed that the Puerto
Ricans should have full right to amend the constitution except
in areas where the bill stipulated that they could not. "I would
hope," he added, "that only basic exceptions of principles should
be made, in order to recognize the dignity of the Puerto Rican
people in the exercise of their democratic wisdom." 82
Leading backers of the constitution bill worked to win support for the measure. At the request of Arnold Miles, director of
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the Bureau of the Budget, DTIP's director Davis wrote on March
16, 1950, explaining details of the bill. Davis explained the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories and
reassured Miles that the bill's passage would not change Puerto
Rico's status as an unincorporated territory and that the island's
political and financial arrangement vis a vis the United States
would remain unchanged. Davis described Puerto Rico's new
status as "much akin" to that of a state in the Union. 83 Ten days
later, Secretary Chapman explained the constitution bill and
expressed his support for it over the National Broadcasting Company.s4
Meanwhile, Stewart French submitted to Senators O'Mahoney and Butler a memorandum on his discussion with FemosIsem, preparatory to the senators' co-sponsoring the constitution
bill. There were disagreements of points of view between French
and Fem6s-Isem. French believed that a joint resolution instead
of a bill might be better to get Congress to approve the constitution project. In the end, however, he accepted Fern6s-Isem's
argument in favor of a bill. In the matter of "compact," the resident commissioner insisted upon retaining it because of the "desirability of such language." French apparently agreed because
he found precedent of the "compact" idea in the Enabling Act of
the Northwestern Territory. On another matter, namely, the
delegation of legislative power to the president in case Congress
failed to act upon the constitution within a specified period of
time, French registered his opposition, "in theory" at least. But
Senator O'Mahoney's aide was sympathetic to Fem6s-Isem's argument that it would not be wise to allow the islanders to complete
the constitution only to have Congress, pressed by "more immediately momentous matters," fail to act upon it. 811
A revised draft of the bill, presumably prepared by French,
accompanied the memorandum. It incorporated at least two important changes. The first was that the constitution had to be
"accepted freely by a majority of the people of Puerto Rico." The
second change concerned the length of time after which the constitution would become effective if Congress should fail to act
upon it. French's revised draft stipulated that if the constitution
was transmitted to Congress within thirty days of a legislative
session, and if after one year of such transmittal Congress had
still not taken action, the constitution would be deemed approved.86
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If Senators O'Mahoney and Butler had any doubt as to
whether the constitution bill had popular insular support, it was
in part allayed by a joint resolution adopted by the Puerto Rican
legislature on March 30, 1950. The resolution fully endorsed the
measure. 87 The following day, eighteen days after Fern6s-Isern
had sponsored H.R.7674, Senators O'Mahoney and Butler introduced a companion bill designated as S.3336. 88 The Senate version
of the constitution bill did not differ significantly from its counterpart in the House. S.3336 had added to it two "whereas" clauses
concerning Congressional recognition of Puerto Rico's right of
self-government. Section 2 of the Senate bill also added a provision not present in the House version. The Puerto Rican people
were specifically authorized to call a constitutional convention.
Other provisions dealing with the transmittal of the constitution
to Congress, its fate should that body not take action within the
legislative session, and the applicability of federal laws in Puerto
Rico were left very much as they were in Fern6s-Isern's bill. 89
The senators accepted Stewart French's recommendation with
respect to the "whereas" clauses and the insertion of an "enabling"
clause but rejected the recommendation concerning the extension
to one year of the time in which Congress could take action on
the constitution. 90
In a statement released to the press by the two senators, it
was pointed out that the bill had popular insular backing and
that it was a significant step in the advancement of self-government. The senators cautioned, however, against interpreting the
measure as a step in the direction of either independence or statehood. They maintained that the bill would not affect Puerto
Rico's relationship with the United States. 91
The administration indicated its support for the bill. President Truman directed the Department of the Interior and the
Bureau of the Budget to forward favorable reports to Congress. 92
Secretary Chapman wrote a letter on April 28, 1950, to Congressman Peterson strongly endorsing the constitution bill. Congress,
he argued, would continue to have the power to determine the
island's ultimate status in the future. The bill's passage, the
secretary continued, would not commit Congress to statehood
legislation in the future. In a memorandum that accompanied
the letter, Chapman concurred with the proposed amendments to
H.R. 7674 as incorporated in the Senate companion bill. 93
On May 16, 1950, the House Public Lands Committee con-
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ducted for the second time hearings on the constitution measure.
All those who appeared before the committee endorsed the bill,
although the memoranda, letters, and telegrams of those who
opposed the measure were inserted in the records. The witnesses
who appeared in person, furthermore, were connected in one way
or another with the administrations of President Truman and
Governor Munoz Marin. Edward G. Miller, Jr., assistant secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, endorsed the measure
because it was in accordance with the United States' policy of
extending greater self-government to dependent peoples. A letter
from Assistant Secretary of State Jack K. McFall was read into the
hearings. McFall commented on the bill's significance in an international context, saying that, "In view of the importance of
'colonialism' and 'imperialism' in anti-American propaganda, the
Department of State feels that H. R. 7674 would have great value
as a symbol of the basic freedom enjoyed by Puerto Rico, within
the larger framework of the United States of America." 94
Another witness was Representative Walter A. Lynch of New
York, who had recently traveled to the island as one of the members of the House Ways and Means Committee to examine Puerto
Rico's tax relationship with the United States. He used facts and
figures to illustrate the fiscal relationship between the island and
the mainland and reassured the committee that the bill would
not alter it. The Department of the Interior was represented by
DTIP director Davis who, in endorsing the bill, referred the committee to the April 28, 1950, letter from Secretary Chapman to
Congressman Peterson, previously cited. 911
Associate Justice A. Cecil Snyder of the Puerto Rican Supreme Court emphasized in his testimony that the bill embodied
a "new, bold, unique, ingenious, creative and dynamic concept,"
while insular Senator Victor Gutierrez pointed out that the bill
had received the support of eighteen of the nineteen senators
and thirty-eight of the thirty-nine representatives in a joint insular
resolution. Fern6s-Isern sought in his testimony to reassure congressmen who may have had some doubts about aspects of the
bill. The phrase "in the nature of a compact," he said, was based
on the principle of mutual consent in which Puerto Rico and the
United States would jointly decide upon future changes in their
relationship with each other. The will of Congress, Fern6s-Isern
continued, would prevail in whatever form and manner federal
authority in Puerto Rico would be exercised. The constitution
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bill would not alter the powers of sovereignty acquired by the
United States in 1898 by the Treaty of Paris. Then he reiterated
a point, which, judging by the number of times it was repeated,
must have bothered many congressmen: passage of the measure
would not commit Congress to be either for or against any specific
form of political formula for Puerto Rico in the future. 96
After Fern6s-Isern's appearance, no more witnesses were
heard. In the communications that appear in the text, several
persons opposed the bill for one reason or another. Juan B. Soto,
professor of law at the University of Puerto Rico, questioned the
essential premise upon which the constitution plan was based in
a memorandum he had prepared at the request of the PEP. He
said that a constitution was derived from the original sovereignty
of the people, and as such it could be revoked only by the authority
that made it. If the United States approved the bill, it would in
effect be recognizing the inherent sovereignty of the people of
Puerto Rico and relinquishing the rights and powers of sovereignty it acquired in 1898. If this indeed was so, the professor
continued, the United States was not obliged to grant financial
aid to Puerto Rico. It might even lead Puerto Rico, Soto implied,
to an undefined legal status from which statehood might not be
possible. 97
Independentista leader Gilberto Concepcion de Gracia stated
his objection more strongly. He said, "We vehemently repudiate
any constitution subject to amendment, repeal, suspension, control, or alteration by Congress or by any other power foreign to
the people of Puerto Rico themselves." He argued that neither
Congress nor Munoz Marin had ever been entrusted with the
power of constitution-making, which belongs "historically, juridically, and politically" only to the people of Puerto Rico. All
opponents of the bill argued that the committee should hold hearings in Puerto Rico to give those persons unable to travel to
Washington an opportunity to be heard. 98
The following day a subcommittee of the Interior and Insular
Affairs Committee conducted hearings on S.3336. The same persons who had appeared the previous day at the House Public
Lands Committee hearings presented their arguments to the
Senate subcommittee. Much of what they said was essentially if
not exactly the same as their testimonies the day before. 99 The
Senate subcommittee was aware of the criticism that many opponents of the bill could not come to Washington to testify for
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a variety of good reasons. But Senator O'Mahoney did not think
it possible to hold hearings in Puerto Rico because it would cause
delay and probably also kill all chance of the bill's passage. 100
Secretary Chapman dispatched a memorandum to Senator
O'Mahoney analyzing the constitution bill and urging its passage.
Since it appears as if the senator was already persuaded about the
merits of the bill at that stage, the secretary's memorandum was
presumably intended to clarify aspects not yet clear or to emphasize the importance he attached to its passage. 101 In any event,
the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs approved
the bill with amendments on May 26, 1950. 102 The committee
altered the language of the bill as introduced by Fern6s-Isern to
provide specifically for a referendum among Puerto Ricans to
accept or reject the act authorizing the writing of the constitution.103 This clarification appears to be in deference to legitimate
criticism that opponents of the bill had not been given sufficient
opportunity to be heard. It did not wish to be open to a charge
later that the bill had been railroaded by committee members.
The Senate committee struck out section 3, which had provided that if Congress failed to take action after the president had
transmitted the constitution it would be deemed approved. Congress would not agree, it would appear, to a move that implied
blanket endorsement and thereby would undermine its claim of
authority over insular affairs. The committee was probably similarly motivated in eliminating section 5. This section concerned
federal laws specifically applicable to Puerto Rico. Despite these
amendments, the Senate committee's approval of the bill was a
major breakthrough. The committee gave a number of reasons
in its appraisal for its favorable consideration. The first group
of factors concerned the popular support for Governor Munoz
Marin and the strong endorsement given the bill by the departments of Interior and State. The second group of factors was that
the bill did not envisage substantive changes in insular-mainland
relations and that it did not seek to bind Congress to a final
political status. The third group of factors was that the bill was
in agreement with the principle of extending self-government,
as embodied in the United Nations Charter, and that its enactment would enhance the prestige of the United States in the eyes
of the dependent peoples of the world. 104
The chairman of the House Public Lands Committee, Representative Peterson, did not express an opinion on the Senate
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amendments, but said he would hear opponents of the bill in the
week of June 5, most notably Representative Marcantonio of New
York. 1O5 On June 8, 1950, the Senate passed the constitution bill
as reported to it by the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs. The bill was one of the 229 measures passed without
objection. 106
On the same day that the Senate passed the constitution bill,
the House Committee on Public Lands held hearings to give the
measure's opponents an opportunity to express their views. Congressman Marcantonio, who had introduced a bill on March 16,
1950, to make Puerto Rico a sovereign state, was the first to
testify. His testimony consisted of two parts. The first was a
speech he had made in Congress on March 16, 1950, and which
he had printed in the hearings. In it, the member of the American
Labor party charged that the bill was a "snare" and a "delusion"
intended to continue the system of "imperialism." The measure,
he explained, evaded the real issue of Puerto Rico's ultimate status
and continued to give the United States veto power and exclusive
jurisdiction in a number of areas. Marcantonio said that Mufi.oz
Marin had falsely built a reputation of being a champion of the
jibaros when in fact he connived with the "Wall Street Crowd"
in implementing "Operation Bootstrap," which he called "Operation Booby Trap." 101
In the second part of his testimony, Marcantonio charged
Munoz Marin and Fern6s-Isern of having deceived the Puerto
Rican people in the November, 1948, elections. He based his
assertion on a comparison of speeches made by Mufi.oz Marin in
July, 1948, and by Fern6s-Isern in October, 1948, with the promises contained in the 1948 PPD platform. Representative Marcantonio said that there were two constitutional steps involved in the
bill, when in fact the PPD platform had given the impression that
only one was necessary to resolve Puerto Rico's ultimate status.
Fern6s-Isern contested this point in a lively debate with Marcantonio. The New York congressman was the only opponent to
appear in person. 1O8
Other opponents of the constitution bill made their positions
clear by communications to the committee. PIP leader Concepcion de Gracia lamented the haste with which the committee
sought to pass the bill. Celestino Iriarte, president of the PEP,
desired to see a provision inserted in the bill that stated that
nothing in it implied a denial of Puerto Rico's right to statehood
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in the future. He also hoped that the phrase "in the nature of a
compact" would not be interpreted to mean that future Congresses could not act favorably on statehood. Independentistas
Rafael Arjona-Siaca and Rafael Perez-Marchand submitted a long
memorandum about legal aspects of the measure. They argued
that the bill was juridically deceptive because the "compact" idea
was meant to give the impression that Puerto Ricans voluntarily
accepted their "colonial" position, when in fact the powers of
Congress could not be "in the least compacted, convenanted, contracted, bargained, or in any way affected by this legislation."
They argued that the bill sheltered a hidden motive, "No matter
what the efforts to conceal the facts, the present relations between
the Puerto Ricans and the United States will continue as they
are, not by the consent of the people of Puerto Rico but because
in the bill Congress had expressly decreed their permanence."
All those opposed to the bill's passage requested that hearings be
held in Puerto Rico. 10 9
Congressman Peterson appeared to believe that opponents
of the constitution measure should be given further opportunity
to be heard.ll0 But on June 14, 1950, three days after he expressed
such sentiments, the Public Lands Committee approved the bill
in an executive session behind closed doors. 111 The measure as
reported out by the House committee incorporated the amendments made by the Senate commitee two weeks earlier. 112 On
June 19, 1950, the bill was referred to the Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union. 113 At this point it was generally
believed that the measure would pass Congress before July 4. 114
Indeed, Mufi.oz Marin hoped that this would happen, because its
passage would give the insular government the opportunity "to
add local significance to national celebration [Fourth of July],
and would also lend itself to wider publication throughout the
world." 115
On June 28, 1950, the House Rules Committee placed the
the calendar for debate lasting for one hour on the House
on
bill
116
Two days later the House debated the constitution bill.
floor.
"unusually strong" support, as Silverman wrote Mufi.oz
was
There
117
those congressmen who expressed support for
Among
Marfn.
that based its confidence in Puerto Ricans
group
one
was
bill
the
Marin in particular. Another group that
Mufi.oz
and
general
in
endorsed the measure did so in the knowledge that Congress
retained the right to decide on Puerto Rico's final political status.
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Still another group that voted affirmatively was moved by a sense
of paternalism towards Puerto Rico. Said Republican Congressman Walter H. Judd of Minnesota, " . . . you cannot expect to
take a child in the third grade or sixth grade and move him up
into a postgraduate school without the various grades between." 118
Another Republican, Congressman Jacob K. J avits of New
York, had some reservations about the bill. The measure, in his
opinion, restricted Puerto Ricans to only one alternative, namely,
the present status, and even that only with prior Congressional
approval. If Puerto Rico could frame its own constitution, he
added, it could also decide on whether it desired independence
or statehood. He was, therefore, in favor of recommitting the bill
for striking out sections 4 and 5. The strongest opposition came
from Representative Marcantonio, who charged that the measure
was a deliberate attempt by Mufioz Marin to mislead the islanders.
But his motion to recommit the bill to the committee failed decisively: I in favor, 260 opposed, and 169 not voting. Thereafter
the bill was passed by a voice vote. Both Republicans and Democrats supported the measure, which suggests that Puerto Rican
autonomy was a bipartisan concern of United States legislators. 119
On the first day of July both the Senate and the House, having
reached agreement on the constitution bill, presented it to the
president for his signature. On the same day that the House
debated the bill, the Department of the Interior requested the
Budget Bureau to recommend to the president the acceptance of
the bill.120 On July 3, 1950, President Truman signed the bill
into Public Law 600, despite appeals by independentistas and
estadistas that he should not. 121 Public Law 600 stipulated that
it be submitted to the Puerto Ricans for their acceptance or rejection. If accepted, the government of Puerto Rico was authorized to call a constitutional convention to draft a (:onstitution
that had to provide a republican form of government and include
a bill of rights. Upon the Puerto Ricans' adopting the constitution, the president of the United States was authorized to transmit
it to Congress. If Congress should approve the constitution, the
provisions of the act were to go into effect: the constitution was
to become effective in internal matters, while that part of the
Organic Act of I 9 I 7 that concerned Puerto Rico-United States
relations was to continue in force as the "Puerto Rican Federal
Relations Act," as provided by section 4 of Public Law 600. The
law did not set a time limit for the entire procedure. 122
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Munoz Marin and Fern6s-Isern regarded the act as a victory
Puerto Ricans. They both pointed out its great significance
all
for
of July celebrations in San Juan. The resident comFourth
the
at
missioner urged the independentistas and estadistas among the
islanders to take the opportunity of hanging their "hammocks"
of independence and statehood, instead, "under the shade of the
tree which sprouts into this new concept of life of liberty in confederation. " Who knows, he continued, the natural evolution of
this "new federative formula" might make the old dilemma disappear from everybody's mind. 123
The striking fact about the implementation of the first portion of Puerto Rico's Commonwealth project was the relative ease
with which the insular leaders secured the passage of Public Law
600 .. A congeries of reasons persuaded the United States that it
was in her interest to enact such a law. The law offered her the
opportunity to respond to charges that Puerto Rico was a colony
of the Colossus of the North. Congress retained the phrase "in
the nature of a compact," despite its legal vagueness, as evidence
of its good faith, because such language created the impression
that Puerto Rico was by her own choice entering into a relationship with the United States. The comments of at least two mainland newspapers might have reflected the exaggerated significance
attached to Public Law 600 by some congressmen and administration officials. The Boston Globe believed that the Puerto Rican
story was one that the "Voice of America should trumpet throughout Asia." The Washington Post argued that in the island's political progress "a more effective riposte to Soviet yelpings about
American imperialism could scarcely be presented to the
world." 124
The more important consideration that went into resolving
Congress' mind, however, was the nature and extent of the change
envisaged by Public Law 600. The United States was not called
upon to make a substantive change in Puerto Rico's existing status
but merely to improve upon it and to formalize it in a brilliantly
conceived constitutional scheme. Puerto Rico gained complete
control of its internal affairs within a federal relationship that
was unique because of its fiscal and tax relationship with the
United States. The envisaged status did not undermine the
United States' role in maintaining the island's position as a strategic outpost nor its supremacy in Puerto Rico's foreign affairs.
And the administrations of President Truman and Governor
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Mufi.oz Marin repeatedly stressed the fact that Congress was not
relinquishing its hegemony on the matter of Puerto Rico's ultimate political status.
A factor of considerable importance was the personality and
politics of Mufi.oz Marin. The governor's innovativeness inspired
among United States lawmakers a kind of enthusiastic confidence
in Puerto Rico's future that paved the way for Public Law 600.
Of no less importance was the dedicated and intelligent efficiency
of Resident Commissioner Fern6s-Isern, who worked assiduously
to see the realization of a concept that had germinated in his
mind. He it was who appeared before committees, conferred and
consulted with Congressional leaders and administration officials,
and piloted the measure through Congress. The resident commissioner worked closely with administration officials whose help
was vital to the passage of the constitution. They were, among
others, Chapman, Davis, Barr, Silverman, Philleo Nash, and
Stephen J. Spingarn. The help of Congressional leaders too was
invaluable. Congressman Peterson, Senators O'Mahoney, Butler,
and Herbert H. Lehman of New York were among the many
who shared in the aspirations of Mufi.oz Marin and Fern6s-Isern.
Together they established a solution, which in the words of the
New York Times was a "notable example of enlightened control
from a governing power and energetic, intelligent progress on the
part of the governed." 125
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CHAPTER EIGHT

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,

July, 1952

In securing the passage of Public Law 600, the Puerto Rican
administration had succeeded in persuading the Congress of the
United States of the wisdom of the plan for a Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico. Then it had to be officially endorsed by the Puerto
Rican people in, a series of carefully planned constitutional steps.
Muiioz Marin was reasonably certain of receiving the support of
the bulk of the islanders. The Popular leader, therefore, took
great pains to maintain procedural propriety, lest he should be
accused of fraud later on. Any instance of malpractice would
tarnish or even shatter his claim that the Puerto Rican people
were establishing a promising experiment in democracy. In this
his patience and resourcefulness were severely tried: firstly, by
those among his compatriots who launched a rebellion and by
others who labeled the entire process fraudulent; and, secondly,
by Congress, which threatened to renege on its promises made in
Public Law 600, to the extent of discrediting his claim of victory
for the principle of self-government. That he succeeded was a
measure of the man's political skill.
One of the first steps was taken at the end of August, 1950.
The Joint Insular Election Committee established dates for the
procedure involved in the drafting, adopting, and approving of
135
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the constitution. Referendum on Public Law 600 was set for
June 4, 1951, and elections for members to the constitutional
convention were to be held on August 27, 1951. The constitution
to emerge out of the convention was to be submitted to the Puerto
Rican people for their acceptance or rejection on January 21,
1952. The date for the registration of voters for the last two
constitutional steps was originally fixed for August 14, I 950, but
later moved to November 4 and 5, 1950. 1 The dates were confirmed at a special session of the Puerto Rican legislature on
September 27, 1950. 2
Mufi.oz Marin desired to have observers present from the
State Department and the United Nations. He wanted "to render
ineffective the [possible] Nationalist and Communist" charges
that the entire electoral procedure was rigged. 3 But he changed
his mind upon the advice of DTlP director Davis, who thought
that to follow the governor's suggestion would be "dignifying"
the activities of the Nationalists and the Communists. The presence of the observers, Davis continued, "would have an effect
opposite to that which [the governor] wish[ed]." 4 However,
Mufi.oz Marin and the insular authorities were "leaning over
backwards" to make sure that complaints by the radical groups
would have no basis. 5 The Federal Bureau of Investigations
(FBI), too, was keeping a close watch on the Nationalist party
in Puerto Rico. A twenty-five page report was filed by the organization on October 12, 1950, covering the party's activities for the
first nine months of 1950.6
The campaign over Public Law 600 began in earnest in
October, 1950. Mufi.oz Marin started with an address in Ponce,
a port city in the southern part of the island, whose mayor, incidentally, was opposed to the constitution. 7 Later in the month
the governor responded to the opponents of the projected constitution.8 PEP leader Iriarte opposed the constitution plan on the
ground that it was really not a PPD program but part of the foreign policy of the United States being implemented to counter
charges of imperialism. 9
But even as this debate was proceeding, the radical element
in Puerto Rico was readying itself for what looked like an attempt
to overthrow the insular government. On October 27, 1950, police
found a cache of arms and dynamite in San Juan. The heightened
vigilance of the insular police may possibly have caused the Nationalists to advance the day of the attempted coup. On October
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28, 1950, there was a riot in Rio Piedras prison in San Juan in
which two guards were killed and 111 prisoners escaped. This
appeared to be related to the revolt that flared up two days later.
Violence and arson accompanied the uprisings in eight towns. In
San Juan five Nationalists boldly invaded the grounds of the governor's residential palace, the Fortaleza, in an attempt to kill
Mufioz Marin. Four of the rebels were killed in the abortive
attempt. From there the uprisings rapidly spread to other parts
of the island. The towns of U tuado and J ayuya were seized by
the Nationalists. The rebels burned twenty-one houses in Jayuya.
In Mayaguez, Ponce, and San Juan bloody clashes occurred between the police and the insurgents. 10
On the mainland two Nationalists attempted on November
1, 1950, to enter forcibly Blair House in the complex of the president's residence in Washington in an apparent bid to kill Truman.
One of the Puerto Ricans and a White House guard were killed
in the firing that followed. The other Puerto Rican, Oscar Collazo, and two of the White House guards were wounded. The
president's life was not directly threatened in all this. The dead
Nationalist was associated with Pedro Albizu Campos, for in his
pocket was found a memorandum bearing the name and signature
of the Nationalist leader. Oscar Collazo, the wounded man, was
the treasurer of the New York branch of the Nationalist party. 11
Since the Nationalists numbered no more than 500 by Munoz
Marin's calculations, he was sure that he could control the uprisings on the island with little trouble. The day after the revolt
broke out he mobilized the National Guard, who used planes,
tanks, machine guns, and bazookas to dislodge the rebels from
their stronghold in Jayuya. 12 Elsewhere the police had succeeded
in subduing the rebels. Some 400 Nationalists were forced to
surrender in this massive crackdown, of whom 244 were placed
under arrest. 13
The administrations of Governor Mufi.oz Marin and President Truman recognized that the uprising, even though it had
failed in its prime objectives, could disrupt and discredit the entire scheduled constitutional procedure. They were careful,
therefore, not to overreact, despite the fact that thirty-three persons in Puerto Rico and two in the United States had lost their
lives. The governor went on the air to reassure the Puerto Ricans
that the rebellion was simply part of a "lunatic movement" and
that the proclamation of martial law was not necessary. 14 On No-
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vember 2, 1950, the governor cabled President Truman, saying
that the people of Puerto Rico were "shocked and offended" by
the attempt on his life but that the incident had not affected "the
bonds of friendship, association, and mutual trust" between the
island and the mainland. 15
Presumably referring to the possibility of federal intervention
that might have arisen, Secretary Chapman insisted that he saw
no evidence of "general unrest" or "serious disturbances" affecting the economic, social, and political life of the islanders. He
believed that the situation could be handled by the Puerto Rican
government. 16 President Truman was of the same opinion. In
a message to the governor on November 2, 1950, he complimented
the insular authorities for their handling of the situation. At a
news conference on the same day, the president reaffirmed his
faith in the Puerto Ricans and declined to discuss the possible
attempt on his life. 17
Two days later Secretary Chapman dwelt at length on Puerto
Rico in an interview over a Washington radio station. He said
that the Nationalists and the Communists in Puerto Rico numbered 700 and 400 strong, respectively. The "great majority" of
the islanders preferred, Chapman insisted, "the gradual development of their land under the system of Democracy" then prevailing. He believed that Puerto Rico had a great role to play in the
better understanding of Latin America and the United States
because it was "a synthesis of Latin American and North American
beliefs." The secretary described the Puerto Rican people as
"patriotic and peace-loving" and hoped that continental Americans would not judge them harshly for the acts of the two wouldbe assassins. 18
Both the insular and mainland governments successfully conveyed the feeling that the uprising was the work of an inconsequentially small group of extremists and that the situation was
well under control. There was no immediately noticeable impact
upon United States private business activities with the island. 19
Meanwhile, the insular authorities moved to quash the power of
the Nationalists. Twenty-one of the diehard independentistas
were sentenced to life imprisonment in May, 1951,20 while their
59-year-old ailing leader, Albizu Campos, was sentenced from
twelve to fifty-four years in jail. 21 There was no evidence of a
conspiracy to kill President Truman. Oscar Collazo was, however, found guilty of the murder of the White House guard. 22
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The uprising failed to prevent the registration of voters on
November 4 and 5. To emphasize that things had returned to
normal, Governor M ufioz Marin ordered the removal of the
National Guard from the San Juan area. Indeed, the PPD leader
believed that the disturbances had caused the various parties to
unite, and he predicted that 95 percent of the people would
approve Public Law 600. 23 The governor reported after November 5, 1950, that an additional 157,902 persons since 1948 had
registered. That number largely reflected persons who had
turned twenty-one years of age since 1948, and who, as it turned
out, represented 30 percent of the number of persons who participated in the June 4, 1951, referendum. 24 Furthermore, at least
one member of the House Public Lands Committee in Puerto
Rican matters did not think that the disturbances would adversely
affect the Congressional position on the constitution. He was
Fred Crawford of Michigan, who in fact urged the committee to
visit the island to reaffirm its faith in Puerto Rico. 211
Much of the debate between November, 1950, and June,
1951, centered around the definition and interpretation of Puerto
Rico's envisaged new status. The position taken by the Mufi.oz
Marin administration left considerable room as to the implications of the new status. Early in December, 1950, for instance,
Mufi.oz Marin described to an El Mundo reporter the position of
Puerto Rico as being "part of the independence of United
States." 26 PEP leader Iriarte felt that the governor's position was
a permanent repudiation of insular independence and was an
indication of his desire to see Puerto Rico eventually become a
state. 27 PIP head Concepcion de Gracia, on the other hand, stuck
to his original contention that Public Law 600 was fraudulent
since it perpetuated Puerto Rico's status as a colony of the United
States. 28
In the February issue of the United Nations World, however,
Mufi.oz Marin termed the island's status a "new type of statehood,
a statehood, which [was] related by citizenship and law to the
other states of the Union." But like independent nations, the
governor continued, Puerto Rico had the right to proclaim its
own constitution. The Puerto Rican people alone had the right
of electing their officials, and these officials were in "no way responsible to any authority of the United States." The Popular
leader wrote, "Our autonomy is further vividly demonstrated by
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the fact that no official of the United States-not even the President-has authority over the Governor." 29
A memorandum from Resident Commissioner Fernos-Isern
to DTIP chief counsel Silverman suggests, however, that the insular administration was not quite clear what Puerto Rico's legal
status would be. The resident commissioner defined for the division's future reference such terms as "territory," "dominion,"
"dependency," and "possession." The terms were defined clearly
in relation to Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States,
and did not have universal applicability. A "territory," according
to Fernos-Isern, referred to "any area subject to the sovereignty
of the United States and incorporated into the United States as
an integral part thereof, but not a State." A "dominion" was described as "any area subject to the sovereignty of the United States
but not incorporated into the United States as an integral part
thereof, whose people shall have organized themselves under a
constitution of their own adoption, into a free body politic in
accordance with a law adopted by Congress in the nature of a
compact with said people." "Dependency" was defined as "any
area subject to the sovereignty of the United States but not incorporated to the United States as an integral part thereof, and
formed into a political unit of government, which has not attained the political status of a United States Dominion as herein
defined." Finally, a "possession" was said not "to describe, apply
or refer to any Territory, United States Dominion or United
States Dependency." 30
It was partly as a result of the confusion and vagueness of the
terms used to describe what the island's status was going to be
that opposition parties were divided as to what their official position on Public Law 600 should be. The PEP had met on August
19 and 20, 1950, but the assembly was forced to adjourn without
taking a vote because of disagreement among various factions.
The meeting was marked by a lively and even violent disagreement between two factions. The faction headed by Miguel Angel
Garcia Mendez and Luis A. Ferre opposed Public Law 600. Its
opposition was based, according to Garcia Mendez, on the alleged
contention of the law's supporters that "it would authorize a selfgovernment status as a permanent compact or treaty" when no
such "treaty" or "compact" existed within the meaning of the
phrase "in the nature of a compact." Garcia Mendez and Ferre
were prepared to accept "any advantageous reforms with a tempo-
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rary character but never as a final solution" to Puerto Rico's
status. 31 The faction led by PEP leader Iriarte was not opposed
to Public Law 600, because it did not consider its approval as
foreclosing statehood as an ultimate status. The assembly sustained Iriarte's position in a hard-fought battle in which the vote
was 156 to 97. Individual party members were left free to vote
for or against the law, which in effect spelled endorsement. 32
The PIP, too, was unable to reach a decision in its meeting
early in 1951 . In the end it resolved to let the voters decide for
themselves. The resolution was approved by an extraordinary
meeting in February, 1951. But PIP leader Concepci6n de Gracia
refuted Public Law 600 in a twenty-seven-point program and
challenged Mufioz Marin to a public debate, which the Popular
leader turned down. 33 The Independentista leader continued to
call the law a fraud, an opinion he conveyed in a letter to Secretary of State Dean Acheson. He based his charge on the ground
that Public Law 600 did not grant sovereignty to the Puerto
Rican people but merely approved an amendment to the Organic
Act of 1917. Congress, he continued, would still retain final authority on insular affairs. The party chief also charged that insular government employees were being forced to contribute 2
percent of their salaries to defer the costs of the PPD campaign. 34
A few days before the referendum the PIP leader announced his
personal decision to vote against Public Law 600. 311
The debate on the projected constitution continued in the
weeks ahead. One facet of this debate was in the form of a series
of leading articles in El Mundo written by prominent men representing different points of view. These articles appeared in the
newspaper from April to June 4, 1951, and beyond.
Juan B. Soto, a professor of law at the University of Puerto
Rico, and an estadista, was the first to contribute a series of articles. He examined all aspects of the projected dominion status
and arrived at two general conclusions, namely, that the PPD's
"Associated Free State" promised more than it could fulfill and
that statehood was the real solution to Puerto Rico's problems;
The envisaged dominion status, Soto argued, was legally ambiguous and in effect left Puerto Rico in a state of semi-sovereign
dependency. The professor pointed out that the "Associated Free
State" did not carry with it legal pledges of continued economic
aid from the United States. Hence, the Federal Relations Act
would contain the same uncertainties that were present in the
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Tydings independence bills, which the PPD had consistently opposed. He disagreed that the "Associated Free State" was equal
or superior, because for one thing it did not involve the rights
and responsibilities that would go with Puerto Rico's becoming
a state and, for another, the economic goals sought by the PPD
could better be attained under statehood. For instance, American
capital would be drawn to the island more readily. He was well
aware of the disadvantages that would accompany statehood, but he
was convinced that they could be offset by its benefits. The payment of federal taxation, for instance, would be countered by
federal grants-in-aid. He did not think that members of the Congress would always remain opposed to statehood for Puerto Rico.
They could be persuaded to think otherwise. 36
Resident Commissioner Fern6s-Isern responded to the articles
by Juan B. Soto. He maintai~ed that statehood was not the issue
in the acceptance or rejection of Public Law 600, even though the
voters had clearly rejected it in the 1948 elections. The "Associated Free State" did not preclude statehood in the future. Puerto
Rico could become a state, provided, of course, Congress and the
Puerto Rican people were both willing. Fern6s-Isern also pointed
out that the position with regard to grants-in-aid and the retention of military bases would not alter with the implementation
of the "Associated Free State." The new status would institute
dual sovereignties in Puerto Rico, one United States and the other
Puerto Rican. The two sovereignties were subject to certain conditions by mutual agreement. Hence, they were not conflicting
but complementary. Similarly, Puerto Rico's economic union
complemented its political affiliation with the United States.
Fern6s-Isem categorized the island's relationship as a new type of
federation in which Puerto Rico was neither an independent state
nor a dependency. 37
Independentista Vicente Geigel Polanco followed with a·series
of articles under the heading "Neither a Constitution nor a Compact." He challenged the resident commissioner's contention that
the act of drafting and adopting the constitution would make
Puerto Rico sovereign in any sense. The constitution had to be
approved by Congress, and the idea of a "compact" was meaningless because Congress retained final authority in the matter of
insular-continental relations. Geigel Polanco backed his assertion
by quoting certain United States administration officials and congressmen who had testified at the House Public Lands Committee
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on the constitution bill. He quoted, for instance, Representative
William Lemke of North Dakota: "You know of course that if
the people of Puerto Rico should go crazy Congress would be
able to legislate another time." The Independentista concluded,
therefore, that the projected constitution was being explained by
the PPD in deceiving terms and that the Puerto Rican Federal
Relations Act imposed inflexible provisions upon the island no
different from those contained in the Organic Act of l 917. Geigel
Polanco conceded the economic benefits Puerto Rico was enjoying as a result of its relationship with the United States but
pointed to restrictions and limitations that were being continued:
strict compliance with United States shipping laws, prohibition
of commercial treaties with other countries, and federal restrictions on such agricultural products as sugar. He advised Puerto
Ricans not to accept Public Law 600 because it was calling for the
approval of the constitution project and the Puerto Rican Federal
Relations Act, which he maintained were distinctly two separate
questions. 38
El Mundo ran other articles by other leading Puerto Ricans.
They included articles by Jaime Benitez, chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico; 39 Socialist leader Bolivar Pagan; 40 Jose
Trias Monge, Munoz Marin's legal advisor; 41 and Fern6s-Isern,
responding to Geigel Polanco. 42
In spite of the several legitimate points raised against the
envisaged Commonwealth status by critics, it was generally believed that the islanders would overwhelmingly vote in favor of
Public Law 600.43 On June 4, 1951, 65 percent of the registered
voters went to the polls. A total of 387,016 Puerto Ricans (76.5
percent of those voting) voted in favor of Public Law 600, while
119,169 persons (23.5 percent) voted against it. Secretary Chapman congratulated a pleased Mufioz Marin for managing the
campaign so well and added, "Substantial minority vote further
strengthens the favorable decision by showing that [the] opposition
was fully and freely presented and [the] people made their own
choice."44 The secretary followed up his cablegram message with
a letter addressing the governor as "My dear Don Luis." In it
Chapman said that the acceptance of the law removed "the last
vestigial remnants of so-called colonialism." But the secretary did
not consider the constitution as a final solution: "It seems to me,
in fairness to the people of Puerto Rico, that only when the eco-
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nomic and social goals are clearly in sight can they decide as to
what ultimate relationship with the United States they desire." 45
The PIP, however, charged that there had been polling irregularities and called for the nullification of the referendum. 46
In anticipation of such charges, Mufioz Marin had invited as observers Representatives Frank T. Bow, a Republican from Ohio,
and Chester B. McMullen, a Democrat from Florida. Congressman Bow said that he had not found any fraudulent practice.47
On June 21, 1951, Governor Mufioz Marin called a special
session of the insular legislature. The extraordinary session laid
the ground rules for the election on August 27, 1951, of the delegates to the constitutional convention. 48 In compliance with these
rules, the various parties met to nominate candidates to the constitutional convention. The Socialist party met on July 1, 1951,
to select candidates who were to participate in the elections for
constitutional convention delegates. Bolivar Pagan resigned his
leadership at the meeting, although it is not known why. The
party, however, affirmed its belief in statehood and instructed
candidates to seek a provision in the preamble to leave open the
door for that status. The PEP convened a month later on August
5 to nominate its delegates. An attempt was made at the meeting
to smooth out differences between the two rival factions. A fifteenmember directorate was instituted to assume all party affairs, and
two of the seats were given to Garcia Mendez and Luis Ferre,
both of whom had challenged Iriarte's leadership. In addition,
nominees to the forthcoming convention were chosen from among
both factions. The PEP, like the Socialist party, advised its candidates to work for a provision in the preamble to insure that statehood as an alternative was not foreclosed in the future. 49 In
contrast to the Socialist party and the PEP, the PPD nominated
its candidates without acrimony and accepted the unquestioned
leadership of Munoz Marin. 50
The PIP, on the other hand, refused to participate in the
constitutional procedure. Its position was that the projected
constitution was a Popular perpetration of fraud upon the Puerto
Rican people. The party instead promised to send its poll watchers to the voting centers. Its leader Concepci6n de Gracia insisted, " . . . we are not going to the colonial election of the 27th
of August, nor to the false Constitutional Assembly, but we will
participate in the registrations and elections of 1952, in order to
obtain a mandate from the people." The PIP's declared non-
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participation in the August elections afforded the PPD with the
opportunity to identify the Independentistas with the Nationalists. In this matter, the Populares effectively used the PIP's November, 1950, statement concerning the Nationalist uprising.
The statement had denounced the Puerto Rican government's
alleged violation of civil liberties and praised the rebels as "fellow
countrymen" who had gallantly sacrificed their lives for the cause
of insular independence. The PPD platform of August, 1951,
declared, "The PIP, . . . postulating political separation from
the American Union, solemnly declares . . . that it admires and
respects those who want to destroy the force of votes by the criminal force of bullets." 51
The elections for the delegates to the constitutional convention were held on August 27, 1951. A total of 431,828 persons
voted, and, as expected, the PPD received the largest number of
votes. Of the total of 92 seats contested, the PPD won 70, while
the PEP and the Socialist party won 15 and 7, respectively. 52
Resident Commissioner Fern6s-Isern was chosen to preside over
the convention for its anticipated duration of six weeks. 53 President Truman sent a message to the convention. The president
considered the meeting as a step of the "greatest importance in
the development of full self-government in Puerto Rico." He
continued, "It is with profound satisfaction that I contemplate
the approaching task of this assembly, for I welcome Puerto Rico's
association with the Federal Union on terms based solely upon
consent and esteem." Secretary Chapman sent a similar message. 54
The delegates worked for nearly five months on the preamble
and completed it for the assembly's vote in the first week of February, 1952. A disputed clause held up the voting for a while.
It stated that one of the purposes of the constitution was "to form
a more perfect union with the United States." The word "union"
was replaced by "association," but this displeased the Estadistas.
Eventually the clause was dropped entirely. 1111 On February 6,
1952, the constitution was approved by the convention by a vote
of 88 to 3, with one delegate absent. 56
On the same day Governor M ufioz Marin addressed the
assembly. He characterized the new Puerto Rican status as partly
"Federal" and partly "Confederal." He continued, "Within these
t:wo factors are enclosed the possibility of its development within
the American union." By "Federal" he meant that there were two
governments, Puerto Rican and United States, "with jurisdiction

UnitedStatesAndTheDevelopmentOfThePuertoRicanStatusQuestion

Page 145

05/11/20 10:14 AM

146

over different matters with respect to the same groups of citizens."
By "Confederal" he meant that there was a "union, more or less
on the basis of states that seek union, than on the basis of two
governments that have jurisdiction over the same people but in
different matters." The Commonwealth status was dynamic, and
therefore held out several possibilities for the future. He expressed it thus, "It may be that the development of Puerto Rico
will take another aspect, and that it will move toward a 'Confederal' form of government, in which there will be no area of Federal authority. . . . " The governor insisted that in the final instance the development would be decided upon by the Puerto
Rican people and not by the Congress of the United States. For
the time being, however, the Commoriwealth status in his opinion
would remove "every trace of colonialism" because it would be
based on a "compact" and the "principle of mutual consent." In
the governor's estimation the status would reach "the highest
possible level of political equality and political dignity." 57
DTIP director Davis wrote to Mufioz Marin on February
14, 1952, informing him of his plans to publicize the constitution.
He said he was having prepared a two-page summary of the most
important features of the document for distribution. Davis said
he had already spoken to Alan Barth and Herb Block of the editorial staff of the Washington Post about doing a piece on the
constitution. The director said he planned to approach the New
York Times and the Herald Tribune (New York) with similar
requests. He also suggested counteracting the anti-constitution activities of L. D. Long, a continental businessman in Puerto Rico
whose relations with the insular government had soured over tax
problems. Davis urged the governor to come to Washington for
a short visit. 58 Several days later DTIP legal counsel Silverman
wrote to Alan Barth, acquainting him with background information about the constitution. 59
Meanwhile, several other mainland citizens joined Long in
leveling charges of dictatorship against Mufioz Marin. Chester
M. Wright, president of the TIES organization, a Miami (Florida)
group of business and professional men, accused the governor of
having passed "urgent" and "gag" laws and of having converted
the insular legislature into a "rubber stamp." The Puerto Rican
government was a one-man affair run by a man who was authoritarian, the charge went. 60 The charges were echoed by Senators
Olin D. Johnston of South Carolina and Owen Brewster of Maine,
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who proposed an investigation of the allegations. Senator Johnston accused the governor of having ignored a 1947 Congressional
directive that a coordinator of federal agencies be established in
Puerto Rico. The senator told his colleagues that he had addressed a communication to Secretary Chapman to that effect.
The letter said in part, "They [the Puerto Ricans] don't want a
Federal coordinator who will know what ·goes on, who is bound
by law, for instance to advise the Congress with respect to all
appropriation estimates submitted by any civilian department or
agency of the Federal Government to be expended in or for the
benefit of Puerto Rico." 61
Secretary Chapman defended the governor in a news conference on February 13, 1952, saying that he thought Mufioz
Marin was doing an "excellent job." On the specific charge about
the federal coordinator, the secretary pointed out that Congress
had on two occasions turned down appropriations to finance the
staff of one. Besides, if the constitution was approved by Congress,
the post in question would probably be eliminated. 62
On March 3, 1952, in spite of the charges, the people of
Puerto Rico once again went to polls to register their positions
on the constitution. (The original date for the referendum was
January '21, 1952, but it had to be moved back because the constitutional convention took longer than expected.) 63 Representatives Bow of Ohio and McMullen of Florida came once more as
observers on behalf of the House Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs. 64 In view of the charges against M ufioz Marin,
the Truman administration probably welcomed their presence. 65
A total of 373,418, or over 80 percent of the voters, balloted in
favor of the constitution, while 82,473 of their compatriots voted
against it. 66
Mufioz Marin commented· that the acceptance of the constitution was a source of pride for both Puerto Rico and the United
States, since what was created was a "new manner of freedom in
the relationship between peoples that have different cultural
origins and both have equal democratic rights." 67 At least two
continental newspapers shared the governor's enthusiastic optimism. The New York Times editorialized, "From our point of
view this result ought to have good effects throughout Latin
America. We are disproving the Communist and Nationalist
charges of 'Yankee imperialism.' The United States has always
been accused by these elements of exploiting Puerto Rico as a
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colony. It will be hard to sustain that propaganda effectively after
what happened." 68 The Washington Post believed that Puerto
Rico's becoming "vigorous, self-respecting, completely democratic,
loyal, and friendly to the United Sta_tes of America" was an instance of pride for the "so-called damn Yankees of the North."
Indeed, the newspaper saw the advantage of extending the commonwealth concept to countries such as Cuba, Panama, Central
America, and Venezuela to bind them in some form of loose
federation. 69
On March 12, 1952, Governor Mufioz Marin transmitted the
English and Spanish enactments of the constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to President Truman. Mufioz Marin
believed that the process by which the constitution had been
adopted was of great significance for both Puerto Rico and the
"democratic world leadership of the United States." It had done
the Puerto Ricans "a deep spiritual good" and had added to the
"prestige of the institutions of the free world in their [insular and
mainland Americans] moral fight against the rulers of the captive
world." The governor stressed the fact that the document was
based on "bilateral action through free agreement." He continued, "No doubt opinions may differ as to the details of the
relationship, from both the Puerto Rican and the general American points of view, but the principle that the relationship is from
now on one of consent through free government, wipes out all
traces of colonialism." 70
The same day that he wrote to the president, Mufioz Marin
addressed a letter to Secretary Chapman. He said he was fully
aware of the constitution's international significance and requested the secretary to publicize the official ceremony at which
Resident Commissioner Fern6s-Isern was to present the constitution to the president. The governor repeated the request on
April 4, 1952. 71 Chapman wasted no time in having prepared a
draft message for the president to send to Congress, together with
the constitution. 72
The Interior secretary's draft message was essentially retained
as the president's message to Congress when the constitution was
officially transmitted on April 22, 1952, to the legislative body.
President Truman stated, "I do find and declare that the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico conforms with the
applicable provisions of the act of July 3, 1950, and of our own
Constitution." The message briefly described the provisions of
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the insular constitution and pointed out that with the document's
approval "full authority and responsibility for local self-government will be vested in the people .of Puerto Rico . . . . No government can be invested with a higher dignity and greater worth
than one based upon the principle of consent." 73
The constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was
completed after the convention had carefully studied the constitutions of the various mainland states in the Union, the Constitution
of the United States, and. the United Nations Charter. It contained nine articles. Article I established that the island was to be
officially designated as the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The
term "Commonwealth" was adopted on February 4, 1952, by
Resolution 22 in the plenary session of the convention. It was the
closest equivalent to the Spanish term "Estado Libre Asociado"
and was defined as "the status of the body politic created under
the terms of the compact existing between the people of Puerto
Rico and the United States, i.e., that of a state which is free of
superior authority in the management of its own local affairs but
which is linked to the United States of America and hence is a
part of its political system in a manner compatible with its federal
structure.'' 74
Article II contained the bill of rights. The opposition in
Congress in the months ahead centered around two sections of
this article. Section 5 guaranteed every Puerto Rican citizen the
right to an education. It continued, "Instruction in the elementary and secondary schools shall be free and shall be compulsory
in the elementary schools to the extent permitted by the facilities
of the state. No public property or public funds shall be used
for the support of the schools, or educational institutions other
than those of the state . . . .'' 75
Section 20 was to cause considerable controversy. It borrowed
ideas from the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.
The section recognized human rights in the following areas: to
receive free elementary and secondary education; to obtain work;
to attain an adequate living standard "for the health and well- .
being of [every person] and of his family, and especially to food,
clothing, housing, and medical care and necessary social services";
to provide social protection in the event of unemployment, ill
health, age, or disability; to give special care and assistance for
motherhood and childhood. An explanation as to why these
rights had to be guaranteed in the constitution read as follows:
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"The rights set forth in this section are closely connected with
the progressive development of the economy of the Commonwealth and require, for their full effectiveness, sufficient resources
and an agricultural and industrial development not yet attained
by the Puerto Rican community." In other words, they were
intended as goals for which the Puerto Ricans were to strive. 76
The legislative power of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
was vested, according to article III, in the legislative assembly,
consisting of 27 senators and 51 representatives in the two Houses.
Minority parties were guaranteed representation. Section 22 provided that the governor was to appoint a controller with the advice
and consent of the insular Senate. The person filling this post
was still being appointed by the president at the time. The next
article dealt with the powers and duties of the executive, while
the article following was concerned with the powers and responsibilities of the island's judiciary. There were to be five justices of
the Supreme .Court, and under the new constitution their appointments were to be made by the governor instead of the president
as was then the case. 77
Article VI provided, among other things, for the general
elections to take place every four years, with no restrictions as to
how many terms a governor may hold office. All persons over
twenty-one years of age, irrespective of literacy or property-holding, were to be eligible to participate in the elections. The procedure for amending the constitution was provided for in article
VII. The insular legislature could propose amendments to the
constitution. If there was a two-thirds majority for the proposed
amendment in both Houses, it was to be submitted to the qualified electors in a special referendum. If, however, the proposed
amendment had a three-fourths majority in both Houses, the
legislature could provide for a referendum to be held at the same
time as the next general elections. It should be emphasized that
United States approval was not necessary in the ratification of an
amendment. Section 3, however, stipulated that no amendment
purporting to alter the republican form of government or to
abolish the constitution was admissible. 78 Article VIII dealt with
senatorial and representative districts.
Among the provisions laid down in the ninth and last article
was one calling for the constitution to take effect when the governor proclaimed it, which must be within sixty days of Congress'
ratifying it. No provision was made for procedure in the event
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Congress changed parts of the constitution, which suggests at least
two things: first, that the convention felt the document complied
with the conditions established by Public Law 600, and therefore
Congress would agree with it entirely; second, since the document
reflected the popular will of the Puerto Rican people on domestic
matters, the constitutional delegates felt that Congress would not
change any aspect, even if it disagreed with it, for the sake of the
principle of self-government. 79
Indeed, Resident Commissioner Fern6s-Isern argued that the
constitution met the four conditions necessary for its acceptance
by Congress: it provided for a republican form of government
with three separate branches, it contained a bill of rights, it conformed with the applicable provisions of the United States Constitution, and it was in agreement with Public Law 600. 80
On April 22, 1952, Senator O'Mahoney sponsored Senate
Joint Resolution (SJ.Res.) 151, while the companion resolution
in the House was designated as House Joint Resolution (H.J.Res.)
430. 81 The two resolutions provided for the approval by Congress
of the constitution, inasmuch as the document conformed "fully
with the provisions of [Public Law 600] of July 3, 1950, and of
the Constitution of the United States." 82
The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs held
a hearing on April 25, 1952. Resident Commissioner Fern6s-Isern
was the first person to testify. He reviewed the provisions of the
Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act and reassured the congressmen that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico would operate
within their framework. He stressed the fact that the political
and economic union had been democratically endorsed by a
majority of the Puerto Rican people. Fern6s-Isern appealed to
the legislators to approve the document on the additional ground
that its meaning transcended "the horizons of Puerto Rico and
. . . of the United States." 83
The resident commissioner's testimony was well received.
Committee members generally asked questions to drive home the
fact that the constitution was a popular document approved in
elections that were free from any kind of electoral malpractice.
Representatives Bow of Ohio and McMullen of Florida testified
to the last fact, as they had observed the referendum. Clair Engle,
congressman from California, was one of the few committee members, however, who had doubts about aspects of the constitution.
He drew attention to section 20 of the bill of rights and expressed
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his puzzlement as to how such rights could be incorporated into
a constitution without the legislature's obligation of implementing them. The congressman also raised similar doubts about the
right to education as expressed in section 5 of the bill of rights.
Furthermore, he believed that the outlawing of wiretapping was
more correctly a legislative function. Representative Monroe M.
Redden of North Carolina agreed with his California colleague,
saying that the rights guaranteeing social protection might lead
the Puerto Ricans to expect too much from their government. 84
Despite the reservations about the bill of rights, most committee members appeared to agree with the statement inserted
into the hearing by Congressman Crawford of Michigan, who was
unable to attend the session. He expressed his support for the
constitution on two general grounds. First, Puerto Ricans deserved the protection of the United States as American citizens.
After all, the islanders had adopted the ideals and institutions
of the United States and had generally cooperated in the same
way that continental citizens had. Second, the United States had
a friend in Governor Mufioz Marin. Crawford said," . . . I think
it will be found that the administration of the present Governor
of Puerto Rico is just about as constructive and helpful and
cooperative as between and with everybody concerned, as any
appointee, military or civilian, who has been sent from the United
States to Puerto Rico." If Congress believed that changes were
necessary, he hoped that it would resubmit the constitution to the
Puerto Ricans to make such changes but that it would not reject
it out of hand. Except for Dr. Jaime Benitez of the University
of Puerto Rico, no more witnesses were heard. 85 The House
committee, according to the New York Times, gave quick and
unanimous approval of the constitution. 86
The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs conducted the first of its two hearing sessions on April 29, 1952.
Governor Mufioz Marin, who was in Washington at the time,
came to testify before the committee. He asserted in a prepared
statement that Congress' approval of the constitution would signify that "the last juridical vestiges of colonialism [had] been
abolished in the relationship between the United States and
Puerto Rico." The principle of compact as contained in Public
Law 600, the governor continued, added the "basic moral element
of freedom" that had hitherto been absent. He was quick to point
out, however, that the relationship could be improved in its
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details, although not in its essence. Munoz Marin rejected the
notion among some Puerto Ricans that any solution outside of
independence or statehood was "colonialism." 87
The governor characterized the Commonwealth status as one
that was not "federated statehood," but neither was it "less than
federated statehood." Because it was not like "federated statehood," many erroneously concluded that the Commonwealth
status was based on inequality. This was not so. He based his
judgment on the merits of the constitution produced by the convention. The procedure involving referenda and elections over
a period of about eighteen months had strictly adhered to the
principle of democracy and legality. Munoz Marin described the
essential features of the constitution: it had little in it that was
strictly legislative because the PPD sought to give the legislature
of Puerto Rico the greatest possible freedom to act upon matters
concerning policy. 88
There was, the governor said, continuing his argument, a
bill of rights guaranteeing essential freedoms, and the government of Puerto Rico was republican with the powers of its three
branches separated. Indeed, the powers of the executive were
reduced in favor of the legislature and the judiciary. This to
Munoz Marin was clear evidence of a "magnificent democratic
spirit" among the Puerto Rican people. He gave several other
examples of this: the practice of vote-buying had disappeared;
the government had sold four of its plants to private business, as
evidence that politics should not interfere with business; and an
anti-government newspaper, El Imparcial (San Juan), was able
to secure through public auction valuable printing contracts from
the insular government. 89
To drive home his argument the PPD leader pointed out
that the Commonwealth status offered the people of Puerto Rico
an opportunity to free themselves from a "deadening anguish"
that accompanied the continued debate over political status. He
said, " . . . the alternative to the dilemma is not colonialism, but
that a new alternative, equal in dignity, although different in nature to independence or statehood, can be conceived and is in
fact being created by the joint action, on the highest mw:al level,
of the Congress of the United States and the people of Puerto
Rico." 90
The committee members were mainly interested in having
the governor respond to charges of fraud made against the PPD.
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Few questions directly concerned the constitution. The main
charge was about electoral fraud. The governor replied to the
charge to the apparent satisfaction of the committee members.
The persistent nature of these charges persuaded DTIP legal
counsel Silverman to prepare later a memorandum on a specific
allegation that between 3000 to 5000 additional voters had been
prevented from voting in the referendum in March, 1952. Most
of the persons involved here had turned twenty-one between January 21, 1952, and March 3, 1952, the time span between the old
and the new dates. A specific law would have been necessary to
accommodate the eligibility of these persons, and so the government of Puerto Rico decided to count them as ineligible except
if the margin of acceptance or rejection of the constitution should
be between 3000 and 5000. As it turned out, the margin of acceptance was 290,945. 91
Resident Commissioner Fern6s-Isern and DTIP director
Davis testified briefly. No opponents of the constitution were
heard. A letter from Independentista leader Concepcion de
Gracia appeared in the appendix of the hearings. One point
raised in the letter, not taken up by the committee but featured
prominently in the debates in the Senate later, was whether Congress would have sole and final authority on matters concerning
Puerto Rico once it approved the constitution. 92 Both the House
and Senate hearings reflected little opposition to the constitution
among committee members. It was this which probably led Secretary Chapman to tell newsmen on April 29, 1952, that he
believed Congress would endorse the constitution. 93
Some senators were, however, raising questions about the
constitution, which was presumably the reason why the Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs held a second round
of hearings on May 6, I 952. Nine senators were present at this
session, in contrast to only four in the April 29 session. Apparently .a need was felt to refute charges of electoral fraud more
strongly, because Congressmen McMullen of Florida and Bow
. of Ohio testified at length on their roles as observers in the March
3, 1952, referendum. They insisted that the refere~dum was free
from any kind of corruption. The committee refused to pursue
a charge of another kind. Senator Johnston of South Carolina
had raised in the April 29 hearing an incident that had occurred
about twenty years ago in which Munoz Marin, then a fiery independentista, had demanded . the removal of the American flag

UnitedStatesAndTheDevelopmentOfThePuertoRicanStatusQuestion

Page 154

05/11/20 10:14 AM

155

when he stepped on an auditorium platform to address a crowd
of people. The senator was not satisfied with Mufi.oz Marin's
reply at the first hearing, and he requested the committee to
pursue the matter further. The committee refused because it
felt it was concerned with the merits and demerits of the constitution and not with the governor's qualifications.94
A substantive issue was raised at the hearing by Senator
George W. Malone of Nevada. He desired to know whether there
was a provision in the constitution that prohibited Congress from
making any change in the relationship betweell' the United States
arid Puerto Rico. DTIP legal counsel Silverman replied no,
saying that even though Public Law 600 used the word "compact"
the relationship between the two would be "in the nature of contractual obligations." Silverman continued, "It is our hope and
it is the hope of the Government, I think, not to interfere with
the relationship but nevertheless the basic power inherent in the
Congress of the United States, which no one can take away, is in
Congress . . . ." Congress had the power to annul any law in
any one of the territories, according to the United States Constitution. Senator Malone remained doubtful, because he had seen
in the United States how many of the powers that rightly belonged
to Congress had been assumed by the president. He wondered,
in effect, whether a general constitutional guarantee was sufficient
to permit Congressional action regarding Puerto Rico, if and
when the question arose. "Suppose," he asked, "these internal
matters become a question of great interest to this country, the
way they are being administered. Do we have the right to go in
at all? . . . Suppose they become obnoxious to the Congress of
the United States. What happens then?" 95
Senator Guy Cordon of Oregon continued with the line of
questioning initiated by his colleague from Nevada. He quoted
from an article written by Mufi.oz Marin's legal advisor, Jose Trias
Monge. Trias Monge had written that the pact was legally binding and that it could not be revoked except by mutual consent.
Senator Cordon quoted from the article, " 'Once the compact is
formalized, the constitution of Puerto Rico may not be amended
except in the manner provided for by the constitution of Puerto
Rico itself, the local laws shall not be subject to derogation by
Congress, neither the Statute of Federal Relations nor law 600
may be amended without the consent of the people of Puerto
Rico.' " 96
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Senator O'Mahoney, who had co-sponsored Public Law 600
in 1950, disagreed with Trias Monge's position. He argued that
the law had not been adopted as a compact per se but "in the
nature of a compact." He continued, " . . . an agreement in the
nature of a compact . . . was one under which the Congress was
reserving to itself, the sections of the Organic Act which were set
out in Public Law 600 as the Federal Relations Act, and under
which it undertakes to delegate to the people of Puerto Rico the
authority to adopt their own laws with respect to local administration, and that this local administration is within the scope of
a free self-governing, democratic republic similar to that of the
United States, but had nothing to do with those subjects covered
by the provisions we have called the Federal Relations Act." The
Wyoming senator told a doubting Senator Cordon, " . . . if the
people of Puerto Rico should step outside, if an attempt should
be made to change the constitution and deal with these matters
outside the scope of the grant, I think that the authority of the
Congress of the United States, under the [United States] Constitution, could not be impaired or reduced." 97
Another part of the constitution, section 20 of the bill of
rights, also came briefly under attack by Senator Malone when
chancellor Jaime Benitez testified. Furthermore, the Nevada
senator did not believe that the government to be established
under the constitution would be strictly republican. He saw
elements of democracy in the constitution. 98
Although no Puerto Rican directly opposed to the constitution appeared before the committee to testify, several communications from opponents of S.J.Res.151 were inserted in the appendix of the hearings. These communications raised similar, if not
the same, questions of constitutional ambiguity and vagueness
raised by the senators. Indeed, the quotation of Trias Monge's
article used by Senator Cordon was part of a memorandum prepared by independentista Arjona-Siaca and estadista Carlos H.
Julia, Jr.DD
In view of the many questions raised in the Senate hearing,
it was not surprising that H.J .Res.430 should have met some
opposition when it was debated on the House floor on May 13,
1952. Section 20 of the bill of rights expectedly came under
heavy attack from several congressmen. Representative Charles
A. Halleck of Indiana, a Republican, saw in it the hand of former
Governor Tugwell. In his opinion the section did not conform
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with the United States Constitution. Another Republican congressman, Carl T . Curtis of Nebraska, believed that the section
called for a "totalitarian government" and could lead to "slavery."
Idaho Representative Hamer H . Budge read into the debate
remarks he had made on a previous occasion. "The Constitution
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico," he said, "in quite different
fashion attempts not only to protect the citizens from an autocratic government but to set up a government not for protection
of rights but for affirmative dispensation of rights in the form of
economic benefits." Another Idaho representative, John T. Wood,
warned, " . . . if we grant this constitution, with its Socialist
bill of rights, we have practically doomed the islanders to economic destruction. We know they cannot operate under it. Then
why give it to them? I am firmly opposed to giving a child stone
when it asks for bread." 100 Both Representatives Budge and Wood
were Republicans.
There were, however, congressmen who agreed with Fern6sIsern that the constitution fulfilled the conditions established by
Public Law 600 and conformed with the Constitution of the
United States. Democratic Representative Isodore Dollinger of
New York urged passage of H.J.Res.430 without amendments.
Republican Congressman Javits of New York criticized legislators
who in effect insisted that the constitution should be inhibited
in terms of what they saw as right or wrong in their respective
state constitutions or the federal Constitution. He reminded his
colleagues that the insular constitution reflected the will of the
Puerto Rican people. Majority leader John W . McCormack of
Massachusetts agreed and pointed to the constitution's wider
implications in Latin America. If the people of Puerto Rico
wanted section 20, Congress should oblige, whether or not it complied with Public Law 600 and the United States Constitution.
Samuel Yorty of California said that congressmen should consider
the fact that Puerto Rico was a "showcase of the United States"
and that everybody was watching to see what Congress did. 101
House leaders had planned to obtain the chamber's approval
without a roll call; but when it became apparent that opponents
would demand one, further consideration was postponed until a
later date. 102
On May 27, 1952, the Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs recommended to the Senate the conditional approval of the constitution. Its amendments were confined to
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article II, the bill of rights. Section 5 was amended so as to guarantee that the provision about "free and wholly . nonsectarian
education" did not prohibit private educational institutions. The
added declaration read, "Compulsory attendance at elementary
public schools to the extent permitted by the facilities of the
state as herein provided, shall not be construed as applicable to
those who receive elementary education in schools established
under nongovernmental auspices." The committee struck out
section 20 entirely. The reason it gave was as follows: "Corresponding enforceable duties to the rights asserted cannot be determined and fixed under section 20, and therefore it is unrealistic,
confusing, and misleading to assert such rights in a constitution
which is intended to be fundamental and clear statement of matters which are enforceable and of the limitations on the exercise
of power." 163
The committee report further stipulated that wherever the
words "democratic" and "democracy" appear in the preamble the
references were in no way to be construed to mean the changing
of a republican form of government. It also clarified in its report
the status of federal authority in Puerto Rico: "The enforcement
of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act and the exercise of
Federal authority in Puerto Rico under its provisions are in no
way impaired by the Constitution of Puerto Rico, and may not
be affected by future amendment to the constitution, or by any
law of Puerto Rico adopted under its constitution." The report
stated also that the approval of the constitution did not imply any
promise of statehood. It characterized the new status as neither
independence nor statehood. "It is," the report explained, "a
self-governing community bound by the common loyalties and
obligations of American citizens living under the American flag
and the American Constitution and enjoying a republican form
of government of their own choosing." The insular constitutional
convention was authorized to accept the amendments on behalf of
the Puerto Rican people, and the constitution was to go into effect
as soon as the governor proclaimed its operation. 104 The Senate
committee accommodated its members' criticism concerning the
bill of rights, but its declaration concerning federal authority in
Puerto Rico fell short of claiming Congressional jurisdiction in the
island's internal matters directly. Puerto Rico could amend its
constitution, except with respect to the bill of rights and republican form of government, without Congressional authorization.
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On May 28, a day after the Senate committee's action, the
House of Representatives debated H.J .Res.430. Early in the
debate it was made known that the House Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs had met that morning before the scheduled
debate and had decided to eliminate section 20 and amend section 5, as the Senate committee had done the day before. Fern6sIsern announced his acceptance of the amendments, when he
spoke halfway through the debate. At least two members of the
House, Representatives Halleck of Indiana and George Meader
of Michigan, both Republicans, wanted it clearly understood,
however, that the constitution would not supersede the Puerto
Rican Federal'Relations Act. Congressman Meader had consulted
the American Law Section and was satisfied that, in approving
H.J .Res.430, Congress would not "in any way make an irrevocable
delegation of its constitutional authority." Judging from the
amount of time spent in the debate on this aspect, however, this
was not a contested point. 1011
The debate centered mainly around the merit or demerit of
section 20 as part of the constitution, and whether Congress had
the right to tell the Puerto Ricans that it should be eliminated.
After all, the islanders had overwhelmingly endorsed the section,
and it was in compliance with Public Law 600. Those congressmen who supported the retention of section 20 argued that many
states within the Union had such provisions written into their
constitutions. Besides, if rejected, the impact upon Latin American countries may be serious, and it would afford the Soviet Union
the opportunity to discredit the United States. Congressman
Javits of New York said for instance, ''1£ ,we should deny to them
[Puerto Ricans] as elemental a right as self-determination, what
respect could they have for all our protestations that we want
people to make up their own minds as to how they will be governed?" Those who desired the exclusion of section 20 based
their opposition upon arguments ranging from its binding nature
to the notion that it was socialistic and would destroy republicanism. Congressman Wood of Idaho said, for example, "They are
setting up a people's democracy which is foreign to our idea of a
·
representative republic." 106
When it seemed as if congressmen would approve H.J.Res.
430 with the amendments recommended by the House committee,
Representative Meader of Michigan introduced late in the debate
a major amendment. It read, "That nothing herein contained
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shall be construed as an irrevocable delegation, transfer or release
of the power of the Congress granted by article IV, section 3, of
the Constitution of the United States." (The reference here was
apparently to the territorial clause of the Constitution.) Meader
said that he was not clear whether a future Congressional law inconsistent with the island's constitution and laws by its legislature
would take precedence over the latter. He asked, "Can the Congress, if it so desires, either pass inconsistent laws or repeal or
amend laws that Puerto Rico passes? Clearly under the present
situation we can. If this Puerto Rican Constitution is approved,
can we?" The Michigan congressman had consulted lawyers who
had told him that Congress could, but he wanted to eliminate
any doubt in simple language. 107
Congressman Wayne N. Aspinall of Colorado protested that
the Michigan representative had not deemed it proper to suggest
the amendment in the committee. He continued, "I believe the
amendment is too far reaching for discussion at this time, and I
suggest that we oppose it and defeat it." There was general objection to the Meader amendment, and it was rejected after
Representative Clair Engle of California made an eloquent appeal
for the passage of H.J.Res.430. 108 A roll call having failed to show
an absence of a quorum, a vote was taken and the joint resolution
was passed. 109
The unexpected Meader amendment indicated the kind of
opposition that the constitution might possibly run into in the
Senate. The Senate committee leaders who hoped to steer the
passage of S.J.Res.151 were possibly aware that some senators
might raise objections. The articles that two of them had had
printed in the appendix of the Congressional Record gave some
indication of this. Senator Owen Brewster of Maine complained
that the tax exemption laws of Puerto Rico were a misuse of the
tax structure because the island was enticing away textile and
other companies. Senator Johnston of South Carolina did not
share some of his colleagues' admiration for Mufioz Marin, as
evidenced in the senator's insistent allusion to the flag incident
referred to earlier involving the Puerto Rican leader in his young
radical days. On May 15, 1952, he had had printed in the record
an editorial from a Tulsa, Oklahoma, newspaper, which stated
that Puerto Rico was really a burden because it had proved to be
a "gigantic incubator of people who often do not understand
American traditions or ideals but who are glad to qualify for
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American residence or American charity." The South Carolinian
was responsible also for printing in the record an article that appeared in the New York Daily News. It objected to section 20
and suggested that the islanders should be made to write another
constitution, or else "socialism, or fascism, unwanted by the great
majority of Americans will have crawled in at our back door." 110
Amid this kind of uncertainty, the Senate debated the constitution on June 23, 1952. Senator Johnston early introduced the
first of his two amendments. It desired to limit the term of office
of the governor to only one four-year period. The senator said
that the amendment was not directed against Mufi.oz Marin; but,
he argued, it was Congress' duty "to throw as many safeguards as
possible around the constitution so as to protect the people of
Puerto Rico as well as the people of the United States." The
amendment was aimed against the "tendency in some countries
for certain individuals to obtain control of the government and
keep control." The opposition to the amendment was spearheaded by Senator O'Mahoney, who argued that such a limitation
should have been written into Public Law 600 in 1950 and that,
in states where no such limits were placed, governors did not
automatically become dictators. He argued, furthermore, that
Governor Mufi.oz Marin was a "remarkable man" with an exemplary record, whose concern for constitutional propriety was
evidenced by the fact that the constitution guaranteed representation for minorities. The argument of the opponents prevailed and the amendment was rejected." 111
The South Carolina senator's second amendment provided,
". . . that no amendment to or revision of the constitution of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall be effective until approved
by the Congress of the United States." His argument was that as
a "possession" of the United States, Puerto Rico "should stay all
the way under our control and not be permitted to rewrite [its]
constitution." The senator was concerned that after disapproving
section 20 Congress had no guarantee that the Puerto Ricans
would not reintroduce it later. There appeared to be greater
sympathy for this amendment than was the case for the first
amendment, presumably because the issue was one which directly
concerned the Senate, namely, the affirmation of Congressional
authority over Puerto Rico. Senator O'Mahoney, chairman of
the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, agreed to
·
accept it. 112

UnitedStatesAndTheDevelopmentOfThePuertoRicanStatusQuestion

Page 161

05/11/20 10:14 AM

162

A third amendment sponsored by Senator John C. Stennis
of Mississippi was defeated. The Stennis amendment provided
for jury trial in the area of misdemeanors. The constitution had
already made provision for trial by jury in the case of felony. The
opponents believed that this was unnecessarily imposing the
Anglo-Saxon system of jurisprudence and law upon a Latin American system, which would involve costs and other adjustments on
the part of the insular government. Besides, if at any time in the
future the Puerto Rican government decided to provide for jury
trial in misdemeanors, the constitution would not prohibit it
from doing so. 113
The Senate agreed to the amendments made to H.J.Res.430
but insisted upon its own amendment concerning Congressional
prerogative to oversee changes to the Puerto Rican constitution.
Senator O'Mahoney requested a conference of the two chambers
in the event that the House of Representatives should disagree
with the Johnston amendment.m The House disagreed two days
later and arranged to send conferees. 1111
Governor Mufioz Marin was understandably perturbed about
the Senate amendment, because it undermined his claim that the
constitution's approval would grant Puerto Rico complete freedom
in internal · matters. He sent a radiogram to Davis saying that if
the Johnston amendment prevailed it would destroy "the whole
spirit of the constitutional process" and would inflict "untold
mental and moral harm" on the Puerto Rican people. , Acting
director Dan H. Wheeler cabled a reply the same day saying that
the DTIP would do "everything possible" to have the amendment
eliminated in the conference. 116
The Senate and House conferees met on June 28, 1952, and
agreed to eliminate the Johnston •amendment. They believed
that "in keeping with the spirit of Public Law 600, Eighty-first
Congress, and the purposes of the Puerto Rican Constitution, the
people of Puerto Rico should have freedom to change their constitution within the limits of applicable provisions of the United
States Constitution, the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act,
Eighty-first Congress, and House Joint Resolution 430." In accordance with this sentiment the following amendment was substituted for the Johnston amendment: "Any amendment or revision of this constitution shall be consistent with the resolution
enacted by the Congress of the United States approving this
constitution, with the applicable provisions of the Constitution
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of the United States, with the Puerto Rican Federal Relations
Act, and with Public Law 600, Eighty-first Congress, adopted in
the nature of a compact." The conferees eliminated section 20
of the bill of rights and, except for minor changes, retained section
5 as amended by the House in May, 1952. The constitution was
to become effective upon the constitutional convention's formally
accepting the amendments made by Congress and the governor's
officially proclaiming its operation. 117
The conference report was submitted to the Senate on July
1, 1952. Senator Johnston was unhappy that his amendment had
been dropped but was willing to support the adoption of the constitution as amended. The Senate accepted the report. 118 On July
2, 1952, H.J .Res.430 was examined and signed by the Senate and
the House. On the same day the Department of the Interior
responded to the Bureau of the Budget by requesting that it rec-.
ommend to the president the approval of H.J.Res.430. It regretted the amendments but felt that the great efforts of Munoz
Marin, Fem6s-Isern, and other delegates of the constitutional
convention should not be allowed to go in vain. 119 A similar
request was sent by assistant secretary of State Jack K. McFall to
the Budget Bureau.120
On July 3, 1952, the joint resolution was presented to the
president, who signed it late in the afternoon. He hailed it as
indicative of United States dedication to the "principle of selfdetermination and to the ideals of freedom and democracy." The
statement released to the press said that "with the approval of
H.J.Res.430, the people of the United States and the people of
Puerto Rico [were] about to enter into a relationship based on
mutual consent and esteem." The joint resolution was signed
into Public Law 447 on July 7, 1952. 121
Munoz Marin, who had on previous occasions used the
Fourth of July to appeal to high idealism, did not miss the opportunity on July 4, 1952. He told the Puerto Ricans that the new
Commonwealth status was "dynamic and full of vitality, carrying
in itself the energy for growth." The governor continued, "We
should repose politically in this status for a time so that our
people can direct all their energy toward the great effort of resolving their hard economic problems . . . . " On July 11, 1952, the
constitutional assembly approved the amendments made by Congress, and decided to submit them to an insular referendum at the
next general election in November. Eighteen days later, the
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Puerto Rican legislature adopted a resolution ratifying in effect
the action by the constitutional assembly. 122
The climactic event, however, took place on July 25, 1952,
when Governor Mufioz Marin pronounced the date as Commonwealth Day. In the presence of 35,000 people, among them distinguished guests from the United States and other neighboring
countries, the governor raised the new Commonwealth flag. The
flag was significant, for it was originally designed by Puerto Rican
revolutionaries in 1895: five red and vertical stripes with a white
star enclosed in a blue triangle. An action by President Truman
intended to convey his good will towards the Puerto Rican people
was announced on that day: the death sentence of the would-be
assassin Oscar Collazo was commuted to a life sentence.123
The Puerto Ricans established in the Commonwealth status
an experiment that was new and unique in constitutional history.
Mufioz Marin defined it differently at different times. He described the status as one in which Puerto Rico was part of "the
independence of the United States." At another time he said
that Puerto Rico had not become a state in the Union but that
it had acquired a status "equal to statehood" in which the island
enjoyed a "new kind of freedom." The PPD chief described the
insular-mainland relationship as being embodied in two kinds
of government, "Federal" and "Confederal," while Resident Commissioner Fern6s-Isern spoke of dual sovereignty, one Puerto
Rican and the other United States, neither one in conflict. There
is in every one of these descriptions an element of truth, but they
are also ambiguous and constitutionally vague. In practical terms
such definitions would, and indeed did, lead to a divergence of
interpretation between the insular government and the mainland
Congress. And yet, despite the ambiguity of the descriptions and
the vagueness of constitutional definitions, both the Puerto Ricans
and the United States Congress endorsed the Commonwealth
status. There are a number of possible reasons.
Insular opponents did not have positive programs with which
to counter the Commonwealth status. Advocates of independence
and statehood pointed to the legitimate weaknesses of the status
but failed to offer the Puerto Rican electorate a clear alternative
program of their own. Admittedly, they were at a political disadvantage, because the insular voters were not called upon to
choose from several status positions but were asked to either
endorse or reject the Commonwealth status. Under these circum-
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stances, the Populares presented themselves as offering a positive
plan that would give the Puerto Ricans a respite from the "mental
anguish," as Munoz Marin explained it, that had accompanied
fifty years of debate on the question of political status.
Besides, the political opponents of the PPD had nobody to
match the charisma and reputation of Munoz Marin. Personalismo is a factor of considerable importance in insular politics. If
the people had doubts about the Commonwealth status, those
doubts were dissipated by their faith in the PPD leader. He was
their first elected governor, enormously popular in the United
States and parts of Latin America, and they were proud of the
kind of political skill and resourcefulness he had demonstrated.
No doubt many Puerto Ricans would have considered a vote
against the Commonwealth status as a vote against Munoz Marin.
The same kind of confidence that the United States administration and Congress had in Munoz Marin was responsible for the
acceptance of the constitution. Furthermore, the United States
desired to dispel charges by Communist and non-Communist
countries that Puerto Rico was a "colony" being controlled
against the will of the people of the island. Beyond this, however,
the continental power's acceptance of the Commonwealth status
was based on more sober grounds. It was the administration's
understanding as expressed by Secretary Chapman in one of his
communications to Munoz Marin that the dominion status was
not a permanent one and that sometime in the future, when conditions permitted it, Puerto Rico would choose between independence and statehood. The Congress of the United States,
on the other hand, agreed to accept the Commonwealth status on
the understanding that the phrase "in the nature of a compact"
did not mean that Congress was irrevocably giving up its jurisdiction over Puerto Rican matters, internal and external. Congress,
however, did not wish to state this as strongly as was suggested by
the Johnston amendment. Instead, it sought to reassure the
Puerto Ricans that it would exercise its jurisdiction over the
island within the limits of the promise it was undertaking in
accepting the new relationship between Puerto Rico and the
United States. And future Congresses were under the moral obligation of not reneging on the promise made by the Eighty-first
and Eighty-second Congresses.
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CHAPTER NINE

The Commonwealth, 1952-1968

There is no exact parallel to the Commonwealth status of
Puerto Rico. It differs considerably from the status of countries
within the British Commonwealth, because the basis of the association is the political independence of the member nations.
Puerto Rico's status had more in common with the position of
small British Caribbean island territories when the United Kingdom organized in the late 1950s the Federation of British West
Indies on the principles of federation and mutual consent. There
were also some common features in at least two of the categories
of possessions established by the French government in 1946.
These two groups were "associated states" (Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia) and "associated territories" (French Togoland and
Cameroons). They were partly integrated with the French central
government by means of their limited participation in the French
National Assembly, and partly independent of the central authority in France because of their relative freedom in local matters.1
In endorsing a unique constitutional formula in the form of
the Puerto Rican Commonwealth, the United States departed
from its traditional territorial policy of permitting either full
statehood or complete independence. The new constitutional pat-
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tern might conceivably have been extended to at least two other
unincorporated territories, namely, Guam and the Virgin Islands.
However, two general factors have prevented this from happening: one, the arrangement was born largely out of the long-term
development of the peculiar relationship between Puerto Rico
and the United States; two, the Commonwealth status has from
the very beginning faced problems of definition. Since these
problems are related with the significance of the Commonwealth,
it is necessary to examine their development in detail.
The difficulties centered around the interpretation of the
nature of the relationship between the United States and Puerto
Rico. Munoz Marin and Fernos-Isern saw in the Commonwealth
arrangement more than a mere extension of autonomy by Congress. Whether or not they regarded in 1952 the Commonwealth
status as permanent or transitory, they considered the relationship
as having been conceived in a compact, and therefore it was not
subject to changes except by mutual consent. It was on the basis
of this principle that Puerto Rican leaders attempted on several
occasions in the next sixteen years to improve and clarify the
relationship. These attempts failed in their objective, and revived
the debate on political status.
Although the debate came up in all its details only in 1959,
the matter of the relationship was discussed by insular and continental authorities when the United States presented in 195.3
Puerto Rico's case before the United Nations to cease reporting
on the island to the world body. The presentation will be discussed here i1;1 some detail because the argument used by the
United States before the international organization was incorporated by Puerto Rico in 1959 in building a case for the existence
of a compact.
The United States had since June of 1947 submitted reports
to the United Nations concerning Puerto Rico. Article 73 (e) of
the Charter of the United Nations called upon members responsible for administering territories whose people had not yet attained
"full measure of self-government'; to submit such reports. In the
five years since 1947, Puerto Rico had attained almost complete
autonomy in domestic matters. There was no common definition
of the phrase "full measure of self-government," and, therefore,
presumably each member nation was left to decide for itself
whether a particular territory, within its constitutional and governmental frame of reference, had reached the status. DTIP's
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legal counsel Silverman believed that Puerto Rico had been transformed from a "non-self-governing territory" to a "self-governing
territory," and therefore it was no longer necessary for the United
States to continue submitting reports on the island.2
Resident Commissioner Fern6s-Isern initially proposed to
President Truman to discontinue reporting to the United Nations.3 Governor Mufi.oz Marin agreed with the idea, probably
to prove by a deed to the Puerto Ricans and the rest of the world
that the Commonwealth's inception had in effect ended the island's colonial status. It would be a gesture of great symbolic
import and psychological advantage. In September, 1952, Mufi.oz
Marin sent to Washington two of his aides to discuss with the
departments of the Interior and of State the procedure to follow
in notifying the United Nations of United States intention of
ceasing to report on Puerto Rico. 4
The two aides came prepared with a draft letter that Mufi.oz
Marin was to send to the president. The Department of the Interior suggested changes, the most important of which was the
deletion of the statement that Puerto Rico had "ceased to be a
territory of the United States." It felt that the statement was a
conclusion of law "probably not correct," and might cause controversy. It ~vas also unhappy about the statements in the draft
that maintained that insular laws could not be repealed or modified by "external authority" and that Puerto Rico's status and the
terms of association with the United States could not be altered
without the island's full consent. The Interior department was
not certain whether this was correct or not. It agreed to the retention of the statement, however, provided it was made clear
that this was Mufi.oz Marin's opinion, and not a settled point in
law. 5 The State department, too, recommended a change. It
suggested that the references to "vestiges of colonialism" be
dropped from the draft letter because it had "certain psychological disadvantages." 6
A day later, September 26, 1952, Davis informed Interior
Secretary Chapman that the DTIP had agreed to discontinue
notifying the United Nations, but that the details of how to do
this had not yet been worked out. Apparently the trip by the two
aides had not been entirely successful in clearing up differences
in interpretation over what Puerto Rico's new status meant. 7 To
iron out the disagreements, Mufi.oz Marin invited Davis and Silverman to come to Puerto Rico. Davis said he was unable to
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come, but agreed to send Silverman. 8 It is not known whether
Silverman made the trip or not.
The disagreement over whether Puerto Rico was still a territory or not had not been resolved by October 9, 1952. In a sixpage memorandum prepared by Acting Secretary of the Interior
Vernon D. Northrop to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, there
were frequent references to Puerto Rico as a "territory." 9 Munoz
Marin took strong exception to this. He said the Commonwealth
could not be abolished by Congress alone because "the form, content, and continued existence of the Commonwealth, as well as its
origin, depend not on the unilateral power of Congress, but upon
the bilateral will of the people of Puerto Rico and the Government of the United States . . . ." Puerto Ricans would be, he
continued, "profoundly disturbed if the terms 'territory,' 'dependency,' or 'possession' were applied to the Commonwealth
because none of them appropriately connote[d] the spirit or the
substance of our political situation." 10 Secretary Chapman complied with the governor's request, for he dispatched an amended
memorandum to Secretary Acheson-it presumably superseded
the October 9, 1952, version-in which all references to Puerto
Rico as a "territory" were dropped. Chapman said that it would be
preferable to emphasize the uniqueness of the Commonwealth.11
Munoz Marin amended a draft letter intended for him to
send to the president in accordance with the governor's interpretation of the Commonwealth status. The draft letter was prepared
by Davis. Munoz Marin objected to the phrase "our view" in the
following sentence, "It is our view that laws cannot be repealed
or modified by external authority." It detracted from the import
of the point being made here because, he insisted, Congress could
not repeal insular laws. Only the courts were in a position to say
whether a Puerto Rican law was valid or invalid. The whole
paragraph, as amended by Munoz Marin, read as follows: "The
legislative power of the Commonwealth under the compact and
the Constitution essentially parallels that of the state governments.
The laws enacted by the Government of Puerto Rico pursuant to
the compact cannot be repealed or modified by external authority.
Their effect and validity are subject to the adjudication of the
courts. Our status and the terms of our association with the
United States cannot be changed without our full consent." 12 The
changes were incorporated by Munoz Marfn in a letter to the
president on January I 7, 1953.13
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The governor's letter to the president (see Appendix B for
the complete text) was intended for transmittal to the United
Nations. Consequently, it dwelt at length on the progress that
Puerto Rico had made toward autonomy since 1898. It stressed,
first, the United States' willingness to grant the Puerto Ricans
complete self-government. Munoz Marin wished to convey the
impression that United States rule was never harsh. Second, the
letter emphasized that the two-year constitutional procedure,
which culminated in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in July,
1952, had popular insular support. The following sums up the
message the governor wanted to transmit to the United Nations:
"The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico . . . represents the government that the people of Puerto Rico have freely adopted. It
reflects our own decision as to the type of institutions and the
kind of relationship to the United States which we desire. There
can be no doubt that in the full sense of the term, in form as well
as in fact, the people of Puerto Rico are now self-governing."
Above all, he wanted the world body to know that the relationship
between the island and the continent was in effect a "compact"
and that Puerto Rico had become a Commonwealth in "free and
voluntary association" with the United States. 14
It soon became apparent that neither the Interior department
nor the State department completely agreed with the idea of
compact as understood by Muiioz Marin. A draft memorandum,
dated January 27, 1953, was prepared by the Interior department.
The memorandum was to be submitted to the United Nations
concerning the cessation of information on Puerto Rico. The
draft memorandum was reviewed a couple of days later by Resident Commissioner Fem6s-Isern and Abe Fortas, who was serving
as counsel to the Puerto Rican government. It is apparent from
the revisions proposed by Fem6s-Isern and Fortas that most of
the difficulty centered around the difference in points of view over
the concept of the Commonwealth and its relationship to Congress. Specifically, the divergence of opinion was over the term
"compact." The insular representatives believed that Congress
had endorsed the compact idea, since Public Law 600 had been
adopted "in the nature of a compact." They therefore inserted
the term "compact" in at least three paragraphs. Paragraph two
as revised by Fern6s-Isern and Fortas, for instance, read as follows:
"In view of the attainment of full measure of self-government
under the Constitution formulated and adopted by the people of
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Puerto Rico within a compact with the United States . . . the
Government of the United States has decided that it is no longer
appropriate for it to submit information on Puerto Rico pursuant
to Article 73 (e) of the Charter." They revised, to take another
example, paragraph twelve, which in part read, "Four political
parties participated in the campaign preceding the referendum;
two advocated approval of the compact embodied in the Act of
Congress . . . ." 15
A Mrs. Fleming of the Department of State (?) analyzed the
proposed revisions by Fern6s-Isern and Fortas. She saw serious
objection t() the inclusion of "compact," because it was "an unsettled, fundamental question of American constitutional law.''
Congress had differentiated between "compact" and "in the nature
of a compact" because it had established various conditions of
approval of the constitution. She continued, "Neither the federal
legislation nor the legislative history of these laws support [the
claim] that there is a 'compact' between the United States and
Puerto Rico . . .. " 16 Fern6s-Isern disagreed with this position
in a memorandum he dispatched to the legal counsel for the state
department. He cited at length from the Senate and House hearings on H.J .Res.430, and from the Congressional debates on it
that followed during the second session of the Eighty-second Congress to prove that Congress had intended to recognize the existence of a compact. Indeed, he argued, Congress was so careful
about it that it did not lay down stipulations when Congress finally
approved the constitution. Fern6s-Isern said he did not understand why the State department raised such questions when
neither the Interior department nor Congress had raised any.17
Mrs. Fleming's advice prevailed, however, for in the memorandum that was officially transmitted to the secretary general of
the United Nations on March 23, 1953, all references to "compact" as interpreted by the insular government were omitted.
Governor Munoz Marin's previously cited letter to the president
on January I 7, 1953, and a copy of the text of the Puerto Rican
constitution accbmpanied the memorandum.18
The memorandum reporting the cessation of United States
reports on Puerto Rico was divided into four parts, each aiming
to show that Puerto Rico had attained a "full measure of selfgovernment" and that it was therefore no longer necessary to
continue submitting reports on the island. The first part described in brief the "steady progression of self-government" in
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Puerto Rico since the island became United States territory in
1898, and pointed out that the Commonwealth status was a culmination of fifty-four years of that progression. The second part
concerned itself with the origin and development of the Commonwealth status between 1948 and 1952. This section emphasized
the principle of government by consent. Public Law 600 had declared that it was " 'adopted in the nature of a compact,' " but had
also stated that the constitution would become effective only "if
approved by Congress." 19
The memorandum's third section dwelt on the features of the
Commonwealth status. The most important features discussed
were the separation of the three branches of the government, a
bill of rights assuring essential freedoms, . the guaranteeing of representation of minority parties, and so on. The last section spoke
about the present status of the Commonwealth. It pointed out
that the island had entered into "voluntary association" with the
United States and that its status was different from the territories
of Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, where the chief
executives and the judges of the highest courts were still appointed by the president. Puerto Rico's relationship with the
United States was a matter of "mutual consent." The following
sentence sought, however, to highlight the island's relative independence in its affairs: "By the various actions taken by the Congress and the people of Puerto Rico, Congress has agreed that
Puerto Rico shall have, under that Constitution freedom from
control or interference by the Congress in respect of internal government and administration, subject only to compliance with
applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution, the Puerto
Rican Federal Relations Act and the acts of Congress authorizing
and approving the Constitution as may be interpreted by judicial
decision. " 20
Presumably to iron out some of the differences and to coordinate the presentation of the Puerto Rican matter before the
United Nations, Munoz Marfn invited Benjamin Gerig of the
Department of the Interior (?) to San Juan. Gerig was in Puerto
Rico from June 19 to 23, 1953, during which time he had two
meetings with the governor, Fern6s-Isern, and legal advisor Jose
Trias Monge. They discussed at great length the way in which
the case should be presented and the kind of responses to make
to anticipated questions. Agreements were reached in the following matters: one, the United States delegation should include a

UnitedStatesAndTheDevelopmentOfThePuertoRicanStatusQuestion

Page 173

05/11/20 10:14 AM

174

high-ranking Puerto Rican; two, the aim of the delegation was to
explain Puerto Rico's status in a manner so as to achieve "the
fullest possible understanding"; three, the delegation was to make
clear that the decision to cease reporting was not obligatory; four,
the matter should be disposed of .in the forthcoming General
Assembly and not be allowed to drag out into the next session;
five, the delegation was to oppose any effort to grant oral hearings
to any of the minority groups in Puerto Rico. 21
But they could not agree on a question of fundamental importance: could Puerto Rico unilaterally alter the new status?
No clear agreement was reached on this point. Gerig realized,
however, that the position of the United States delegation on the
matter should be "very clear." He pointed out a decision given
by the Federal District Court in Puerto Rico that might possibly
be utilized by the United States delegation. The Court ruled on
a case that in effect said that the agreement could not be changed
unilaterally. 22
The United States delegation decided to use the Federal
District Court's opinion in its presentation. The delegation freely
referred to the idea of compact, even though the March 23, 1953,
memorandum had avoided all reference to it. On August 27,
1953, Mason Sears, United States delegate to the United Nations,
told the General Assembly's Committee on Information from
Non-Self-Governing Territories that the Commonwealth was conceived "in the nature of a compact." He continued, "A compact,
as you know, is far stronger than a treaty. A treaty usually can be
denounced by either side, whereas, a compact cannot be denounced by either party unless it has the permission of the other."
Sears referred to the Federal District Court ruling. The resident
commissioner, a member of the United States delegation, echoed
Sear's argument: "As of July 25, 1952, the jurisdiction of the
Federal Government in Puerto Rico is based on a bilateral compact to which it is a party and into which the people of Puerto
Rico have entered of their own volition." Frances P. Bolton,
another member of the United States team, told the Fourth Committee of the Trusteeship that since a bilateral compact existed
between the island and the continent mutual consent was necessary to make any changes.28
The United States delegation succeeded in doing what it had
set out to do. It blocked attempts by independentistas, who sought
to present their cases in oral hearings. (The PIP, however, sub-
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mitted lengthy memoranda.) 24 The delegation was able to respond satisfactorily to the questions raised by delegates from
other countries skeptical about the claim that Puerto Rico had
ceased being a dependency. The delegates from the Soviet Union,
India, Mexico, and Guatemala were especially critical. The
United Nations committee approved on November 5, 1953, however, a draft resolution to accept the request by the United
States. 211 By the time the draft resolution was debated by a plenary
session of the General Assembly on November 27, 1953, sufficient
groundwork had been laid by the United States delegation to ensure success. United States Ambassador to the United Nations,
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., assured the assembly that he had been
authorized by his government to say that if at any time the insular
legislature requested "more complete and even absolute independence," the president would recommend that Congress grant
it.26 The resolution was adopted by the assembly by a vote of
26 to 16, with 18 member nations abstaining. Among those countries voting affirmatively, incidentally, were fifteen Latin American states. Only Guatemala and Mexico from among the American nations voted against the resolution, while Venezuela and
Argentina abstained. 27
The language of the resolution as adopted appears to be
more than was anticipated in the March 23, 1953, memorandum.
The idea of a compact was explicitly recognized in the resolution.
The resolution read, "Recognized that, in the framework of their
Constitution and of the compact agreed upon with the United
States of America, the people of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico have been invested with the attributes of political sovereignty which clearly identify the status of self-government attained by the Puerto Rican people as that of an autonomous
political entity."28
The endorsement by the United Nations, as significant as it
was within an international context, did not contribute directly
to clarifying the nature of the relationship between the island and
the mainland. The Puerto Rican government was to argue later,
however, that the United States action had confirmed the general
principle that the relationship could not be unilaterally changed.
The difficulty arose when attempts were made to translate the
principle into reality in specific areas of relationship between
Puerto Rico and the United States. Two major attempts were
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made in the next fifteen years, and on neither occasion was the
matter resolved.
Although Mufi.oz Marin had earlier expressed a desire to
improve and clarify the relationship between Puerto Rico and
the United States, it was only in 1959 that he made the first real
effort towards this end. 29 On March 19, 1959, the Puerto Rican
legislature adopted a joint resolution requesting Congress to implement several proposals ·in order to clarify insular-continental
relations. 30 The proposals were incorporated in a bill (H.R.5926)
introduced on March 23, 1959, by Fem6s-Isem; A companion
measure (S.2023) was sponsored by Senator James E. Murray of
Montana a couple of months later. The legislation is generally
referred to as the Fem6s-Murray bill.31
The Fem6s-Murray bill sought to replace the Federal Relations Act, whose language was described as "anachronistic," with
the "Articles of Permanent Association of the People of Puerto
Rico with the United States." The "Articles of Permanent Association" contained fifteen articles, which were divided into three
groups in Mufi.oz Marin's summary of them. The first group was
described as "self-executing modifications." There were several
important provisions in this section. One was for the transfer of
debt-incurring limit of the Commonwealth and municipal governments from the Federal Relations Act to the Puerto Rican
constitution. Another sought to have appeals to go direct from
the insular Supreme Court to the United States Supreme Court
of Appeals. A third provision concerned the resumption of sharing in the common burdens of the Union. It provided that the
difference between the United States Internal Revenue tax on
liquors and the Puerto Rican Internal Revenue tax on rum
shipped to the United States would go to the federal treasury as
an insular tax. 32
The second group of articles consisted of "non-self-executing
modifications." The first of the two most important provisions
in this group concerned Puerto Rico's paying the costs of federal
functions on the island and in some cases taking over the responsibility for these functions. The second provision sought to establish machinery to work out a special rate of tariff on articles
imported into Puerto Rico from other countries. The example
cited by Munoz Marin was the importation of codfish, a staple
food in Puerto Rico, from Canada. A third group of articles was
listed as "miscellaneous modifications." This category included a
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prov1S1on for mutually exempting insular and mainland bonds
from taxation, another for guaranteeing the resident commissioner's seat in Congress in the "compact" itself, a third for establishing procedures in turning over federal property in Puerto Rico
to the Commonwealth government, and a fourth for allowing
the Federal District Court of Puerto Rico to conduct trials in
Spanish whenever necessary. 33
In effect the bill sought to attain explicitly moral and legal
recognition to the Puerto Rican concept of a "compact," one
which could not be altered without Puerto Rican concurrence.
This is the way the Washington administration interpreted it, as
reflected in the memorandum by assistant director of DTIP Sylvester I. Olson. The bill was intended to give, the memorandum
continued, a few more "perquisites" of a state that Puerto Rico
did not have, while at the same time liberalizing the fiscal arrangement between the island and the mainland. Indeed, the measure
sought to transfer to the Commonwealth government substantial
powers then exercised by the federal government.34
A hearing scheduled on June 9, 1959, revealed considerable
opposition to aspects of the measure from members of Congress,
and the various executive departments of the federal government.
Senator Henry Jackson of Washington questioned Governor
Mufioz Marin on a substantive issue, one on which the entire
Puerto Rican attempt rested. The senator was concerned that the
Commonwealth concept of compact meant Congressional compliance with the thesis of bilateral action. If this was so, it would
mean that Congress could not legislate for the island without the
express consent of the insular government. In such an arrangement, Congress would be restricted in its powers to a point where
Puerto Rico could resist federal authority. Approval of the measure, Senator Jackson concluded, would compromise Congressional
power indefinitely. The various executive departments, too,
raised questions in matters concerning their respective jurisdictions in their written observations. These questions generally
dealt with specific aspects of the Fem6s-Murray bill. The consensus was that serious practical difficulties would arise if the
constitutional aspects of the insular-continental relationship remained unresolved. 311
Since many changes were necessary to meet the criticism of
Congress and the administration, Fern6s-Isern decided to introduce a "clean bill" instead of making amendments. Meanwhile,
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Munoz Marin made a major policy statement in September, 1959,
known as the Cidra Declaration. The governor declared that
Puerto Ricans would be permitted to vote on a political status
of their choice sometime in the future when their per capita
income reached a certain level. He limited the status alternatives
to only Commonwealth and statehood. The Cidra Declaration
was officially approved by the central committee of the PPD. 36
Whatever reasons impelled Munoz Marin to make such a declaration in the midst of the Puerto Rican effort to improve the Commonwealth status in Congress, 87 it was significant from at least
three points of reference. First, it was a tacit admission on the
part of Munoz Marin that the Commonwealth in its present form
was not intended to be a permanent solution. Two, the PPD was
no longer considering electoral victories every four years as continued endorsement of the status. Three, the party of Munoz
Marin appeared to have moved away more than ever from independence.
A new version of the Fern6s-Murray bill was introduced in
September, 1959. The latest version softened the idea of "irrevocable concept." Article IV (a) was changed so as to eliminate
any possible interference with the quota system as established by
the Sugar Act. Section (f) of the same article deleted language
that had placed the burden of proof upon the president in claiming that the "general interest of the United States" required him
to reject an insular request to exclude Puerto Rico from a trade
agreement. Article VIII was rewritten in order to preserve the
supreme authority of the United States over navigation on island
waters, harbors, and inlets. A new article, article XVI, was added
in response to the Interior department's criticism that the old
version of the bill seemed designed to freeze the status question.
The article provided that at some future date, when the per capita
income of the people of Puerto Rico reached the level equal to
the lowest state in the Union, the entire terms of association would
be reviewed. 88
A special subcommittee of the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs decided to hold hearings in Puerto Rico. Apparently the committee desired to hear a wider variety of Puerto
Rican sentiments before deciding on the bill. The hearings were
conducted in the first ten days of December, 1959. Estadistas and
independentistas were given the opportunity to testify at the
hearings. The estadistas, encouraged by the admission of Alaska
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and Hawaii as states in the Union and by their growing electoral
strength, insisted that the PPD plan would foreclose statehood,
and was in fact a clever and devious scheme to make the island
independent eventually. The independentistas, on the other
hand, accused the governor of having abandoned independence
and of moving towards statehood. They insisted that independence was the only logical solution to the status issue.39
At least three points of view emerged in the hearings on the
nature of the relationship between the United States and Puerto
Rico. In the end these will probably help to clarify the association, and presumably form the basis of the eventual settlement
of a vexing question.
The first view was that of the Commonwealth government
as reflected in a lengthy memorandum submitted jointly by Puerto
Rico's Attorney General, Hiram Cancio; the governor's legal advisor, Trias Monge; and the Washington law firm of Arnold,
Fortas, and Porter, which was retained by the insular government.
The memorandum reviewed the constitutional procedure up to
1952 and concluded that a compact had been created. Beyond
1952 two specific instances confirmed its existence: first, the argument used by the United States government when it presented in
1953 Puerto Rico's case before the United Nations; second, the
decision by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Figueroa
v. People of Puerto Rico (232 F. 2d 615, 620, 1st Cir. 1956), which
stated that Public Law 600 had indeed offered a compact. The
court had concluded, "We find no reason to impute to the Congress the perpetration of such a monumental hoax." The Fern6sMurray bill, the memorandum continued, did not challenge Con.gressional powers and federal sovereignty over Puerto Rico in
areas closely analagous to those of the states within the Union.
But this point did not alter the fact that a compact existed. 40
A second position was referred to in a memorandum prepared by Robert Kramer, assistant attorney general of the United
States. The memorandum was submitted at the request of the
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Kramer discussed the second position as one of the two theories (the other
being Puerto Rico's, just reviewed above) being espoused by
some people, but was careful not to impute it to either the administration or Congress. According to this theory, the compact
involved no more than an agreement on the· part of Congress to
repeal most of those portions of the Organic Act dealing with
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internal matters. Congress, however, continued to exercise plenary authority under the territorial clause of the United States
Constitution. Hence, the compact was not intended to effectuate
a total or even partial divestiture of that authority. Congress still
retained the power to nullify insular acts. The memorandum concluded, " . . . if the compact were construed to prevent Congress
from amending it unilaterally, Congress would be limited in its
legislative authority over some matters about which it may legislate with respect to the States."41
A position that might be termed intermediate was advanced
by David M. Helfeld, a professor of law at the University of
Puerto Rico. He was concerned less with legality and constitutionality and more with morality and political reality. Or as he
himself explained it in his testimony, his approach was an attempt
to harmonize legal theory with political reality. Public Law 600,
the professor argued, had to be viewed as embodying a political
understanding that rested "on morality, on the good faith and the
good will of the participants." In view of this, and in view of the
realities under which insular-continental relationship operated
between 1952 and 1959, it was not likely that Congress would take
a regressive step concerning the association. To support his argument, Helfeld pointed out that Congressional action since 1947
had been to advance progressively Puerto Rico's political freedom.
His argument implied that even though in theory one Congress
could not bind future Congresses, in practice it was not likely
that future Congresses would renege on decisions made by earlier
Congresses.42
Fern6s-Isern relates that the Senate committee was not expected to report out the bill. The House committee, however,
continued to consider the bill. It hired a special counsel, Judge
Shriver, to make recommendations. The special counsel consulted
with Fern6s-Isern in several conferences to agree upon a bill and
reported favorably to the committee in May, 1960. However, further consideration of the bill was postponed until the following
year because it was thought to be too late in the session for the
bill to pass both chambers. The bill was to be reintroduced in
1961 but was abandoned by Munoz Marin in early January of
1961 "in a surprise move." 43
The difficulty that the 1959 attempt ran into in Congress
persuaded Munoz Marin to try out what Fern6s-Isern calls the
"Presidential approach." 44 In July, 1962, he wrote a letter to
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President John F. Kennedy in which he called for clarification
of the Commonwealth in its "moral and juridical basis" to prove
false the charge that the status was not a "free choice of the people
of Puerto Rico in their sovereign capacity." The relationship
could be strengthened on the basis of "permanent association,"
provided that aspects that were not "indispensable" were eliminated. He ended by suggesting that the Puerto Ricans register
their preference in a referendum from among three alternatives:
Commonwealth, statehood, and independence. President Kennedy endorsed the governor's sentiments and indicated the propriety of consulting the people of Puerto Rico concerning their
status preference.46
Following this exchange, the Munoz Marin administration
sponsored a bill in the insular legislature calling for a plebiscite.
Hearings were conducted in which some eighty witnesses testified. The opposition to the bill centered around the need to
define "Commonwealth" before submitting the status to referendum, and the absence of any guarantee that Congress would be
willing to act upon the results of the referendum. 46
On December 31, 1962, the Puerto Rican legislature incorporated the provisions of the bill into a joint resolution and
passed it. The joint resolution proposed the "prompt settlement"
of the island's status in a "democratic manner." The preamble
of the resolution defined statehood as "the way enjoyed by the 50
states of the Union," and independence as "the form already
known in other countries of America." Commonwealth was defined as a "permanent union with the United States," according
to the following principles: first, the affirmation of the sovereignty
of the people of Puerto Rico and their right to enter a compact
with. the United States as a "juridical equal"; second, the establishment of a permanent and irrevocable union based on "common citizenship, common defense, common currency, [and] free
market"; third, a clear delineation of United States powers with
respect to Puerto Rico, and the reservation of all other powers
to the island; fourth, participation by the people of Puerto Rico
in certain federal processes, e.g., Puerto Ricans taking part in the
election of the president and vice president; fifth, adoption of a
formula to provide for insular contribution to the United States
treasury. Section 2 of the resolution requested Congress to indicate the form of Commonwealth it was willing to accept before
a referendum was conducted. 47
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In accordance with section 2 of the joint resolution, H.R.5945
and other similar bills were introduced in Congress providing for
the creation of a United States-Puerto Rico Compact Commission.
The commission was to consist of twelve members, four appointed
by the president of the United States, four by the governor of
Puerto Rico, and two each by the Senate president and the House
speaker of the United States. Its task was to draft a compact along
the lines of the definition of the Commonwealth in the joint
resolution. The president was specifically authorized to enter into
a compact with Puerto Rico, after which the islanders would
choose from among an adequately defined Commonwealth and
the other two altematives. 48
Independentista and estadista opponents of the bill criticized
it sharply at the hearings that followed. They contended that the
plan proposed in the bill was not in accordance with the insular
joint resolution and was intended to endorse the Commonwealth
status. They pointed out that the commission's task would be
limited to defining only the Commonwealth status, and not the
other two, and that the president would be authorized to enter
into a compact only with respect to the status favored by Munoz
Marin. Furthermore, they objected to including on the referendum ballot the Commonwealth status, which they regarded as
temporary, side by side with two permanent alternatives. Some
Congressional critics, too, were unhappy with aspects of the bill,
and insisted that the commission's recommendations not be made
obligatory for Congress to act upon. 49
When it became apparent that the measure would not pass
Congress, it was abandoned. In its place a new bill was introduced
that was acceptable to independentistas and estadistas. 50 It finally
became law in February, 1964. This act created a United StatesPuerto Rico Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico, whose
function was limited to examining all facets of insular-mainland
relationship and submitting its findings to the president, Congress, and the Puerto Rican legislature. The original bill contained a provision that stated that Congress had to act upon the
commission's recommendations concerning a plebiscite. This act
had no such provision. The commission's membership, too, was
changed. Its thirteen members as finally apportioned were as
follows: a chairman, and two persons appointed by the president,
four members of Congress, six Puerto Ricans of whom three were
Populares, two Estadistas, and one Independentista. 51
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The commission worked from June, 1964, to August, 1966,
under the chairmanship of James H. Rowe, Jr., a Washington
attorney who had also headed the 1949 Commission on the Reorganization of the Puerto Rican government. Using the services
of advisors and experts in all fields, the commission conducted the
most thorough and balanced study of Puerto Rican views on the
question of status. Exhaustive hearings were held in San Juan
in both Spanish and English. Between May 14 and 18, 1965, the
commission heard witnesses on legal-constitutional aspects, while
for four days during July and August, 1965, its attention was
focused on socio-cultural factors. Finally, between November 27
and December I, 1965, testimonies concerning economic aspects
of insular-continental relationship were heard. Impressed by the
scope and breadth of the study, the legislative bodies of the United
States and Puerto Rico ordered the printing of an additional 4500
copies of the three separate volumes and the commission report
so that its findings might reach a wider reading public. 112
The report of the commission arrived at conclusions that in
themselves were not new. But the commission's thoroughness
and relative impartiality gave them a ring of authority. The
report stated that all three alternatives were equally valid morally
and that any one would confer upon the islanders "equal dignity."
Moreover, no legal or constitutional reasons would bar the people
of Puerto Rico from choosing any status position. The commission insisted that Puerto Rico had to maintain absolutely the
economic growth rate established since 1940, whatever its status.
Here, the commission grappled with the problem of extrapolating
existing Commonwealth growth patterns upon those advocated
by statehood and independence supporters to arrive at some conclusions. It warned that any abrupt change in the direction of
either statehood or independence would cause serious economic
dislocation. In the commission's judgment, a transition period of
at least fifteen years would be necessary in the case of statehood,
and a longer unspecified period in that of independence. Whatever status alternative the Puerto Ricans chose, the commission
pointed out, it would require "mutual agreement and full cooperation" of the two governments to implement it. The commission's position implied that the Commonwealth status could
operate on a permanent basis.113
However, the commission's conclusions on the specific questions of compact and the dual operation of insular and continental
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powers in Puerto Rico were somewhat circumlocutory. And it
was precisely in these areas that the Commonwealth status had
showed weaknesses. The report stated, ". . . the precise allocation of powers between the Puerto Rican Government and the
Federal Government is a matter subject to determination only
on the basis of the individual analysis of each area of governmental
activity." The commission apparently did not wish to decide
upon a matter that could be resolved only by the two respective
governments. But it did emphasize the bilateral character of the
Commonwealth status insofar as "the basic governmental structure" was concerned. Neither government was free to act unilaterally with respect to certain specific areas. Or as the report
stated the matter, ". . . there are in effect two spheres of power:
the congressional power and the power of the Government of
Puerto Rico. Within each sphere there are areas in which each
government is free to act without consultation of the other government and without impinging on the principle against unilateral amendment where the fundamental government character
of commonwealth is concerned." 54
The commission believed that a referendum would be helpful
the "will of the citizens of Puerto Rico." Conseestablishing
in
quently, it recommended that a plebiscite be held in which all
three alternatives would be presented. Following the plebiscite,
the commission continued, ad hoc advisory groups should be established to recommend to the president, Congress, and the
governor of Puerto Rico the "appropriate transition measures" to
be taken. 511
Munoz Marin, no longer a governor but still wielding enormous influence on the PPD as a senator, was delighted at the
commission's conclusion that the Commonwealth status was
equally valid. The Populares sponsored a bill calling for a plebiscite on July 23, 1967. Despite the opposition of the PER and
PIP members, who argued that a transitory status should not be
placed on the ballot next to two permanent alternatives, the
measure became law on December 23, 1966. The act called for
a referendum on July 23, 1967, for the Puerto Rican people to
choose from among the three alternatives. A majority of over 50
percent for any one position was to be construed as representing
the will of the people. If either independence or statehood was
chosen, Congress would be asked to extend to the island the desired status. A majority vote for the Commonwealth status was
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to mean the following: first, reaffirmation of Puerto Rico's existing status of permanent association with the United States; second,
common citizenship was to be the absolute basis for the continued
association; third, the government of Puerto Rico would undertake to improve the Commonwealth relationship; fourth, no
change was to take place in United States-Puerto Rico relationship without prior approval of the Puerto Rican people. 116
The proposed plebiscite caused division in the ranks of the
PER and the PIP. The PER decision to boycott the referendum
led the party's vice president, Luis A. Ferre, to organize an opposition of United Statehooders advocating participation in the plebiscite for statehood. Similarly, the PIP's decision to boycott the
polls caused a rift within its ranks. Dissident Populares, too,
registered their opposition to their party's official endorsement
of the Commonwealth status and decided to join the Anti-Plebiscite Sovereignty Fund. Mufi.oz Marin was reasonably certain,
however, that the electorate would endorse the Commonwealth
status. Indeed, this was probably why he decided on a referendum. He was fully aware of his popularity and of the fact that
the Commonwealth had become identified with his leadership.
The 69-year-old founder of the PPD, therefore, campaigned hard,
traveling to each one of the 76 districts in the island. 117
On July 23, 1967, 703,000 (65.8 percent) of the 1,067,000
registered voters went to the polls. The abstention was 30 percent
higher than in general elections. The Commonwealth status was
endorsed by 60.5 percent of those voting. Statehood registered
38.9 percent of the votes, while independence was supported by a
mere 0.6 percent of the voters. Mufi.oz Marin claimed two days
later that the referendum had ended "the century-long debate
about political status." That exaggerated claim was pardonable,
given the fact that the Commonwealth status, the creation of
Mufi.oz Marin, Fern6s-Isern, and other Populares, had been directly and specifically endorsed for the first time by the Puerto
Rican people. The victory also meant that Mufi.oz Marin could
leave politics on a triumphant note. 118
It is highly probable that the debate on political status will
continue for as long as the question of Commonwealth status does
not culminate in a final and permanent solution. Had the 1959
attempt succeeded in improving its terms 119 before it was postponed "by agreement," 60 it might have transcended the essentially
economic rationale upon which it had been conceived. To be
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sure, Congress did not deny that the status was a new and unique
e;Kperiment in federalism in which Puerto Rico was somewhere
between a sovereign country and a state within the Union. The
1959 attempt, however, did not help to define more clearly in
practical terms what the experiment was. Consequently it revived
a debate that Munoz Marin had hoped had disappeared. There
is no telling whether the debate would end if the island became
a state in the Union or an independent country. But politicians
in the future might profit from Munoz Marin's lesson: it is not
enough to have a status that accommodates economic realitiesit is imperative that a sensitive part of the Puerto Rican personality make-up, known, for want of a better term, as "dignidad," be
accommodated too. It will probably take another politician
with a bit of poetry in his make-up to harmonize the two. Yet,
it is clear that the Commonwealth status has been an acceptable
and successful vehicle for the majority of the Puerto Rican people.
Whether it would stay as transitional or be declared permanent
lies with the future.
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CHAPTER TEN

~~operation Bootstrap":
The Economic Dimensions
of the Commonwealth Status

Although references to Puerto Rico's economic realities have
been made earlier in the study, a full discussion of the systematic
insular response to them has been reserved for this chapter.• Economic aspects of Puerto Rico's relationship with the United
States also shaped the island's political and · constitutional ties
with the mainland. Indeed, they figure very prominently in giving
rise to the Commonwealth concept.
Puerto Rico's economic dependence upon the United States
was a fact well recognized by Popular leader Mui'ioz Marin and
others. Mui'ioz Marin had at one time believed that political
independence for the island could be arranged within the framewor~ of this dependence. He gradually abandoned the hope that
Puerto Rico could achieve political sovereignty and still retain
the economic benefits of its continued relationship with the
United States. His expulsion of independentistas from the Popu• The economic program began in the second half of the 1940s. Its
discussion might have preceded the chapters dealing with the formulation
and · implementation of the Commonwealth status, but at the expense of
narrative continuity. Hence, its placement here.

187
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lar party,in 1946 was symptomatic of this realization. 1 A year
later, the Popular leader embarked upon a policy evocatively
known as "Operation Bootstrap" in an effort to industrialize
Puerto Rico. The new economic program in effect acknowledged
the island's dependence on the United States and energetically
sought to use continental resources in a way that increased Puerto
Rico's ties with the mainland. In Mufi.oz Marin's pragmatic way
of thinking, political formulas had to accommodate economic
realities.2
The beginnings of the new economically realistic policy can
be traced at least two years before its official commencement of
1947. The man at the center of this approach was Moscoso, who
had been general manager of PRIDCO since its inception in 1942.
Moscoso explored the possibilities of offering inducements to private capital in 1945, but he was prevented from openly advocating
such a program because the then governor, Tugwell, was opposed
to enlisting the facilities of private capital in what was a public
corporation venture. It was only after Governor Tugwell's departure that Moscoso could more fully and openly reorient Puerto
Rico's industrialization drive. 3
There were a number of reasons for the shift in policy. Perhaps the most important was that the early ventures of PRIDCO
failed to live up to their expectations. Four of the five subsidiaries
established by the Development company were far from being
successful operations. The Puerto Rico Glass Corporation was
contracted to be built in February, 1943, but began its operation
in June, 1945, months behind schedule. Financially it faced a
dim future in 1947, although it later proved to be a success under
private supervision. PRIDCO's second project, the Puerto Rico
Pulp and Paper Corporation, encountered similar problems, along
with difficulties with respect to personnel, management, litigation,
and substandard machinery, to name a few. 4
The Puerto Rico Shoe and Leather Corporation was formed
in January, 1946, but it took over a year to begin operations. The
corporation spent another year training its personnel, so that it
really only began functioning in January, 1948. Although the
plant was said to have good prospects at that time, it ran into
difficulties later on. The fourth of the Development company's
project, the Puerto Rico Clay Products Corporation, was afflicted
with problems of one sort or another from its inception. It was
organized in November, 1944, but did not begin operations until
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August, 1947, because of the difficulty resulting from wartime
and postwar conditions of obtaining the necessary equipment.
Soon after starting operations, its sanitary ware section experienced serious marketing and other difficulties and had to be
discontinued.11
By May, 1948, PRIDCO had invested over $22 million in its
industrial program, of which $10,700,000 was invested in its subsidiaries.6 Only one of its ventures, the Puerto Rico Cement Company, organized in 1939 by PRRA, was an unqualified success,
and its heavy profits substantially made up for the losses on the
remaining four subsidiaries. 7 But the overall performance of the
subsidiaries was dismal, especially when measured against their
own objectives. Their difficulties were widely covered in the
insular press, so that the economic program failed to attract local
private capital as it was originally intended. The program fell far
short of its goal of self-sufficiency by 1947.8 Moreover, Moscoso
and his staff became involved in labor contracts and problems of
material allocations and industrial bottlenecks instead of concentrating on planning and administering the economic development
program.9
The employment openings offered by the Development company's activities fell far short of its anticipated goal of 10,000. By
1947 the number of employees in PRIDCO's operations reached
a mere 1500.10 According to Moscoso's calculations, employment
in the government plants cost approximately $10,000 per job in
capital expenditure. Even if this were halved, the cost of providing full employment would exceed $300 million. 11 At this pace,
Puerto Rico could not achieve a level of employment commensurate with an acceptable rate of unemployment, nor could it balance employment between agricultural and industrial sectors.
And one of the program's goals was to make employment less
dependent upon seasonal labor. 12
Moscoso realized, too, that growing mainland competition
and changing marketing trends in the postwar period would put
further strain on the island's economic program. The sanitary
ware section of the Puerto Rico Clay Corporation had to be
closed mainly because of this reason. In the case of the glass plant,
the drop in the sale of rum in the United States made it necessary
to reduce the production of bottles. The island's shoe plant could
not meet local demands for greater variety in the styles of footware manufactured. 18 Besides, most manufacturing units experi-
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enced difficulties of production establishment and marketing because they were small undertakings organized under individual
ownership rather than corporations and relied heavily upon ·the
United States for raw material and machinery. Over 72 percent
of the total of 2077 plants in 1946 depended wholly or partly
upon the United States for raw material and markets. And such
manufacturing industries that were developed-sugar, tobacco,
needlework, and canned fruit-were largely aided by United States
capital. 14
By 1947, then, the problems that beset the insular industrialization program suggested a need for reorientation. The program's
early emphasis upon local capital and self-sufficiency had failed
because of the scarcity of adequately trained labor and managerial
personnel, market restrictions, shipping costs, competition of
highly developed, low-cost, continental industries, the absence of
risk-taking funds on the island, and so on. 15
The policy shift that occurred officially in 1947 was in evidence as early as 1945. Moscoso, who was going to become a central figure in the new approach to industrialize Puerto Rico, conceived some of his new ideas after reading ads that were being
run by some southern states in leading magazines and newspapers
in 1945. One such ad that caught the general manager's special
attention was the promotional campaign sponsored by the state of
Mississippi to attract investment. The program was known as the
"Balance Agriculture with Industry" Plan. In September, 1945,
Moscoso persuaded the board of directors of PRDCO (known as
Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company, PRIDCO, after
1946) to undertake in its newly established "Aid to Industrial
Development" (AID) program an advertising campaign in the
United States to promote Puerto Rico as a good place for investors.
In addition, he prevailed upon the directors to open an office in
New York City, ostensibly to help the Development company's
subsidfaries in marketing and procuring their products. But
Moscoso intended the office to be used also as an industrial promoter, and gradually it shifted its energies more and more towards
this end. 16
Upon Moscoso's recommendation, the board of directors appropriated a total of $53,000 to be used in the preparation of a
booklet describing the locational and other advantages of opening
industries in Puerto Rico. A leading New York advertising agency
owned by Mccann-Erickson was hired to help in preparing and
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placing an ad about Puerto Rico in the February, 1946, issue of
Fortune magazine. A booklet along similar lines was published
in 1946, and numerous ads were run in well-established magazines
slich as Business Week and Nation's Business. Direct contacts by
mail, too, were made. 17
A total of 726 enquiries were received from firms that were
interested in investing in Puerto Rico, but none appeared to the
Development company as really worthwhile. Moscoso apparently
wanted to attract prestigious firms that would lend a great boost
in the promotional effort. At least one reason why the early advertising campaign was not successful was because it was wanting
in modesty in the claims it made for Puerto Rico as a good location for industries. 18 But it failed mainly because the incentives
the Development company offered were not sufficient in themselves to attract mainland industries to open branches in Puerto
Rico. The AID program had an allotment of $0.5 million to construct factory buildings to be sold or leased to prospective private
firms. About ten small concerns were established before 1947
under this incentive. Obviously the Development company would
have to offer larger incentives to attract capital from the continental United States. 19
The new program that was developed by the insular government between 1946 and 1948 attempted to do just that. It sought
to take advantage of the special tariff and tax relationship between
the United States and Puerto Rico, and the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of the United States. If, for instance, a
mainland industrial firm opened a branch in Puerto Rico, these
exemptions could permit its goods to enter the mainland markets
free from tariffs. The problem was to offer an additional incentive large enough for a mainland industrial establishment to take
the risks involved in transferring in whole or in part its operation
to a new location. The Puerto Rican government offered this
incentive in the form of industrial tax-exemption, together with
other incentives, already existing, such as provision of f.JCtory
buildings and low-cost labor.
Attempts had been made earlier in Puerto Rico to pass a
tax-exemption law. Efforts in 1919, 1925, 1930, 1936, and 1944
did not prove successful. In the 1944 attempt Moscoso personally
lobbied for a tax-exemption measure, but the bill was vetoed by
Governor Tugwell. Moscoso was successful in 1947 and 1948
when the Puerto Rican legislature, with Pinero as the governor,
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passed two laws, Act No. 346, May, 1947, and Act No. 184, May,
1948, known as the Industrial Tax-Exemption Acts. The taxexemption legislation provided for a twelve-year period (July 1,
1947, to June 30, 1959) during which the existing and newly
established firms from the United States were to operate free
from most of the taxes that they were held liable to pay on the
continent, and an extra three years during which they were partially exempted. The acts exempted industries from three major
tax levies: first, taxes on individual, corporate, and partnership
incomes; second, municipal and central government taxes levied on the property used by an exempted firm and on property
leased to such a firm; third, local levies such as license fees and
excises.20
In addition, the Puerto Rican government provided by separate legislation several relief measures that exempted firms participating in the program from insular excise taxes on machinery,
apparatus, raw material used by them, and on goods transferred
from one manufacturer to another or to an agent for shipment
outside of the island. There were, however, limited categories
of incomes and taxes from which the industrial establishments
were not exempt. They were: investment income, interest payment accrued on loans made to an exempted firm, and such minor
taxes as federal social security, workmen's compensation premiums, fees on motor vehicles, and ad valorem excise taxes on
"luxury" products such as radios and cigarettes, and so on.21
The economic program was revamped in three related areas
in accordance with the new policy: a drive to build up the tourist
industry, the disposal of PRIDCO's five subsidiaries to private
interests, and a systematic campaign to promote continental private investments. In its drive to develop tourism, PRIDCO pursued its original intention to contract with a private hotel company to operate facilities built by the Development company. The
hotel to be built was to serve the needs of potential businessmen
visiting the island as well as tourists willing to exchange dollars
for Caribbean sunshine and hospitality. PRIDCO negotiated
with the Hilton company in 1947 a settlement that in part stipulated that two-thirds of the profits were to go to the Development
company. The Caribe Hilton Hotel was completed at a cost of
$7 million to PRIDCO and opened its doors to visitors in December, 1949.22
The Puerto Rican government believed that the moment was
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opportune to sell PRIDCO's five subsidiaries to private interests.
The failure of the subsidiaries had caused Mufioz Marin's Popular
party considerable embarrassment, as its opponents leveled unsparing criticism at government policy. Mufioz Marin did not
have to admit complete failure-and indeed, he did not-and he
salvaged as much political credibility out of the situation as he
could by claiming that the transfer was an anticipated phase of
the economic program. Despite Mufioz Marin's and Moscoso's
desire to dispose of the subsidiaries, neither was willing to sell
them in haste or at less than the best possible price. PRIDCO
made known its desire to sell the government plants as a package
deal and waited for the offers. It was subsequently decided, however, to separate the Puerto Rico Shoe and Leather Corporation
for sale to a reputable continental firm. Such a firm, it was
PRIDCO's feeling, would have the skill and the facility to
broaden the variety of the plant's products and would lend the
former government corporation's products the prestige and popularity that the United States firm enjoyed on the continent. In
December, 1949, the shoe plant was transferred to Joyce Inc. 23
PRIDCO had to wait considerably longer to sell its remaining four subsidiaries (cement, glass, paperboard, and clay products). It was about to sell them to a New York businessman, Karl
F. Landegger, when it received a considerably better offer of $10.5
million from the island's Ferre Enterprises. Besides, Mufioz
Marin saw political advantage in selling the plants to the Ferre
family because it represented influential leadership in the island's
Republican party, which was in political opposition to the Popular party. The transfer to the Ferre family would partly still
criticism of government failure in its industrialization program,
and would demonstrate by a sale to private investors that they
had nothing to fear from a government that accepted opposition
within the limits of democratic processes. The sale to the Ferre
Enterprises was contracted in September, 1950, although the
actual transfer of the four plants took place in April, 1951.24
The major aspect of the Puerto Rican government's economic
program was to attract United States investments. Mainland
companies were now invited to open new ventures or branches in
Puerto Rico to produce either finished products or parts to be
shipped to the United States for use in parent firms. PRIDCO
preferred to promote mainland firms with established reputations.
First, such firms would generate an all-round confidence in the
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island's program and would help in the promotional effort. Second, such businesses were more likely to have greater depth in
management skill and other industrial resources to accommodate
whatever problems that might arise in operating newly located
industries.
Following 1947, the insular government mounted a concerted promotional campaign. It opened offices in major cities on
the mainland and advertised its program widely in such magazines
as Time, Newsweek, and the New Yorker. 25 The government
periodically supplied statistics to the press and interested manufacturers to show the progress made. PRIDCO released, for instance, its fifth annual report to the press in 1948, showing, among
other things, that it had appropriated nearly $2 million to build
twenty-three new factories sold or leased to prospective businessmen.26 In addition, businessmen and bankers were taken on inspection tours of new facilities and were given considerable prominence and attention at official occasions. 27 There was, for
instance, a goodly representation of business executives and
financiers at Munoz Marin's inauguration as governor in January,
1949.28
In an open letter to mainland industries in July, 1948,
Governor Pinero enumerated the advantages of investing in
Puerto Rico, especially for those that were labor-oriented. He
stressed wage differentials and a ready labor force of 675,000 that
could be recruited and trained for the industries' use by the
insular government under its AID program. Pinero reassured
businessmen that there were few strikes in Puerto Rico, and those
that did occur were usually resolved by arbitration. There was
also available, the governor continued, cheap transportation facilities. Some of the other benefits he listed were: tax-exemption,
absence of tariff barriers and federal taxation, government's aid
in finding suitable sites for building factories at its own expense,
and the ready supply of electric power from the government
hydrolectric plant at cheap rates. 29
In addition to such promotional efforts, several Puerto Rican
leaders spoke directly to business groups. An insular representative addressed the American Marketing Association on the way
in which the tax moratorium on industries worked. 30 Munoz
Marin stressed at a press conference the importance of the economic program for the island's well-being, 31 and later spoke to

UnitedStatesAndTheDevelopmentOfThePuertoRicanStatusQuestion

Page 194

05/11/20 10:14 AM

195
about eighty executives of investment and commercial banking
institutions at a luncheon in New York City.32
The first of a series of major industries to be drawn to Puerto
Rico was the Textron textile plant. Moscoso was pleased with
their relocation to Puerto Rico because the textile plant would
allow PRIDCO to consider developing a whole series of other
products related to textiles, including the development of a finishing and printing mill and the establishment of an apparel industry. Originally, a textile plant had been planned in 1945 as a
subsidiary corporation of PRIDCO, known as Telares de Puerto
Rico, but it was abandoned by mid-1947. The Development company invested $4.3 million in building the plant for the new
venture, and the Textron firm organized a Puerto Rican corporation with an initial investment of $0.5 million worth of stock. 33
Textron's experience in Puerto Rico, however, proved to be
an unhappy and controversial one. Its transference from New
England to Puerto Rico caused anxiety among the New England
residents. Its announced closing of six mills meant retiring 3500
workers, and caused Republican Senator Charles Tobey of New
Hampshire to launch an investigation. As chairman of the Senate
Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, the senator
said, "The United States has been acting as a wet nurse for Puerto
Rico for years. It is robbing United States workers of their livelihood to subsidize companies like Textron in the territory by
granting Federal tax exemptions. We are killing off things here
to build in Puerto Rico." 34 It was directly as cl result of this unfavorable turn of events that Muiioz Marin adopted a new rule
of not exempting industries that shut down their plants entirely
in the United States so as to relocate them in Puerto Rico. "It is
not," he told a joint session of the insular legislature, "the philosophy of the Government over which I preside to seek the closing
of factories in order to have them open in Puerto Rico. " 35 In
response to a letter in March, 1949, by Congressman Thomas J.
Lane of Massachusetts, M uiioz Marin reassured the legislator in a
question-answer format that he was opposed to "industry-stealing."
The letter dealt with other pertinent issues, and Representative
Lane had it inserted in the Congressional Record for the benefit
of other congressmen.36
If the charges of "industry-stealing" helped the Puerto Rican
government in policy clarification, Textron's experience as an
industrial operation was potentially harmful to the island's indus-
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trialization program. By mid-1950 the textile plant management
had become disillusioned because of its mounting difficulties with
labor, management, and so on. Indeed, by 1954 Textron was
pressing for the closing of its tricot plant and was spreading
among mainland manufacturers unfavorable reports on Puerto
Rico as a suitable industrial location. This forced Moscoso in
1956 to appeal to top Textron management officials to stop undermining the development program. In 1957 the Textron plant
transferred its management to Indian Head :fyfills in the United
States, which was formerly part of the Textron empire. 37
Despite the adverse publicity emerging out of the Textron affair, there were, by fiscal year 1950, 114 old and new industries in
operation, 34 of which had been opened in that year, and an additional 12 were in the process of being established. 38 PRIDCO's
function over the previous two years had changed from being a
corporation directly managing industrial enterprises to a regulatory and guiding agency operating as a regular department of the
government. Its role with the private sector, too, had changed.
Hence, a need was felt to reorganize the administration of the
industrial program. 39
Munoz Marin had coincidentally appointed in 1949 the Commission on Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Puerto
Rican government to recommend to him the necessary administrative changes in anticipation of the adjustments envisaged under
the new political status of Commonwealth. The commission
recommended, inter alia, the creation of a new executive Department of Commerce and Industry under which were to be placed
PRIDCO, the Transportation Authority, the Communication
Authority, Office of Industrial Tax-Exemption, Office of Rent
Control, and General Supplies Administration. 40
However, since the Puerto Rican government did not have
the power to create new executive departments, M ufioz Marin
established in 1950, partly on the commission's recommendations,
the Economic Development Administration (EDA), placing
PRIDCO and the Transportation Authority under its control.
Teodoro Moscoso was named as the administrator of the new
agency, in which capacity he acted as the "board of directors" of
the Development company. The promotional and research functions of PRIDCO, as well as labor recruitment and training, were
transferred to EDA. PRIDCO retained, however, functions normally performed by a corporation, such as making loans and
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renting industrial buildings. In effect, EDA (more popularly
known as Fomento) operated as an executive department, and its
administrator had as much freedom in the running of PRIDCO
as a cabinet member would have had. 41
The reorganization of the economic program in 1950 set the
stage for the development under "Operation Bootstrap." There
were problems, to be sure, and the insular government modified
aspects of the program where changes were deemed necessary. But
statistics show that the program's essential goal of promoting continental capital had succeeded. The Fomento was fairly liberal in
approving petitions from businesses that sought to participate in
the program. Petitions were accepted or rejected on grounds of
policy rather than strict legal eligibility, and the chief criterion
that appears to have been used by the EDA was the desirability or
nondesirability of industries in terms of the Development administration's economic objectives. As · of June, 1952, 350 petitions
were accepted and only 35 were refused. 42 The success of the
program is apparent from figures given by H. C. Barton (see
Table 1).43
TABLE

1.

INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS UNDER "OPERATION BOOTSTRAP"

Number of Industries
Year ending
June 30

1943-1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959

Opened

24
28
34
36
63
75
74
52
88
90
96
II I

Closed

0
0
3
5
II

12
21
31
27
25
45
28

Existing

24
52
83
ll4
166
229
282
303
364
429
480
563•

Operating

Being
established

24
50
80
108
157
223
264
292
354
422
464
530

9
9
12
17
28
31
30
35
49
91
84
91

• Of this total 113 were locally operated.

As of June, 1952, the firms attracted to Puerto Rico were
largely light industries with concentrations in seven major categories: food, textiles, apparel, chemicals, fabricated metals, elec-
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trical equipment, and miscellaneous manufacturing.H In 184
new firms operating as of July 1, 1952, the sum of $68 million in
capital was invested. Of this total $20 million (29 percent) repres
sented government funds in the form of buildings and loans
provided by PRIDCO and the Government Development Bank.
The remaining amount of $48 million was the contribution of
private investors, of which $28 million was from the United
States and $20 million from Puerto Rico.4 5 The total investment
of over $500 million between 1947 and 1958 represented an increase of 35 percent.46
Tax-exemption was the most important factor in attracting
mainland capital. Ninety-five percent of the fourty-four industries
polled attributed tax-exemption as the most powerful incentive
in their operating in Puerto Rico. Three other factors that were
considered as the next most important trailed far behind: low
wages, 70 percent; efficiency of machinery and equipment, 69
percent; and the attitude of the community, 65 percent.47 The
Development administration calculated that a corporation earning
an income of $100,000 before paying taxes would pay $46,500 in
federal taxation, leaving a profit in the amount of $53,500. Taxexemption in Puerto Rico would increase the corporation's profit
by 87 percent. In the case of an individual owner with a profit
of $100,000, federal income tax in the sum of $67,320 would
reduce it to $32,680. Under Puerto Rico's tax benefits, the owner's profits would be catapulted by 206 percent.48 The total tax
benefit reaped by mainland businesses between 1947 and 1951
reached close to $5.3 million. 49 The long-term annual capital
flows from the mainland between 1947 and 1958 increased from
$18 million to $161 million. 50 The net income originating in
tax-exempt manufacturing businesses rose from zero in 1947 to
$1.8 million in 1950, $4.2 million in 1951, $7.0 million in 1952,
$23.4 million in 1953, and $46.5 million in 1954.51 By contrast,
the net income arising out of both tax-exempt and non-taxexempt manufacturers increased from $27 million in 1940 to $115
million in 1952.52
Puerto Rico benefited enormously from the increased economic activities. Product series statistics as well as the net income
by industrial origin reflect this. Table 2 shows figures randomly
selected from tables prepared by the Puerto Rico Planning
Board. 53
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TABLE

2.

PRODUCT SERIES AND NET INCOME BY INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN

Current Dollars, in Millions (Fiscal Years)

1940

1950

1960

1970

1972

Gross product .................................. 286.7
26.7
Manufacturing ··---·-··-·--····-····-·········
26.5
Trade ................................................
Finance, insurance, real estate ---- 24.6
2.6
Contract construction ---·················
Agriculture ·····•································ 70.5

754.5
88.7
101.7
51.8
26.8
149.4

1,681.3
288.8
236.9
140.5
87.3
180.2

4,601.7
949.1
670.3
442.4
344.7
184.4

5,822.5
1,139.2
819.4
558.1
478.9
210.6

There was a corresponding upward trend in the island's per
capita income and in the number of employed. The per capita
figures were $121 in 1940, $279 in 1950, $582 in 1960, $1,417 in
1970, and $1,713 in 1972.54 The number of workers in Puerto
Rican factories climbed from 31,000 in 1939 to 59,700 in 1953,
70 percent of whom were employed in businesses that were assisted by the Fomento. 55 Between 1950 and 1954 there was an
addition of 20,000 workers in construction plants, transportation
and other public services, and manufacturing. The gain, it must
be admitted, was offset by the drop in employment in the home
needlework industry and agriculture. 56
The fact most noteworthy from the point of view of this
chapter is that Puerto Rico's industrial program, from 1947 to
1952 and beyond, more firmly integrated the island's economy
with that of the United States. Harvey Perloff lists six criteria to
measure economic integration of one geographic region to
another. First, the bulk of the trade of one is with the other, and
is of vital importance to the economy of the first. Second, there
is a common tariff structure. Third, the credit needs of one are
supplied by the banks of the other, and the currencies of the two
are identical. Fourth, the public finances of one make an important
contribution to the fiscal revenues of the other. Fifth, the investments of one make up a substantial part of the total investments
in the other. Sixth, the mobility of labor and the shifts of industry characterize the relationship of the two regions. 57
Before the six criteria are illustrated by statistics, it would be
useful to point out the unique features in the fiscal relationship
between Puerto Rico and the United States that have added new
and intricate dimensions to the issue of economic integration.
This fiscal arrangement, which had been in operation since 1900,
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provides for all federal customs duties collected in Puerto Rico
and for federal excise taxes on rum and tobacco shipped to the
United States to be returned to the insular treasury. In 1917 the
Puerto Ricans were also made United States citizens without their
having to pay federal taxes collected from all Americans under
the internal revenue laws. Furthermore, Puerto Rico receives
federal grants-in-aid even though it is not a state within the union.
These factors have helped the insular leaders in planning their
economic program. The extent to which this program, however,
has further integrated the insular economy is revealed in the
discussion of Perloff's formula.
Puerto Rico imports most of its products from the United
States and, indeed, exports most insular goods to the mainland.
In fiscal 1947-48 the percentage of Puerto Rico's exports and
imports amounted to 97 percent and 94 percent respectively. The
export and import percentage for fiscal 1951-52 was 92 percent,
while imports decreased to 89 percent. 118 In fiscal 1950-51 the
excess of imports over exports was over $115 million.59 The bulk
of Puerto Rico's imports consisted of manufactured articles, but
even in 1958 more than half the meat, nearly half of the eggs,
and about one-third of the milk consumed on the island came
from the mainland. 60 It was only heavy, long-term capital investments that helped to finance the growing deficit in goods and services in the balance of payments.61
A common tariff structure has permitted United States manufacturers to take advantage of tax-exemption and low-cost labor
secure in the knowledge that their produce would be marketed on
the mainland without tariff barriers. Of the total sale outside of
Puerto Rico, more than two-thirds were contributed by EDApromoted mainland industries (in addition to sugar, rum, and
tobacco sales), almost all of it to the United States. 62 (Only in the
case of sugar were restrictions on imports to the mainland imposed.
The United States placed a quota limitation of 900,000 tons of
raw sugar per year from the island, which allegedly cost Puerto
Rico $25 million in retired acreage and reduced refining, in addition to laid-off workers.) 63 Moreover, in terms of the fiscal arrangement, excise taxes and customs duties were returned to the Puerto
Rican treasury. Excise taxes have amounted to between 8 and IO
percent of the Commonwealth government's total net recurrent
revenues for every fiscal year between 1950 and 1972, and customs
duties have amounted to between 1 and 3 percent. 64
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Puerto Rico's access to United States credit has helped the
island to finance its deficits in a variety of ways. In 1950 the
insular government issued $18 million worth of Commonwealth
bonds in the United States. The number of such bonds decreased
sharply the following year, but it has steadily increased thereafter.
Furthermore, the availability of mainland credit facilities tied the
island's banking system to that of the United States through the
association of domestic banks to their correspondents and the
relationship of foreign banks with their head offices. Both the
head offices and correspondents have supplied credit to insular
banks. 611

As a result of Puerto Rico 's unique political status, it has received federal contributions in the form of grants-in-aid, direct
expenditure of regular federal civilian agencies, emergency federal expenditures, payments and services to insular veterans, and
expenditure by the Social Security Administration. The figures
in Table 3 underscore this close fiscal relationship with the United
States. 66
TABLE

3.

COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT NET RECURRENT
REVENUES

Selected Fiscal Years, in Thousands

1940
20,970
Commonwealth sources
Non-Commonwealth sources
(customs duties, U.S. excises, federal grants-in-aid) 5,340

Total

26,310

1950

1960

1970

1972

90,406

193,462

562,488

752,434

18,867

57,854

260,839

390,741

109,273

251,316

823,327 1,143,175

The federal contribution of $390,741,000 for fiscal 1972
represents more than one-third of the total recurrent revenues
for the Commonwealth government. 67 In addition, United States
defense spendings have made an enormous contribution to the
island's economy. Federal defense expenditures in Puerto Rico
for the ten-year period from 1942 through 1951 amounted to $570
million. In contrast, the nondefense expenditures for the same
period totaled $114 million. The wages, salaries, and supplements
paid by the federal government between fiscal 1960 and fiscal 1970
came to $1,267 million. 68
The disbursements by the government of the United States
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play an absolutely essential role in Puerto Rico's economy. They
help to balance the unfavorable trade figures between the United
States and Puerto Rico. 69 They have given employment to many
Puerto Ricans and have helped in financing essential measures,
in addition to stabilizing basic industrks. In raising the island's
income, the federal disbursements have strengthened the purchasing power of consumers, which in turn has made possible industrial expansion and increased importation. 70 Munoz Marin hoped
in 1953 that eventually the island could dispense with the substantial federal aid. 71 This has remained a hope for the future.
The bulk of foreign investments in Puerto Rico was also
from the United States. The long-term mainland capital invested
increased from $18 million in 1948 to $161 million in 1959.72
Two-thirds of the investments in 1957, according to the London
Economist, were from the United States. European manufacturers
had been thwarted from making large investments because of the
fear on the part of American firms of "back-door imports." Hence,
the EDA was forced to cut its promotional activities in Europe.
In 1957, the Economist stated, not a single European company
was established. 73
With the island's economy so heavily dependent on United
States businessmen, it would be natural for Puerto Rico to be
subject to mainland economic cycles. Werner Baer studied the
effects upon the Puerto Rican economy of the recessions of 195354 and 1957-58. The impact of the two recessions, Baer discovered, depended on whether an insular firm was a mainland plant
established in its entirety or a subsidiary of a continental firm
producing finished products or parts to be assembled later on the
mainland into finished products. The effects of the recessions
were more direct on the first rather than the second type. Generally, however, a number of factors cushioned the adverse effects
of the recessions, so that Puerto Rico's industrialization program
was not directly but indirectly affected. Indirectly, mainland recessions meant a reduction in migration of Puerto Ricans to the
continent of the United States, which in tum meant an increase
in unemployed workers on the island. 74
Population growth and migration are two crucially important
factors in Puerto Rico's economic program. The essential goal of
the entire program was to raise the standard of living and cut
down the rate of unemployment. The task is Himalayan in proportion. The rate of growth of an already overpopulated island-
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there were 668 persons per square mile in 194575-is exceptionally
high, so that the labor force increments by the natural process
of births and deaths grow far more rapidly than employment
openings can absorb them. Total employment has risen from
512,000 in 1940 to 658,000 in 1950, and from 760,000 in 1955 to
860,000 in 1960. But the population of Puerto Rico has grown,
too. It rose from 1,869,000 in 1940 to 2,275,000 in 1960.76 While
it is to the credit of the insular government that it has been able
to reduce unemployment from 17.9 percent in 1940 to 12.8 percent in 1950,77 the rate of unemployment did not drop below 11
percent until 1964.78
Migration has, therefore, acted as an escape-valve. As United
States citizens, the Puerto Ricans have freely migrated to the mainland to avail themselves of work opportunities, thus removing a
sizable percentage of the natural increase that would otherwise
swell the ranks of the unemployed and the underemployed. In
the ten-year period between 1941 and 1951, about 240,000 Puerto
Ricans left the island, reducing by half the excess of births over
deaths of 486,000 in th~ same period. 79 Between 1950 and 1954
some 100,000 Puerto Ricans migrated to the United States. 80
Emigration is, therefore, essential for a healthy state of the island's
economy, even though in January, 1949, Munoz Marin insisted
that it should not be regarded as a permanent part of the solution
to Puerto Rico's problems. 81 Indeed, the money sent back to the
island by Puerto Ricans in the United States is a considerable
boon to the insular economy. Puerto Rican agricultural workers
who migrate to the mainland seasonally alone contribute close to
$6 million per year to the general economy. 82
The shift of mainland industries to Puerto Rico raises two
additional problems. First, would industries stay when the period
of tax-exemption expires? It was apparent that because over 90
percent of the firms were being attracted for this reason the period
of tax-exemption would have to be continued for a longer term.
Another tax-exemption law was passed in I 954, providing for the
granting of a ten-year period of exemption to successful applicants
regardless of the year in which it first received the grant. Firms
that had been exempted in 1948 could petition to have their grants
redrawnin terms of the 1954 law. 83 The insular government was
well aware that the tax-exemption law has not helped an equitable
distribution of wealth, nor have the enormous rates of profit been
reinvested in Puerto Rico. Still, the Development administration
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hoped that the higher incomes for the economy as a whole would
offset the inequity in the tax structure, and that in the end the
Puerto Rican economy might become less dependent on taxexemption as a permanent feature of insular economy. 84
Second, could the Puerto Rican government continue to insist on minimum wages below federal levels established by the
Fair Labor Standards Act in the face of opposition by mainland
unions? The government of Munoz Marin has insisted that any
extension of mainland minima to the island would destroy Puerto
Rico's economy. This argument, plus the astute handling of
the whole matter by Munoz Marin, persuaded Congress in 1954
llot to pass a minimum wage law for Puerto Rico. But it was
clear that low-cost labor as an incentive for mainland investors
lost its original strong appeal because of its vulnerability to attacks by labor organizations. 85
Munoz Marin and Moscoso were fully cognizant that the
revamping of the industrialization program had serious political
implications. It was a well-thought-out, long-term program,
which envisaged utilizing to the island's fullest advantage the
neither-independence-nor-statehood political status of Puerto Rico
in 1948. Both realized that the island would lose its unique
tariff and tax relationship under independence or statehood, and
that without the unique elements in its association with the
United States their economic program could get nowhere. I£
Puerto Rico could attain statehood, assuming that was possible
in 1948, it would lose many of the federal contributions, would
not be able to grant tax-exemption, and would be burdened by
federal taxation. Under independence, assuming once again that
it was possible in 1948, Puerto Rico could not attract mainland
industries, if only because the strong incentives of a common tariff
structure and accessibility to the United States market facilities
would disappear.
Businessmen wishing to invest in Puerto Rico desired to be
reassured about at least two aspects of insular politics and program: first, whether Puerto Rican leadership was reliable; second,
whether a substantive change of the island's political status was
expected shortly. Such was the case of a potential industrialist
who inquired of the firm of Arnold, Fortas, and Porter. The
Washington firm was in a good position to respond to such a request, because it had been retained in 1946 by the insular government to handle legal matters that might arise in its relations with
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continental citizens and businesses. Arnold, Fortas, and Porter
reassured the businessman on both counts. The document stated
that Mufi.oz Marin was a highly reliable leader under whom there
was no concern to fear government expropriation of private interests. Furthermore, the firm's communication continued, the
recent concessions of self-government to Puerto Rico-referring
to the Elective Governor Act of 1947-had weakened the sentiment for independence and strengthened that for dominion status.
The letter ruled out statehood even more strongly. 86
The firm's confidence in Mufi.oz Marin and the island's economic program was shared by key administration officials and
congressmen. DTIP's director Davis believed that the island's
industrialization program had a brilliant future. 87 Michigan's
Representative Crawford expressed enthusiasm for Puerto Rico's
economic program, and California's Representative Norris Poulson was convinced that the only man capable of saving the island's
economy was Mufi.oz Marin. 88 The developmental project impressed members of the House Committee on Public Lands when
Mufi.oz Marin unfolded it in detail on July 12, 1949. He hinted in
his testimony that he was planning in the near future for a political formula that would accommodate economic realities in Puerto
Rico. 89
"Obviously, the United States could not," he recalled in 1953,
"maintain its present good economic treatment of Puerto Rico,
which is vital to our continued development, if we acquired a
status which had all the legal paraphernalia of separate independence. It became clear that only under some form of status in
which we retained our American citizenship could we preserve
th_e economic conditions which are necessary for our survival as a
people." A new political approach meant moving away from the
''either/or" formula, he added. "We continued to be preoccupied
as a collective group with the notion of a plebiscite in which we
would be required to choose between separate independence and
federated statehood-despite the fact that under either alternative
the economic life of our people would be gravely threatened." 00
Economic considerations largely gave birth to the concept of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Status Debate Continues

The subject of Puerto Rican status has been the most persistent topic of discussion among the people of Puerto Rico. The
debate has been variously described as debilitating and "futile,"
as an "obsession" that has caused anger and "mental anguish." A
negative criticism is implied in such terms of description: why
do the Puerto Ricans insist upon continuing a Sisyphus-like
wrestling with a definition of themselves in relation to the people
Jose de Diego called the "Gentlemen of the North," instead of
tackling the more mundane and material matters of struggle and
survival? The quest of self-identity, however, constantly urges
fulfillment. It need not be harmful. On the contrary, it can lead
to spiritual and moral growth. This indeed has been the case
with Puerto Ricans, for they permitted Mufioz Marin to channel
the quest in a constructive manner away for the time being from
independence and statehood. Repose in the Commonwealth
status, he told them, so that they might search fruitfully for a
permanent solution and at the same time apply themselves to the
important tasks that face them. Fernos-Isern echoed Mufioz
Marin's sentiments when he told independentistas and estadistas
in 1950 to hang their "hammocks . . . under the tree which
sprout[ed] into this new concept." Who knows, he continued,
207
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the formula might yield a permanent settlement to an old dilemma.
That M ufioz Marin succeeded in weaning Puerto Ricans
away from an "either independence or statehood" way of thinking was a measure of his leadership abilities as much as it was a
reflection of the islanders' spiritual growth. He himself had
started out as an independentista at the time the PPD was founded
in 1938. But by the time the party scored a narrow electoral victory in 1940, he was beginning to have doubts about pursuing
either independence or statehood for the immediate future. The
economic well-being of Puerto Rico became his primary consideration. By 1946, when he had consolidated his political position,
he abandoned independence as a Popular goal. He argued persuasively that Puerto Rico could not economically sustain either
independence or statehood and convinced fellow Puerto Ricans
that the continued association of the island with the United States
under the most liberal terms of self-government possible was in
its best interest. He separated the issues of autonomy and political
status to the extent that the dichotomy of these two closely interrelated issues could be achieved.
This approach harmonized with the attitude of Congress,
which, in the heightened security-conscious atmosphere of the
postwar period, desired to retain control over the island in vital
matters. And this 3,500-square-mile Caribbean island was strategically placed at the gate of its sister islands and the Panama
Canal. There was, therefore, little sentiment in Congress to grant
the island independence, even though the various bills introduced
by a champion of Puerto Rico's independence, Senator Tydings
of Maryland, included absolute provisions for maintaining United
States military and naval bases on the island. Congress preferred
instead to grant self-government in small doses. There was little
opposition to the appointment of the first Puerto Rican as governor, Jesus T. Pinero, in 1946. About a year later, the United
States legislators, reassured by the able governorship of Pinero,
believed that the islanders should be allowed to elect their own
governor. But their caution and conservatism did not yet permit
the auditor and the justices of the Puerto Rican Supreme Court
to be appointed or elected by the islanders. One suspects that they
were fearful lest a pattern of anarchy and revolutions follow a
sudden grant of self-government and thereby detract from the
island's important strategic role. A few members of Congress were
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influenced in their thinking by such patterns in some Latin American countries and were wont to consider Puerto Rico to be Latin
American in "temperament."
Congress was, however, quite impressed by the administrative
abilities of Governor Munoz Marin. Influential members of the
Congressional committees concerned with Puerto Rican matters
frequently praised the work of the governor, and generally did
anything possible, such as print his speeches in the Congressional
Record, to make more of their colleagues aware of the existence
of a talented administrator and a reliable friend. They pointed
enthusiastically to "Operation Bootstrap" and the significance
Puerto Rico's economic well-being would have for the rest of
Latin America. Resident Commissioner Fern6s-Isern's quiet but
industrious efficiency in Washington was also instrumental in projecting a favorable image of Puerto Ricans generally.
The most notable among the influential members on Puerto
Rican affairs were Representative Crawford of Michigan and Senators Butler of Nebraska and O'Mahoney of Wyoming. Others
were Representatives Engle of California, Taylor of New York,
and Peterson of Florida and Senators Cordon of Oregon and Lehman of New York. Congressman Peterson and Senator O'Mahoney
were chairmen, respectively, of the House Committee on Public
Lands and the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.
Of course there is no way of telling why members of Congress
showed interest in Puerto Rico. Representative Crawford came
from a state that had beet sugar interests, which in theory should
have made him an opponent for the increase of quotas on Puerto
Rican sugar. And perhaps he was. But he did not desire to eliminate Puerto Rican competition in this area by granting the island
independence. Indeed, he devised plans to utilize Puerto Rican
migrant labor for farms in Michigan. New York representatives
and senators generally supported the advancement of insular
autonomy, which probably reflected their concern for the Puerto
Rican constituents in their state. Partisanship was not seriously
involved, for both Democrats and Republicans generally backed
Puerto Rican self-government.
These several factors accounted for the virtual absence of
opposition in 1950 when Munoz Marin, very ably supported by
Fern6s-Isern, in whose mind the concept had germinated, asked
Congress to permit the islanders to write their own constitution.
It seemed to many members of Congress the logical step in the
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advancement of insular autonomy. The Puerto Ricans had demonstrated their capabilities in the exercise of responsible selfgovernment. It is probably true that many congressmen and
senators saw the step as an issue separate from the question of
political status. However they interpreted the phrase "in the
nature of a compact," they probably understood Public Law 600
of 1950 to give the islanders complete autonomy in internal matters, except that if things ever went out of control on the island
Congress had the final authority to straighten them out.
This observation should not detract from the positive and
progressive attitude of many of the United States legislators who
believed that Puerto Ricans deserved the greatest possible selfgovernment within the bounds of the United States policy of
enlightened control over former dependencies and territories.
Many were aware, too, that in the Commonwealth a new and
unique experiment in federalism was being established. In retrospect it seems unfortunate that Congress did not define this experiment more clearly, because its vagueness was to become a
source of controversy in the years ahead. But if Congress had
attempted to do so, or if Fern6s-Isern had been less adroit in his
maneuvering, the project might have become bogged down in
an endless debate over the question of political status.
Reference has been made so far only to Congress' reaction to
insular autonomy. The United States administrations, especially
that of President Truman, played a substantial role. The Truman
administration could boast of three major developments in the
short space of seven years: the appointment of a Puerto Rican
as governor, the first elective governor, and the establishment of
the Commonwealth. Indeed, this was by far more than the administrations from 1898 to 1945 could claim for any and all overseas possessions. The Truman administration was, however, operating in a new era when big nations felt at least a new moral
obligation to extend greater and greater self-government to its
colonies, dependencies, and the like. National movements in
Africa and Asia, inspired by Western political ideas of sovereignty,
independence, and freedom, demanded an end to the domination
by Western colonial powers. The colonial revolt had built up
pressure in the years after the First World War and had gained
momentum in the years following the Second. In Asia, for instance, India had achieved independence by 1947; and Burma,
Ceylon, Indonesia, the states of Indo-China, and Malaya were in
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different stages of evolution towards self-government and independence. The United States never regarded Puerto Rico as a
colony and was sentitive to reference of it as one. It extended
self-government to Puerto Rico as if it were a colony, however.
The Truman administration owed a great deal to its predecessor in terms of the direction that Puerto Rican development
took. The personnel in the Department of the Interior under the
Roosevelt administration worked for the same ends that were to
be achieved under the Truman administration. Secretary Ickes,
Undersecretary Fortas, and Governor Tugwell were committed
to achieving an elective governorship in Puerto Rico. They were
fully aware that the governor's post in the past was a position
regarded as payment of partisan loyalty to some continental politician. They were convinced that Puerto Rico's administration
should not be subject to partisan politics, for it was too important
and too serious a task, one which involved the welfare of over two
million people. But as progressive as their attitudes were, they
failed to obtain even a modicum of self-government for the island,
primarily because of the administration's deteriorating relationship with Congress. Secretary Ickes and the others were in no
small way responsible for the failure in 1943-1944 to pass a bill
intended to make the governor's post elective. Thwarted in this
matter, the Roosevelt administration could not even consider
resolving the status question. The dilemma is summed up in Abe
Fortas' words:
. . . I-and I believe Secretary Ickes-at all relevant
times was deeply influenced by the practical limitations
imposed by the Congressional situation. It was clear that
Congress could not be induced to make a bold forward
move as the first step toward achieving improved status
for Puerto Rico. It was clear that the task had to be accomplished by successive moves.
I was at all times completely in sympathy with the
idea that Puerto Rico should have an elected governor
and complete dominion over all of . its internal affairs
through locally selected officials, and that United States
participation in Puerto Rico's internal government
should be eliminated so far and as soon as possible. 1
These high officials, although they were for a time members
of the Truman administration, left their posts within twelve to
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eighteen months of Truman's taking over the presidency. It was
after their departure that relations between the administration
and the Congress improved. Indeed, harmonious relations with
the legislative body were absolutely necessary, because the Eightieth Congress was dominated by Republicans. This pattern was
continued in the Eighty-first and Eighty-second Congresses, when
Democrats were in control. Some of the persons worthy of mention are undersecretary, and later secretary, of the Interior Chapman; DTIP director Davis; and head of the Caribbean Branch
of the DTIP, Mason Barr. Chapman had entered the Roosevelt
administration -in 1933 as an assistant secretary in the Interior
department. By the time he became the secretary in 1949, his
grasp of the Puerto Rican question was enormous and his understanding of the workings of Congress and the government excellent. He and other Interior personnel worked closely with Fern6sIsern to coordinate their actions vis a vis Congressional leaders.
The smooth cooperation and coordination in the passage of the
1947 Elective Governor Act and of Public Laws 600 in 1950 and
44 7 in 1952 are examples of the approach that was absent in the
early 1940s.
Fern6s-Isern played a vital role in the implementation of the
Commonwealth. He represented in Congress not only the insular
government but the Puerto Rican people as well, since he had
been elected by them. He acquitted himself extremely well as
liaison between the Puerto Rican government on the one hand
and the administration and Congress on the other. Since he was
intimately involved in the formulation of the Commonwealth
concept, he was in a good position to explain it to legislators and
administrators, and to defend it before committees, conferences,
and meetings.
A factor of considerable importance was the personality and
politics of Munoz Marin. This factor has been stressed in the
advancement of Puerto Rican autonomy throughout this study.
His inspiring leadership won the support of the Puerto Rican
people. Fern6s-Isern states, " . . . without him it would have
been most difficult if not impossible to move the Puerto Rican
people in the direction of Commonwealth and to sustain their
efforts for its achievement." 2
Munoz Marin used to the island's fullest advantage his familiarity with American political traditions and institutions, sometimes even to the point of exaggerated ego-building for the United
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States. His excellent command of the English language, according to Garcia Mendez, 3 was no less an advantage in his cultivating
the friendship of administration officials and Congressional leaders, many of whom he came to know on a first-name basis. They
in tum could not but be impressed by his charisma and knowledge
of things. Congressional committees sometimes broke tradition
by giving him standing ovations, and Congressional leaders saw
in him a man who transcended Puerto Rico and through whom
the United States could communicate with Latin America. They
trusted and respected him, and his policies of close cooperation
and association reassured them. Whatever reservations administration officials and Congressional leaders may have had about
granting Puerto Rico greater self-government, such thoughts were
partly allayed by the personality of Mufioz Marin. This was a
considerable achievement for a man who up to 1937 had openly
advocated political severance from the United States.
The success of the Commonwealth status was based considerably on its economic advantages. The implication of this was
that neither statehood nor independence could offer similar benefits for the near future. Indeed, the United States generally accepted the argument in the 1940s and thereafter that economic
disaster would follow if either of the two alternatives was hastily
imposed upon the island.
In the case of statehood it was argued that it would lose
customs dues and excise taxes on offshore shipments, as well as
other forms of federal benefits. Besides, Puerto Ricans would
need to pay federal taxes under statehood, and this might overburden their earning capacities. There would, however, be increased federal contributions: increased grants-in-aid, social security, assignments for roads, and so on. But it was difficult to
calculate exactly whether the losses could be offset by the gains.
It was because of these compelling reasons largely that statehood never became an issue in Congress in the same way that
it did in the cases of Hawaii and Alaska, two other important
United States territories. These two territories, however, were
"incorporated" and hence subject to full United States taxation
even before they achieved statehood. They received no benefits
from customs duties and United States excise taxes on offshore
shipments, nor could they offer tax exemption as in Puerto Rico.
Statehood in Hawaii and Alaska did little to cMnge their tax
relationship with the United States. Moreover, Haw.i.ii and Alaska
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were rich in natural resources and promised to be self-dependent
assets within the Union. In addition to all that, the people of
Hawaii and Alaska had explicitly shown their preference for statehood in popular referendums. Indeed, Hawaii had even organized
in 1950 a constitutional convention to draft a constitution on the
basis of statehood, although it became a state only in 1959.4
To be sure, organized political and economic groups advocating statehood in Puerto Rico conducted vigorous campaigns
for sup~ort among United States lawmakers and the insular electorate. But Congress and the Puerto Rican people remained unconvin ed about statehood in the face of its apparent disadvantages) In part, statehood proponents were unable to build up
momentum for their cause in Congress because an anti-statehood
party dominated insular politics throughout the 1940s. In the
unlikely event that the Puerto Ricans had chosen to ask Congress
for statehood in 1950, they would have faced some other hurdles
that confronted Hawaii and Alaska in their battles for statehood,
namely, partisan politics, race, noncontiguity, and so on. But the
Puerto Rican statehood movement in the 1940s never really got
off the ground.
In recent years, the support for statehood among Puerto
Ricans has increased. Nearly 39 percent of those voting in the
1967 referendum chose statehood. The years of successful association under the Commonwealth have probably made Puerto
Ricans more receptive to permanent affiliation with the United
States. The move to become a state in the Union, however,
would be an irrevocable one, and Puerto Ricans are not likely tc;>
rush into it. The findings of the 1965-1966 United States-Puerto
Rico commission further suggest that the transition would be a
difficult one. Leading estadista Garcia Mendez concedes that the
phenomenal increase in yearly Puerto Rican gross income has
made Puerto Rico the "metropolis" and the United States the
"colony." 11
The independentistas probably enjoyed some strength in the
early 1940s, in part, because the PPD had not yet shed its image as
a party of independence. There were many independentistas
within the ranks of the PPD. But Munoz Marfn abandoned
independence as a Popular goal in 1946 and expelled independentistas from the party. Thus spurned, the independence group
formed a party of its own, the PIP. It has, however, shown no
great electoral popularity and has grown weaker over the years.
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The Puerto Rican people have remained unconvinced about
independence. Only 0.6 percent of those voting in the 1967 referendum favored independence. To a very great extent this is
because the independentistas failed to present effective plans and
programs of how Puerto Rico might adjust to independence
without suffering a drop in the growth rate and serious economic
dislocation. The 1965-1966 United States-Puerto Rico commission was not persuaded that the transition to independence would
require ten but not more than twenty years, as maintained by an
economist representing the PIP. It felt that fundamental changes
would be necessary in the institutional relationship between the
island and the mainland. As an independent country, Puerto Rico
would need to develop additional and alternative sources of financing capital investment and new export markets, for which an
unspecified transition period, much longer than fifteen years,
would be necessary.
From an economic point of view, the Commonwealth status
extremely beneficial to Puerto Rico. It has fully exbeen
has
unique tax and fiscal relationship between the island
the
ploited
to become industrialized and to upgrade the
mainland
the
and
the Puerto Rican people. Few other groups
of
living
of
standard
of people have achieved so much so rapidly. In the process of its
achievement, however, Puerto Rico has developed a pattern of
institutional relationship with the United States that has more
and more come to assume a permanent structure. Puerto Rico's
economic growth rate has become firmly tied to the pattern. This
is why transition to statehood or independence in the future is
going to be difficult. But the great merit of the Commonwealth
status is that it is not irrevocable-it has left room for the Puerto
Ricans to grow not only materially but spiritually as well, until
a permanent solution can be found.
There are, of course, limitations to the status. The 1959
attempt to improve its terms indicated a substantial range of areas
that required redefinition and refinement. Its opponents have
not been slow to point out its weaknesses. Independentista Geigel
Polanco raises a fundamental question: "The fact is that substantial powers are still exercised in Puerto Rico by the Federal Government of the United States." He denies that Puerto Rico has
achieved full autonomy or that the relationship is based on the
·
principle of bilateral "compact." 6
anomconstitutional
and
legal
its
Garcia Mendez points-to
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alies. The Federal Firearm Act, he says, was made applicable to
the United States but not to Puerto Rico. The Taft-Hartley Act,
however, is applicable to Puerto Rico as well. Furthermore, the
"National Labor Board has jurisdictional priority over the Insular
Labor Board in any matter where a conflict of jurisdiction might
emerge." In judicial matters, too, contradictory decisions prevail.
He cites several examples, two of which are: in Mora v. Torres
(113 F. Supp. 309 D.P.R. 1953) it was decided that the Fifth
Amendment was still in force in Puerto Rico because the island
was no longer a territory but subject to a new relationship determined by a "compact" that could not be unilaterally changed.
However, a similar decision by the U.S. District Federal Court
of Puerto Rico in Detres v. Lions Building Corporation was revoked by the Court of Appeals 7th Circuit (234 2d 596 1956),
which stated that Puerto Rico was still a "territory" and that there
was no difference between a "territory" and the "Commonwealth."7
In view of these weaknesses in the Commonwealth, what is the
future of the status issue in Puerto Rico? It is appropriate to
permit the thoughts of Fern6s-Isern, the man who helped to
formulate and implement the Commonwealth, to answer the
question:
My own personal belief is that statehood in the
union would mean a totally anomalous situation for
Puerto Rico and the United States. It is an unnatural
extremely difficult accommodation. I can not conceive
that the people of Puerto Rico will ever agree to it, or
ask and persist asking for it, and to pay the price for it.
On the other hand I believe that it is not in the interest
of the United States that the association of Puerto Rico
therewith be dissolved. The United States will always
find it contrary to its best interest to set up an independent republic in Puerto Rico.
Since the Puerto Rican people will insist on a completely self-governing commonwealth, it is obvious that
the dilemma will not be "independence vs. statehood,"
but rather full self-government in association with
United States or full self-government separated from
the United States. Ultimately the decision will be made
not by the Puerto Rican people themselves, but indeed
directly or indirectly by the United States. 8
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A. MEMORANDUM FROM MU~OZ MARIN TO
SECRETARY ICKES
January 5th, 1937.
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY ICKES
From Luis Mufioz Marin
RE: Political status of Puerto Rico.
Statehood or Independence:
It is universally recognized in Puerto Rico that the taking of definite
steps with regard to the final political status of the island should not be
further delayed. It is almost as universally recognized that no form of
colonial status-that is of delegated and therefore revocable powers to Puerto
Rico,-will be acceptable to, or dispose of the problem in, Puerto Rico.
There are only two forms of political status that remain possible: independence and statehood. Both have the quality of dignity for the Puerto
Rican people, and both have the quality of juridical permanence, neither
being revocable in law.
Of these two definitive solutions, statehood seems to be ruled out for
reasons of a practical nature-from the viewpoint of the United States as
well as from that of Puerto Rico.
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Statehood, from Puerto Rico's viewpoint:
From the point of view of Puerto Rico, statehood would accomplish no
economic change favorable to Puerto Rico but would rather tend to perpetuate the present unsound economic system based on the overwhelming
preponderance of sugar. It would have the adverse economic effect of depriving Puerto Rico of its customs receipts, its income and inheritance tax
receipts, of a large part of its internal revenue receipts. Therefore, the only
economic change encompassed by statehood would be to convert the Federal
Government into one more absentee extractor of the wealth produced by the
Puerto Ricans. It can be easily seen what such a change would mean to
the already miserable standard of living of the population, and to the Government services, especially Education and Public Health. Politically, it
would involve minor and superficial improvements by creating a handful of
additional elective offices.
Statehood, from U.S. viewpoint:
From the point of view of the United States, what advantage does statehood entail? -None whatever that can be seen, save the aid and counsel in
Congress of eight representatives and two senators from an unassimilated
and, due to intense population and other factors, unassimilable nationality.
If Puerto Rico contributed its eight or nine million dollars to the Federal
Treasury as a State, the State Government would immediately collapse. If
it did not contribute this money, because of instant replacement in the form
of relief and other grants, then there would not even be this gain. On the
other hand, the United States would be embarking on an entirely uncharted
sea,-the incorporation of overseas territory thickly populated by people of a
foreign culture into the perpetual Union. And whatever threats exist today
in Puerto Rico to legitimate American interests, whether as taxpayers or as
producers, would then be made to exist in perpetuity. This perpetual quality of statehood should be enough to terrify both the people of the United
States and the people of Puerto Rico. After all, even independence can be
taken back with the consent of the Puerto Ricans. Statehood cannot be
taken back even if the Puerto Ricans should ardently desire to have it taken
back and the American people should desire to take it back with equal
ardour.
Independence: Tydings Bill
The only remaining solution, independence, was in fact accepted as the
only alternative to the colonial system in the so-called Tydings independence
bill. Whatever the pernicious clauses of that bill (and they were many), this
recognition of the only alternative was clearly realistic. The United States
could certainly not allow the Puerto Rican people to vote on statehood
unless they could commit themselves to grant statehood if favored by the
popular vote.
While introducing the offensive and destructive so-called Tydings Bill
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again would certainly not help matters in Puerto Rico, it is nevertheless true
that dropping the whole subject and not presenting any legislation leading
to independence,-if-the-people-want-it, would disclose the presentation of
the Tydings Bill last April naked to the Puerto Rican people, divested of its
only good quality (the recognition of a right) and reduce it to a gesture of
political chicanery in extreme bad taste, and of economic terrorism. The
fact that the bill was the fruit of Dr. Gruening's twisted and unadmirable
state of mind, and that your approval and that of the President extended
only to the principle involved and not to the horrible details, is known to
few. To the people of Puerto Rico at large, the Tydings Bill, as drafted, is
the last word, the only word, of the Roosevelt Administration on the subject.

1936 elections
The last elections in Puerto Rico cannot be considered as changing the
need for decent independence legislation, because the result was clearly determined by the economic terrorism of the Tydings Bill. This is not an
ex-post-facto conclusion. As soon as the Tydings Bill was introduced as an
Administration measure, I informed officials of the Division of Territories
(Dr. Gruening and Mrs. Hampton) that the bill was an instrument that had
made absolutely certain the defeat of the forces that had been supporting
the Administration against the vicious attacks of the sugar corporations and
their political representatives. After the Tydings Bill was presented, I
resigned, in proof of the sincerity of my conviction, my own candidacy for
Resident Commissioner in Washington, to which I was nominated unanimously twice by the Convention of the Liberal Party. It was obviously impossible for a political force to win an election when the chief political
plank of its platform was apparently defined by the U.S. government, which
has the deciding power, as ruin and starvation. Although in spite of the
economic terrorism of the Tydings Bill the Liberal forces polled 48% of
the popular vote (more than I expected under the circumstances), an election held under such clear-cut economic duress cannot be considered as an
expression of public opinion, unless you wish to consider the high percentage
of the votes polled, in spite of the duress, as an indication of public feeling.
I think I may have presented to you personally this certainty of the loss of
the elections by the Liberal forces, through no fault of their own, as far
back as last April or May, when I had one or two interviews with you on
the subject of the Tydings Bill. However, I am not certain that I presented
this to you, but I certainly did to Mr. Chapman, Dr. Gruening, and · Mrs.
Hampton. It definitely does not represent hind-sight.
Now, I wish to point out to you, Mr. Secretary, why independence for
Puerto Rico, although certainly no utopia, is necessary from the point of
view of Puerto Rico, and I believe inevitable from the point of view of the
United States.
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Possible motives of Empire
In the first place I think you will agree with me that, aside from military
reasons, which play no part in the Puerto Rican problem,(•) there are only
two motivations for the control of one people by another: one is economic
exploitation; the other is the White Man's Burden. Economic exploitation
is simple and straightforward. The White Man's Burden can be one of two
things: a sincere desire to help another people, or a disguise to make exploitation respectable and palatable to the decent people of the exploiting
country. It is historically clear that the sincere desire to help is a motivation
that functions only during a very small part of the time and on very rare
occasions. I believe that the Roosevelt administration is one of those rare
occasions, so far as Puerto Rico is concerned. Even under the Roosevelt
Administration, the state of mind of one individual, in a key position, has
been enough to swamp the character of generosity of the Roosevelt-Puerto
Rican policy, to place the island unnecessarily in the hands of the worst
reactionary interests, poisoning the whole situation with the spirit of distrust
and revenge. But even if this had not been so, the Roosevelt Administration,
your own tenure as Secretary of the Interior, have only four years and fifteen
days to go. To any believer in liberty such as you are, to any anti-imperialist,
such as Dr. Gruening used to be, to any believer in the rights of people to
control their own destiny, it seems that the historically proven reality that
peoples don't control other peoples, in the long run, except for purposes of
exploitation, must be the basis for any fair-minded decision as to Puerto
Rico. I believe it is clear that, if the United States continue to own Puerto
Rico, most of the long years that will follow the Roosevelt Administration
will be devoted, as all the long years that preceeded it, mainly to protecting
exploitation of the people of Puerto Rico by a few privileged interests over
here and, as an incident, in Spain. On the basis of that truth it is that I lay,
in terms as simple as that, the need of independence for Puerto Rico.
Practical need for Independence,
from Puerto Rico's viewpoint
However, there are more detailed reasons why independence is necessary
for Puerto Rico. Under the American tariff Puerto Rico has become practically a one crop country. This crop-sugar cane-, like all crops subject to

(•) Puerto Rico, especially since the American flag was raised over the Virgin
Islands, is said not to be of military importance to the United States. However,
in any case, every sensible Puerto Rican will agree that even under independence
the United States should have all the naval and military facilities in Puerto Rico
that they may require for their national security. The national security of the
United States will always be a primary concern of the Puerto Rican people, because of the friendly relations existing, because of the good neighbor policy, and
because the security of the whole Caribbean will always be intimately involved
with the national security of the United States.
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complicated processing before reaching market, is of the worst for farmers
and workers. It comprises 70% of the total production. It is 50% absenteeowned in the United States (in three Atlantic seaboard cities of the United
States) and about 20% owned in Spain. This causes an absentee outflow of
wealth produced by low-wage laborers and low-income farmers that can be
estimated at some 15 to 20 million dollars a year. With the farmers constantly being driven out of the best cane lands, with this continuous extraction of wealth, with this continuous "human mining" (in the sense in which
the Department of Agriculture uses the term "soil mining"), it is clearly seen
that a change in this system is imperative and cannot be long delayed. The
Roosevelt administration recognizes this, and were it not for Dr. Gruening's
state of mind, would be doing something more or less substantial about it
by keeping Reconstruction to its original aims. But I do not think th~t any
student of history can hold that such a favorable situation could be trusted
to last very much beyond the Roosevelt administration.
So long as the present system continues, Puerto Rico will not be able
to produce the tropical foods that it consumes. So long as Puerto Rico is
subject to dumping from the United States, all land distribution policies,
unless it be for the planting of mQre sugar cane, will be nullified and destroyed by a dumping on the Puerto Rican market of the same products produced by the families that may receive the land. Then there is the problem
of coffee, essentially the soundest crop in Puerto Rico. It is sound because
land in coffee is more evenly distributed than in any other crop; because it
has to grow under shade and therefore automatically protects forestation
over the whole coffee-growing area; because it has a potential (formerly
existent) European market at good prices without the need of tariff favors;
because it is grown on the uplands where the climate is healthier, the
tuberculosis rate is lower and malaria is at a minimum, where the only major
health problem, outside of those arising principally from a starvation diet,
is the hookworm, easily cured if effort can be concentrated upon it; because
less than one per cent of it is absentee owned. Coffee was Puerto Rico's
principal crop when the American regime began. Under present conditions
there is no hope for the coffee industry. The quality of Puerto Rican coffee
is too high priced for the American market, and only a negligible amount
enters it. On the other hand, Spain, the principal natural market for Puerto
Rican coffee, has given Puerto Rico a quota of only 450 hundredweights,
that is, the product of about 200 acres. Other coffee-producing countries
have large quotas in Spain, which does not produce coffee, because of their
bargaining power in establishing reciprocity treaties. If Puerto Rico had
such bargaining power, it could quickly recover the Spanish and other
markets for its coffee. This would not hurt any United States producer. For
instance, Puerto Rico consumes Spanish wines in quantity, and it does not
consume California wines. Puerto Rico could admit Spanish wines free in
exchange for a reasonable coffee quota, this being a benefit to Puerto Rico
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without impinging on the interests of any United States producer. Other
Spanish luxury products, which hurdle the high tariff anyway because of
long established Puerto Rican consumer habits, are in the same category.
With local tariff-making and treaty-making powers, Puerto Rico could:
(l) successfully recreate a class of small landholders
(2) increase food production
(3) develop its coffee industry
-all this with a negligible adverse effect on the economy of the United
States.

Population problem
The population problem is of course the most serious social and economic problem that the Island has. The threat involved in this problem will
not, I believe, vary very much whether the present status is continued or
independence is established. It will be a tragic problem under any circumstances. Church opposition to birth control will exist under any regime, and
will cease to exist or to be effective when the problem reaches a climax,
under any regime. Under the present status, opposition to birth control has
also a tinge of jingoistic feeling which it would lack under independence:
that is, it is looked upon by some as an attempt to impose American mores
on the Puerto Rican people. The fact that this feeling is absurd does not
make it less of a reality.
Emigration is another solution that perhaps won't vary much whatever
the political status. Emigration could be arranged on a large scale to the
unpopulated parts of the Dominican Republic, across the Mona Channelemigration with land distribution to the emigrants. I do not believe that the
United States could afford, especially under the Good Neighbor policy, to
have hundreds of thousands of Puerto Rican American citizens on Dominican
soil who would surely create an unceasing stream of diplomatic problems.
Probably such emigration could only be arranged on the basis of the emigrants' acquiring Dominican citizenship after a short term of residence, or
return to Puerto Rico if they did not wish to acquire it. Under such terms
there would be no substantial difference in the problem if the citizenship
that they relinquished was the American or the Puerto Rican.
Government under independence
From the point of view of government, there is of course the danger that
Puerto Ricans will establish bad governments, as there was once a dangerwhen Aaron Burr was almost elected President instead of Jefferson-that the
young United States would establish bad governments. On this, I want to
say two things:
(l) that the danger that the United States will establish bad governments
in Puerto Rico is a danger already proved by the facts.
(2) that Puerto Rico has in its development certain clear-cut differences
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from other Latin American countries that have established bad governments.
These differences are:
(a) that there is no wilderness in which bandit revolutions can prosper;
(b) that Puerto Rico has a peaceful tradition;
(c) that Puerto Rico has never had an army and need never have one,
as the model republic of Costa Rica has not;
(d) that it has had the benefit (in most ways an undoubted benefit) of
38 years of democratic practice. (It has been democratic practice so far as
the electorate is concerned, although of course not democratic in so far as the
power conferred by the electorate on its representatives is petty and unreal);
(e) that it would begin its independent life not in the midst of the
chaotic conditions created by revolution, but under conditions of peace,
friendship, mutual understanding, cultural and economic reciprocity with
the United States.
In spite of all these advantages, we may still establish bad governments.
It seems to me that the establishment of bad governments by the people of
Puerto Rico, or the appointment of bad governments by the government of
the United States, is largely in the hands of fate. We must take our chances.

Spiritual effects of the colonial system
Also the spiritual havoc brought about by a Government that is demo•
cratic in its selection but not democratic in the powers that it is allowed to
exercise, should not be underestimated. Under the colonial system Puerto
Ricans have nothing to fight for politically, excepting jobs under the budget
-patronage and pie, in the continental vernacular. The Governor's veto
power, and Congressional veto power behind that, debar Puerto Ricans from
any real broad policy-making. Only when there happens to be a sympathetic
administration in the United States (the present one is the only example)
can any real fundamental policies be attempted. The very pettiness of the
power fought for in elections makes the elections all the cruder and sets a
low standard for the qualities involved in political leadership. Last, but not
least, colonial government tends to develop an attitude of bootlicking, toady•
ing, proclamation of a 100% americanism, most proclaimers of which do not
understand even 10% of what americanism in the best sense means. Imagine
your children brought up in that atmosphere and you will sense how I and
many other Puerto Ricans feel about it. I certainly do not want my own
children to grow up and live their lives out in the spiritually corrupting
atmosphere of a colony.
Independence: from U.S. viewpoint
· From the viewpoint of the United States, of the American people, the
ownership of Puerto Rico is as bad business as it is for the mass of the Puerto
Ricans. Certainly, the workers, the farmers, the over-whelming majority of
businessmen of the United States, do not make one cent's profit out of own-
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ership of Puerto Rico by the United States.(•) A few sugar corporations do
make an enormous profit out of Puerto Rico. They take out so much money
produced by Puerto Rico that the island is constantly on the verge of a social
collapse. As a result of this a fair-minded Administration has to supply the
people of Puerto Rico, through Federal agencies and from the Federal
Treasury, with part of the millions that exploitation has taken out and continues to take out of Puerto Rico. Thus you have the general body of
American taxpayers, who are completely blameless for the situation, paying
millions as a fine for the misdeeds of a few corporations, (some of which are
not even American corporations) and in order to keep going the population
that produce the absentee profits. The Americans that feed the cow are not
the Americans that milk it. The hit-and-run driver that runs over the people
of Puerto Rico is not the innocent taxpaying bystander who pays the hospital bill so that Puerto Rico can get out on the streets again to be run
over, to go to the hospital; to be run over, to go to the hospital, to be run
over-endlessly.
Reconstruction might have corrected this situation substantially and
permanently for both the Puerto Rican people and the American taxpayers,
if Dr. Gruening's mind had not become irrevocably twisted as a result of
irrelevant circumstances. But even if this had not happened there would
be no guarantees of success beyond the termination of the present Administration.
Consideration of this angle of the problem cannot be concluded without
mentioning certain dangers to American producers from a possible overproduction of competing products in Puerto Rico. Without ruining Puerto
Rican production, decent arrangements can be arrived at under independence that, while protecting the life of Puerto Rico, will forever safeguard
American producers against a contingency that they legitimately fear.

Legislation recommended
On the basis of the foregoing comments I would suggest to the Administration the presentation of a bill along the following lines: Under thorough
election safeguards (including safeguards against buying the votes of a starving population) elections for a Constitutional Convention would be called.
The Constitutional Convention would draft a Constitution and submit it to
the President of the United States. When approved by the President the
Constitution would be submitted to the people of Puerto Rico, under the

(•) Producers of wheat, cotton goods, textiles, metals, machinery, petroleum products, chemical products, automobiles, and many other products that Puerto Rico
cannot produce, and the handlers of said products, do have a large volume of sales
in Puerto Rico which should be maintained under any reciprocity agreement, as
Puerto Rico should obviously give preference to U.S. products that it cannot
produce, over the rest of the world.
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same election safeguards. When approved by the people of Puerto Rico, the
Constitutional Convention would appoint commissioners and the President
of the United States would appoint commissioners to draft a commercial
reciprocity agreement. When the agreement so drafted had been approved
by the President and by the Constitutional Convention, it would be submitted to the Senate of the United States for its approval. When the Senate
of the United States had approved it, elections would be called in Puerto
Rico, under similar election safeguards, for the election of the first Puerto
Rican Government. Some time after this election, the President of the
United States would proclaim the independence of Puerto Rico, the elected
Government would take office, and the reciprocity agreement would go into
effect simultaneously. If there is a constitutional difficulty in giving such
agreement the status of a treaty because of its being approved before Puerto
Rico acquired the status of a sovereign nation, it could be submitted again
to the Senate, (the dates can be so close so that it would be the same Senate)
to make the agreement constitutional in the United States; and in the few
months elapsing the statu[s] quo in trade would be maintained. In case of
disagreements in the course of this process, modifications would be made according to objections presented and that step in the process repeated. The
procedure of voting on the Constitution is that used in the case of the
Philippines. I believe it is a great improvement on an a priori plebiscite
because it gives the people a chance to vote on an independence the general
structure of which they know beforehand. Of course if the majority of the
people were against independence as such, they could make known their
will by voting against the Constitution as often as it was presented, regardless
of its clauses. (It is a certainty that they would not do this.) A reasonable
limit would be placed on the number of submissions of the Constitution to
the people. I should be grateful for the opportunity of presenting a draft
of a bill embodying these principles.

Reciprocity
I have not dwelt on any particular form for the reciprocity agreement
provided in the proposed legislation because such agreement, being subject
to approval by both sides to the transaction, presumably would be satisfactory to both sides whatever its exact terms might be. However, I may state
here briefly my own conception of what a mutually fair reciprocity agreement would embody. In such an agreement, Puerto Rico should give an airtight preference to the United States in the Puerto Rican market for all
commodities (wheat, cotton, cotton manufactures, textiles, metals, machinery,
automobiles, moving pictures, coal, petroleum products, chemical products,
dried meats, etc.) that Puerto Rico cannot produce. In exchange for this the
United States should admit into the American market under the best possible
conditions such quotas of sugar, tobacco, citrus fruits and needlework as do
not impinge upon the legitimate interests of U.S. producers of these com-
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modities. A margin of freedom should be left to Puerto Rico to negotiate
with European countries for reasonable coffee quotas. The articles included
in this margin should be those that the United States do not sell in quantities to Puerto Rico in any case, such as wines, olive oil, and others. The
principle involved would be that Puerto Rico should give U .S. products
complete preference over the products of all other nations excepting the
products germane to Puerto Rico itself.

Danger of a plebiscite to U.S. prestige
A plebiscite presenting merely the abstract idea of independence involves, I believe, a certain very real danger to the United States. If the
plebiscite should defeat independence, whether fairly or not, no one would
believe in the genuineness of the plebiscite in Puerto Rico, in Latin America, or in the world. In the first place, I do not recall a single historical
example where a people were made to vote on the naked problem of their
own sovereignty as against that of another people. Plebiscites such as those
held in the Saar and in Tacna-Arica, have always been to give a population
caught between frontiers, so to speak, a chance to decide under which of
two existing sovereignties they wish to be. If an abstract plebiscite should
be lost in Puerto Rico, with the forces of the insular government controlled
by the United States, with the police controlled by the United States, with
the judicial machinery controlled by the United States, with money spent
by Federal agencies controlled by the United States, nobody in the world
would believe that the plebiscite had been fair and that Puerto Ricans had
freely voted against their own sovereignity over their own country. The
well-known accident of Dr. Gruening's sudden ferocious opposition to independence (the author of the so-called independence bill, no less!) would
merely help to make matters worse. But even assuming complete impartiality
and fairness on the part of all the United States agencies in Puerto Rico, it
must be clear to you that such impartiality would simply not be believed
in either by Latin America or by the rest of the world, including most
people in the United States.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I should like to say that if the American people are victims of the ownership of Puerto Rico, if the mass of the Puerto Rican people also are victims of that ownership, if the logic of events and .interests
seems to make it quite clear that the present situacion [sic] cannot go on
and that independence is the only solution,-why allow obstacles to arise
irrelevantly in the way of what will eventually be to the common interest
of both the American people and the Puerto Rican people? Why not establish a clear-cut policy, of which the introduction of a bill as suggested is
one step and the curbing of anti-independence propaganda by high Federal
officials is another? Why not move conscientiously and with a clear head and
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a clear objective toward the intelligent discharge of responsibilities incurred
in Puerto Rico and the intelligent and friendly establishment of independence-, this process to be halted only by a repeated adverse vote of the
Puerto Rican people on the Constitution submitted to them?
Of course if it should be so halted I really don't know what the United
States could do with this problem. That improbable bridge, however, can
be crossed when and if it is reached.

B. LETTER FROM MU~OZ MARIN TO
THE PRESIDENT
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO
La Fortaleza, San Juan
Office of the Governor
January 17, 1953
The President of the United States,
Washington, D.C.
My dear Mr. President:
On July 25, 1952, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was formally installed in response to the wish of an overwhelming majority of the people
of Puerto Rico pursuant to a compact between them and the Government
of the United States. Puerto Rico became a Commonwealth in free and
voluntary association with the United States, and its people have now attained a full measure of self-government. Accordingly, I respectfully suggest
on behalf of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico that the Government of the
United States take steps to notify the United Nations of the status of Puerto
Rico, that it is no longer a non-self-governing area, and that reports concerning it are no longer appropriate under Article 73(e) of the Charter.
This development has climaxed fifty-four years of growth in mutual
understanding and mutual good will. Democratic rights in Puerto Rico have
been progressively recognized as self-government has increased. Since 1917,
the people of Puerto Rico elected all members of their legislature which had
comprehensive powers to enact laws for Puerto Rico. Since 1948, the people
of Puerto Rico also elected their own governor, and all other officials of
Puerto Rico were locally elected or appointed by elected officials except the
Auditor of Puerto Rico and the Justices of the Supreme Court. Until the
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Commonwealth of Puerto Rico began to function, the latter officials were
appointed by the President of the United States with the advice and consent
of the United States Senate. The Congress of the United States, however,
retained full jurisdiction to legislate with respect to Puerto Rico without
the consent of its people, to override its laws, to change its form of government and to alter its relations to the United States.
These reservations have been to a large extent formal. In the entire
fifty-four years history of United States administration of Puerto Rico, Congress did not in any instance exercise its power to annul or amend an Act
of the Puerto Rican legislature, nor did it modify the relations of Puerto
Rico to the United States except progressively to extend self-government to
its people in response to their wishes. Even before 1948, the appointed
Governor ·of Puerto Rico was a Puerto Rican whose selection was recommended by the majority political party of the island. After 1948, the appointed Auditor and Justices of the Supreme Courts were Puerto Ricans, also
appointed with the recommendation and approval of the majority party.
This political history has been accompanied by a mutually beneficial
economic relationship. The people of Puerto Rico have received many services from the Government of the United States and have benefited by grantsin-aid. Puerto Ricans have not been subject to the payment of taxes and
have been entirely free of imposts, duties or any form of exactions for the
support of the Federal Government. At all times since the turn of the century we have enjoyed free trade with the United States, and since 1917 we
have had the benefit of common citizenship. Despite the fact that our population has grown from 953,000 inhabitants in 1900 to 2,219,000 in 1950, our
standard of living has substantially increased. For example, the average per
capita income in 1930 was $122.00 as compared with $319.00 in 1950.
The people of Puerto Rico have been keenly aware of our basic economic problems due to the density of population and the poverty of natural
resources. We are proud of the progress that we have made and are continuing to make by the utilization of our own talents and our democratic
institutions. This progress would have been impossible, however, if it had
not been for the sympathetic cooperation of the United States, manifested
in a wide variety of ways, material and political. We have been helped in
building sounder social and educational bases for the exercise of our political
rights and for our own economic advancement. Our joint efforts in combatting illiteracy and improving health conditions have produced remarkable results. In 1900 the literacy rate in Puerto Rico was 20 per cent as
compared to 78 per cent in 1950; and in the same period the death rate has
dropped from 25.3 per thousand to IO per thousand.
Although the relationship was one of freedom and justice in practice,
the people of Puerto Rico were not satisfied to remain in a status which appeared to reflect the imposition upon a people of the will of another community. We are proud of our culture and background, and we cherish our
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individual dignity and our common heritage. We profoundly believe that
our government should be solidly based upon our own will and our own free
choice. Accordingly, for some years, as our democratic institutions developed
and became firmly established, the people considered and debated the matter
of their status.
Specifically, the people of Puerto Rico discussed three choices: independence, statehood within the Federal Union, or association with the
United States as a free Commonwealth. At no time did we consider that
our choice was restricted, or that any alternative was foreclosed to us or
could not be achieved by peaceful means; and it should be said that at no
time did the United States attempt, directly or indirectly, to interfere with
our choice. On the contrary, President Truman said in a message to the
Congress as long ago as October 1945,
"It is the settled policy of this Government to promote the
political, social, and economic development of people who have not
yet attained full self-government and eventually to make it possible
for them to determine their own form of government• 0 • It is
now time, in my opinion, to ascertain from the people of Puerto
Rico their wishes as to the ultimate status which they prefer, and,
within such limits as may be determined by the Congress, to grant
to them the kind of government which they desire."

And in his message to the Congress in January 1946, he said,
"This Government is committed to the democratic principle
that it is for the dependent peoples themselves to decide what their
status shall be."
Each of the alternatives of independence, statehood, and association has
been represented in Puerto Rico by a political party which favored it, and
which actively campaigned for the support of the electorate and nominated
candidates for the legislature and the governorship. In the 1948 elections the
three alternatives were fully presented to the electorate by the three main
political parties. The preference of the people, expressed in an election
which was as democratic as any in the world, was unmistakably expressed in
favor of the third alternative: a free Commonwealth associated with the
United States on the basis of mutual consent. Their choice is aptly summed
up in the Spanish name of the new body politic, "Estado Libre Asociado."
It was at the request of the officials of the Puerto Rican government
acting pursuant to the mandate of the people that the Congress of the
United States initiated the series of actions which resulted in the creation of
the Commonwealth. On July 3, 1950, the 81st Congress enacted Public Law
600. This was, in effect, an offer by the Congress to the people of Puerto
Rico, which we might accept or reject, to enter into a compact defining the
status of Puerto Rico and the relationships between the respective com-
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mumues. The compact offered the people of Puerto Rico an opportunity
to establish our own government and to remain in association with the
United States on defined terms. It was the precise formula that the people,
through their elected representatives, had requested.
According to its terms, Public Law 600 was submitted to the qualified
voters of Puerto Rico in a referendum held on June 4, 1951 after months of
intensive debate. The Law was accepted by the people of Puerto Rico by a
vote of 387,016 to 119,169. Sixty-five per cent of the eligible voters participated in the referendum. In this as in all elections in Puerto Rico, all
citizens of at least 21 years of age, male or female, without property or
literacy requirements, were entitled to vote.
After acceptance of Law 600, a Constitutional Convention was elected
on August 27, 1951 in an election where all the qualified voters had the
right to participate. The Convention met at San Juan on September 17,
1951 and proceeded to draft a Constitution. On February 6, 1952 it approved the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico which it had
drafted, by a vote of 88 to 3. On March 3, 1952 the qualified voters of
Puerto Rico again went to the polls to express approval or disapproval of
the Constitution drafted by the Convention. The Constitution was ratified
in this referendum by a vote of 373,594 in favor of approval and 82,877
against approval.
Pursuant to the Provisions of the Compact, the Congress of the United
States on July 3, 1952, approved the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico. On July 11, 1952, the Constitutional Convention of Puerto
Rico by resolution accepted amendments proposed by the Congress and took
the final step in ratifying the Constitution of the Commonwealth. The
Commonwealth was duly installed on July 25, 1952, and the flag of Puerto
Rico was raised beside the flag of the United States.
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, therefore, represents the government that the people of Puerto Rico have freely adopted. It reflects our
own decision as to the type of institutions and the kind of relationship to
the United States which we desire. There can be no doubt that in the full
sense of the term, in form as well as in fact, the people of Puerto Rico are
now self-governing. We have chosen our institutions and relationship with
the United States. We have determined the nature and distribution of the
powers of government. We have created our own Constitution under which
we established our own government, the nature of which is described in
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution as follows:
"The government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall
be republican in form and its legislative, judicial and executive
branches as established by this Constitution shall be equally subordinate to the sovereignty of the people of Puerto Rico."
Under this Constitution, of course, all of our officials are either elected by
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the people or are appointed by officials whom we elect. The legislative
power of the Commonwealth under the compact and the Constitution essentially parallels that of the state governments. The laws enacted by the
Government of the Commonwealth pursuant to the compact cannot be
repealed or modified by external authority, and their effect and validity are
subject to adjudication by the courts. Our status and the terms of our association with the United States cannot be changed without our full consent.
The people of Puerto Rico are firm supporters of the United Nations,
and this great organization may confidently rely upon us for a continuation
of that good will. The Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
will be ready at all times to cooperate with the United States in seeking to
advance the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Sincerely yours,
LUIS MU:lil'OZ MARIN
Governor
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
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